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Abstract 
In this research I employ an interdisciplinary approach in order to theorize the experience 
of Being Transsexual and to reflect upon current debates in critical social psychology 
about such notions as `self, `identity' and `embodied subjectivity'. Seven male-to-female 
and seven female-to-male individuals who identified as either transsexual or 
transgendered took part in three in-depth interviews that explored their experiences of 
gender transition. A pluralistic methodological approach, drawing upon the principles of 
discourse analysis and phenomenology, was used to analyse the interviews. I argue that 
whilst Cartesian dualist constructions of transsexualism regulate the binary gender system 
they fail to account for the complex process of identifications which the transsexual 
subject has to negotiate. Transsexual subjects are never completely free from their past 
experiences, past selves, past relationships or previous practices of embodiment. To 
varying degrees, these all undermine any new-found sense of gender confirmation. 
Consequently, I argue that Being Transsexual entails the ongoing process of becoming 
`male' or `female'. In a move towards a theory of embodied subjectivity, it is suggested 
that any transition in subjective experiences of gender is intrinsically tied to and 
inseparable from shifts in gendered embodiment. Finally, I argue that affiliations between 
transgendered and gay and lesbian communities should be strengthened in order to 
challenge the regulatory practices of heterosexual normativity, thus enabling individuals 
to live more ambiguous modes of gendered subjectivity. 
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Introductory Overview 
A movement for change lives in feelings, actions and words 
Adrienne Rich, The Politics of Location, (1986: 223). 
Theoretical accounts in the field of transsexualism can be broadly classified into two 
major categories. The first is clinical in its approach, encompassing medical, psychiatric 
and psychological research that perceives transsexualism as a syndrome, subject to 
treatment and observation. The second approach has a more socio-cultural outlook, in that 
it is principally concerned with the relationship transsexualism has to the culture at large 
(Bolin, 1988). However, whether focusing on the etiology (Stoller, 1975), or analyzing 
transsexualism in a quest to understand how gender is socially constructed (Kessler & 
McKenna, 1985), transsexuals have been increasingly theorized and studied in an effort 
to understand the broader categories of sex and gender. 
Traditionally gender has been used to distinguish psychological, social and cultural 
aspects of maleness and femaleness (Kessler & McKenna, 1985). Within this context, it is 
now widely agreed that there are two sexes, defined in terms of the anatomical body - 
male and female - and two genders, defined in terms of personality traits and behaviours - 
masculine ' or feminine - which are often seen as socially constructed. Yet, in most 
attempts to distinguish between `sex' and `gender', there is an assumption that `sex' is 
somehow prior to gender - the biological bedrock upon which gender differences are 
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constructed (Kitzinger, 1994). Alternative perspectives are provided however, particularly 
from those working within a poststructuralist or Foucauldian framework. These studies 
challenge the `truth' of the Western belief that there are two, and only two, biological 
sexes, suggesting that the `reality effect' of this belief has been produced by powerful 
medical and scientific discourses (see Butler, 1990; Laqueur 1990). 
Harry Benjamin first coined the term `Transsexualism' in 1953. It is unusual because it 
names the method of treatment and rehabilitation rather than the syndrome -a syndrome 
for which there is no known cause. Without a known cause, transsexualism is open to 
self-definition through personal suffering. Physicians, however, have constructed their 
own criteria of symptoms that an individual must fulfill before they will accept their self- 
defined condition. From an extensive literature review, Roberto (1983) concluded that 
symptoms required for a clinical definition of transsexualism included: 
... the 
belief that one is a member of the opposite sex... dressing and behaving 
in the opposite gender role... perceiving oneself as heterosexual although 
sexual partners are anatomically identical... repugnance for one's own 
genitals and the wish to transform them. .. and a persistent 
desire for 
conversion surgery (Roberto, 1983: 446-447). 
In fact, the demand for surgery is often regarded as inherent in the clinical definition of 
transsexualism (Hoenig, 1982). Thus, the clinical literature may attempt to provide a 
classification system or an etiologic basis for transsexualism, but at the same time it also 
creates `meanings' or `stories' that constitute the transsexual experience (Plummer, 
1995). Influenced by Foucault's History of Sexuality (1981), Chapter Two provides a 
historical overview of psychiatric and medical accounts of homosexuality and 
transvestism that pre-empted the emergence of a transsexual subject. The subsequent 
tensions between transsexual individuals and the clinical establishment over diagnostic 
criteria and access to surgery are then discussed in the light of the influence of 
transgender politics. 
However, this is not the only field where this creation of `meanings' or `stories' takes 
place. A transsexual identity is also constructed by the discourses that evolve from others 
who have gone through the same reassignment process. As transsexual individuals' own 
accounts become more available, whether through autobiography, newspaper articles or 
television documentaries, transsexual subjectivity has emerged as an increasingly 
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recognized site for the meeting of various discourses. Here, the term subjectivity is used 
in the same sense outlined by the authors of Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social 
Regulation and Subjectivity: 
We use `subjectivity' to refer to individuality and self-awareness - the 
condition of being a subject - but understand in this usage that subjects are 
dynamic and multiple, always positioned in relation to discourses and 
practices and produced by these - the condition of being a subject 
(Henriques et al., 1984: 3). 
Thus, media coverage provides a fertile culturally located site where discourses 
concerning the nature and status of transsexualism can circulate between academic 
literature, transsexual individuals' subjective accounts and lay interpretations. 
1.1 Transsexualism: A sign of the times 
The historical timing for the presentation of this thesis is of considerable importance. 
Writing at the beginning of the new millennium, in the aftermath of the stylized 
apocalyptic angst that peaked during the final few years of the last century, we can begin 
to engage with some of the questions that were raised about the changing nature of sex, 
gender, and embodiment. From Baudrillard's lamentation that "we are all transsexuals" 
(1992: 20) to the warm welcoming of the same notion by some queer theorists (e. g. 
Halberstam, 1994), it is suggested that transsexualism is a sign of the times. Yet, given 
that the number of transsexuals in the UK is currently estimated at only somewhere 
between two and three thousand (Press for Change, 2000), the exponential interest in the 
phenomenon is somewhat surprising. Transsexuals are the stalwarts of day time chat 
shows. From the tame UK based versions such as Tricia, to the nightmarish freak show 
style of The Jerry Springer Show, whilst 18 million viewers tuned in to watch the much 
loved Hayley of Coronation Street attempt to marry her beau, Roy. It seems that we are 
endlessly fascinated by the phenomenon transsexualism whilst we also abhor it. Why are 
some transsexuals, like the character Hayley, seemingly so accepted, whilst others, like 
many of the guests on The Jerry Springer Show, rejected as freaks? Perhaps the different 
readings have something to do with the overall harmony with, or disruption of, the 
familiar cultural and symbolic markers of gender. Hayley presents no threat to the socio- 
cultural references imbued in femininity: she works in a cafe, she wants to be married, 
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she wants to have children and, crucially, she looks like a woman. Hayley conforms to 
the hegemony of heteronormativity. She can only be read as a heterosexual, feminine 
woman. Unlike the plight of many male-to-female transsexuals, Hayley is never misread, 
her physical appearance never undoes the cultural practices of a female embodiment - the 
character is, after all, played by a woman. 
Transsexualism opens up the possibility of change: a flight of fantasy into a newly 
embodied self; the temptation of eradicating a past sense of self; becoming someone you 
were not (Foucault, 1988); `being a new person' (see Chapter Six). In postmodern 
accounts of gender mutation, it is argued that medical advances in intricate surgical 
procedures have produced new `technologies of self' hich emphasizes the plasticity of 
bodies. We need no longer to be sexed, we are cyborgs, monsters, transsexuals 
(Haraway, 1990). But, in this thesis it will be argued that we are still very much gendered 
beings, both overly attached to and ambivalent about our gendered selves, and that our 
bodies are not always malleable to our desired presentation. 
With the fin de siecle in mind, Rita Felski (1996: 27) posed two questions: `What is the 
connection between discourses of the end of history and the end of sex? ' and `How do 
our cultural imaginings of historical time relate to changing perceptions of the meaning 
and nature of gender difference? ' She attempts to address these questions by contrasting 
`transsexual' as metaphor in the work of Jean Baudrillard (1993) and `transgender' as 
metaphor in Donna Haraway's (1990) hybrid symbol `the cyborg'. 
Certainly, the terms `transsexual' and `transgender' have a complex relationship with one 
another. Transgender is more recent in conception than transsexual, and one that is 
historically free from the medical pathologizing of a perverse sexual identity. However, 
at times they are used interchangeably, although some theorists may attempt to define 
transgender as distinct from transsexual, or as an umbrella term that may include 
transsexual. Richard Ekins and Dave King (1999) provide perhaps the most detailed 
explanation of the complex ways in which the term `transgender' is employed. They 
discerned four positions: 
Virginia Prince pioneered the term `transgenderist' and `transgenderal' 
(Prince, 1976: 145) to refer to people who lived full-time in the gender 
opposite to their biological sex, but did not seek sex/gender re-assignment 
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surgery. Richard Ekins established the Trans-Gender Archive, at the 
University of Ulster, in 1986 (Ekins, 1988). The term was chosen to provide 
an umbrella concept which avoided such medical categories as transsexual 
and transvestite; which included the widest possible range of transgender 
phenomena; and which took the sociological view that aspects of sex, 
sexuality and gender (not just gender), including the binary divide, all have 
socially constructed components. Not long afterwards, the `transgender 
community' came to be used as an umbrella term to include transsexuals, 
transvestites, transgenderists, drag queens and so on, as well as (in some 
uses) to include their partners and friends and professional providers. Most 
recently, the term came to presuppose a radical edge - to refer to the 
transgressive nature of transgendering, as in Boswell's (1997: 54) view that 
`[T]ransgender has to do with reinventing and realising oneself more fully 
outside of the current systems of gender' (1999: 581) 
Given the sheer scope of this concept it must be acknowledged that when theorists, or 
individuals, refer to transgender identity they may be meaning different things and, 
unfortunately, the subtlety they may be alluding to is not always made apparent. 
However, Ekins and King take a more flexible and inclusive stance where 
"transgendering refers BOTH to the idea of moving across (transferring) from one pre- 
existing gender category to the other (either temporarily or permanently), AND to the 
idea of transcending or living `beyond gender' altogether" (1999: 581-582). 
For the purpose of this thesis, I focus on and primarily employ the term `transsexual'. I 
do this because when I began the research I embarked on an enquiry into transsexual 
subjectivity, working within a stricter definition of `transsexualism' influenced by the 
clinical accounts that defined `transsexual' in terms of having begun, or completed, 
transition to live full-time in the other gender (Bockting & Coleman, 1992). However, I 
was interested in sexual orientation identifications other than heterosexual (see Roberto, 
1983). Thus, I simply set my criterion as having started hormone replacement therapy 
(see Chapter Four for a more detailed discussion). It was only later in the research 
process that I discovered how difficult it was to draw a clear distinction between the two 
`trans' identities, particularly when thirteen of the fourteen participants fitted neatly into 
my definition of `transsexual' and yet many strongly resisted using this term to describe 
themselves. Instead, some preferred to identify as `transgendered', which challenged my 
previous conception of that term as merely a gender performance that did not involve 
hormonal or surgical intervention. Hence, the relationship between the participants 
deployment of `transsexual' and `transgender' identifications along with the processes of 
negotiating other gendered identities will be addressed in Chapter Five. This is not to 
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suggest that any conclusions can be drawn in an attempt to distinguish between their 
occasions of use. But, the ways in which the participants interchangeably draw upon and 
resist these identities will be explored to illustrate their complex relationship to each 
other and lack of mutual exclusivity. 
Rita Felski, however, attempts to investigate the relationship between historical 
specificity and the recent proliferation of images of transsexualism and transgender 
within some postmodern and poststructuralist thought. Felski sees "the figure of 
transsexuality or transgenderism as the site of deeply invested and symbolically charged 
rewritings of history and time" (1996: 346). She provides evidence for this by 
juxtaposing Jean Baudillard's nightmarish vision of an epidemic of signification with 
Donna Haraway's celebration and welcoming of the promise of a transgender metaphor. 
Baudrillard ponders "what fascinates us in the apparition of the transsexual; it is the 
fading out... of sexual difference" (1992: 13). Furthermore, he suggests that in the 
aftermath of the sexual revolution: 
... the 
liberation of sex will have had the effect of sending everybody on a 
quest for their "gender, " their generic and sexual identity, with fewer and 
fewer possible answers given the circulation of signs and the multiplicity of 
pleasures. It is thus that we suddenly became transsexuals (1992: 21). 
We are all transsexuals. Felski argues that Baudrillard's pessimism is exacerbated by 
what he sees as feminists' attempts to accelerate this confusion by contesting what was 
once viewed as an inescapable biological destiny of being male or female in terms of 
rights and preferences. Consequently, "we have become `indifferent and undifferentiated 
beings, androgynous and hermaphroditic' (TE 25), creatures without gender and hence 
without sex" (Felski, 1996: 339). In contrast, Donna Haraway, whilst agreeing with 
Baudrillard that there has been a radical transformation of social relations precipitated by 
cybernetics, biotechnological innovations, and the omnipresent dissemination of media 
networks, envisages new and inconceivable possibilities in hybrid gender identities. As 
Felski states, Haraway: 
... argues that old oppositions of masculine and feminine, along with their 
corollary distinctions of private versus public, mind versus body, culture 
versus nature, no longer hold in the new world system (1996: 340). 
Felski suggests that the type of questioning of sexual difference offered by Haraway may 
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aid the "generation of new feminist stories of possible futures, fueling imaginative 
projections and new worlds and alternative genealogies" (1996: 346). But, as Felski quite 
rightly points out, the universalizing conception that "we are all transsexuals" 
homogenizes differences that have political consequences. Namely, "the differences 
between men and women, the difference between those who occasionally play with the 
trope of transsexuality and those others for whom it is a matter of life or death" (Felski, 
1996: 347). 
Thus, since the early 1990's transsexualism has remained a hotly contested site of 
cultural inscription (Stone, 1991). Certainly, in the stances provided by Baudrillard and 
Haraway there are widely diverging views as to whether the proliferation of images of 
the transsexual/transgender subject should be mourned or celebrated. And yet, central to 
these interpretations is the question of why now. In Chapter Three, I trace the emergence 
of interest in transsexualism from a socio-cultural perspective. I follow the shifts in 
gender theory from a feminist critique of the sex/gender distinction (e. g. Gatens, 1983; 
Martin, 1991) to the emergence of queer theory, epitomized in the work of Judith Butler 
(1990; 1993). Following Jay Prosser (1998: 5), it is argued that `queer studies has made 
the transgendered subject'. It is the level of investment in transgender, in gender 
ambiguity, that has produced such a widespread interest in the transgendered and 
transsexual subject. Felski (1996) outlines one example of the metaphorical signification 
`transgender' can hold in the accounts of feminists and cultural theorists. Others have 
investigated more broadly the differing questions which `transgender' poses for gender 
relations, considering whether or not `transgender' reinstates or transgresses a binary 
gender system (e. g. Raymond, 1994; Wilton, 2000). Yet, within these theoretical debates, 
the embodied subjectivity and individual experiences of those who identify as 
transsexual or transgendered are often lost (Ruben, 1998). More recently, we have seen 
the beginnings of a new discipline, `trans-studies', which attempts to rectify this anomaly 
and where investments are heightened as many of those who engage are themselves 
transgendered. This study forms part of that process. Thus, I hope to build upon and 
enrich some of these theoretical compositions by conducting an empirical study that 
focuses on the qualitative accounts of those whose lived experience is as transsexual. 
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1.2 Methodological considerations 
In the style of Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna (1985), a further aim of this 
research is to engage with theoretical conceptions of `sex' and `gender' through an 
analytical account of the social and cultural aspects of transsexualism. This endeavour 
should also enable the thesis to make original contributions to the recent and growing 
debate on new ways to study notions such as 'self', `identity' and `embodiment'. This 
second facet is underpinned by an increasingly voiced need to move beyond a discourse 
analytic methodology which fails to fully account for subjectivity (e. g. Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987), and fails to address the "inherently embodied nature of discourse itself" 
(Sampson, 1998: 24). Extracting the multiple and contradictory discourses that a 
transsexual individual draws upon and positions their experience within will provide an 
interesting insight into the cultural discourses that are available to make sense of the 
social world at this particular moment in time. It will not, however, tell us why these 
individuals position themselves within the discourses that constitute a transsexual 
identity. Of course, the question of why is outside the remit of the current project, maybe 
even a lifetime's work. But, the thesis will contribute to methodological developments 
that take discourse analysis beyond the presentation of a snapshot of transsexual 
experience and the evidencing of the socially constructed nature of gender. This is 
achieved by approaching the project from an `embodied standpoint' (Csordas, 1999), 
drawing upon phenomenological perspectives alongside a poststructuralist informed 
analysis. In addition, Hollway & Jefferson's (2000) notion of the defended subject is 
utilized to offer an explanation for why some participants may hold on ferociously to 
particular subject positions in order to fend off anxiety and sustain their sense of gendered 
being. Thus, the methodology incorporates an eclectic and hopefully rich range of 
perspectives. These issues are addressed in Chapter Four. 
1.3 Beyond discourse: theorizing transsexual embodied subjectivity 
In the initial stages of this research project a wide scale collection of media accounts of 
transsexualism was conducted. The aim was critically to evaluate media based accounts 
of transsexualism, documenting how they represent and construct some of the versions of 
transsexual experience that are explored in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. Here, the term 
`media' is used in a very broad sense to group together textual and visual materials that 
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circulate in the public sphere. I specifically drew upon: newspaper articles taken from the 
mainstream and gay press; transsexuals political group Press for Change's campaign 
material; alongside a detailed analysis of a television documentary, Heart of the Matter: 
More Sexes Please (1997). These were analyzed using the principles of discourse 
analysis (see Chapter Four) and the findings were presented in several conference papers 
(Johnson, 1998; 1999; 2000). However, during the course of the research a shift in 
emphasis away from simply isolating and documenting instances of particular discourses 
to creating a more nuanced account of transsexual embodied subjectivity necessitated a 
re-focusing of the thesis and its layout. Thus, a taster of the types of representations of 
transsexualism found in media accounts are provided here as a backdrop to the central 
research aims subsequently formulated, rather than appearing as a main tenet of the 
dissertation itself. 
Norman Fairclough (1995) argues that analysis of media language should be recognized 
as a weighty component of any research on contemporary processes of social and 
cultural change. Certainly, the power of the media to create specific versions of a `truth' 
should not be underestimated. As he states: 
The wider social impact of the media is not just to do with how they 
selectively represent the world, though that is a vitally important issue; it is 
also to do with what sorts of social identities, what versions of 'self', they 
project and what cultural values (be it consumerism, individualism or a cult 
of personality) these entail (1995: 17). 
In the case of transsexualism media representations tend to be sensationalist, rather than 
informative about a complex phenomenon or a marginalized group. For example, this is 
not an unusual headline for stories featuring transsexuals: 
Prisoners to have sex swaps on the NHS (Geraint Smith, Evening 
Standard, 12 March 1999). 
Taken from the Evening Standard, with its right-wing editorial, this front-page headline 
is underpinned by a moral code that both suggests reassignment surgery is a waste of 
NHS funds and that `criminals' are even more unworthy of these resources. However, 
this type of headline is always over-shadowed by the crassness of those that 
predominantly appear in The Sun. Here, with the obligatory and basic rhyme in place, is 
just one of many examples: 
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Blonde Was Once A Balding Fella: Tory turncoat Shaun Woodward's 
sister used to be a mister (Victor Chapple, The Sun, 20 December, 1999). 
Yet, the most familiar representation of transsexualism is the Cartesian dualist notion of 
`being born in the wrong body'. The pervasiveness of this aphorism in transsexuals' 
narrative accounts is illustrated in Chapter Five. However, within media based stories 
this construction of transsexualism tends to be headlined in its more sensationalist form 
of being `trapped in the wrong body'. For example: 
Trapped! Trucker must wait two years for sex change op (Andrew 
Wright, Swanage Advertiser, 29 July 1999). 
Torn in the wrong body' can be found in almost all media accounts, but it tends to 
appear further into the text once the reader's attention has been caught, often in quotes, 
when the subject of the article is being cited. For example, in an interview with Jackie 
from the docu-soap Paddington Green, she was cited lamenting: 
I was cheated by mother nature. I was in the wrong body, unhappy, and 
throughout my teens there seemed no way out... All those years I just 
imagined I was trapped like that for the rest of my life (Michael Burke, The 
Mail on Sunday, 10 January 1999). 
In this thesis it is argued that whilst a Cartesian dualist explanation for the experience of 
being transsexual may reflect the disembodied feelings of those who identify as 
transsexual (Prosser, 1998 see Chapter Five), it also has the effect of regulating a binary 
gender system, reinforcing and reinstating a polarized two gender system. This argument 
is not new. In fact, `the medical construction of transsexualism' is frequently charged 
with this type of complaint by many who engage conceptually with the phenomenon 
(e. g. Billings & Urban, 1995; Hausman, 1995). For example, Judith Lorber argues: 
"Transvestites and transsexuals do not challenge the social construction of gender. Their 
goal is to be masculine men and feminine women" (1995: 20-21). However, more 
significantly, I also argued that whilst the deployment of a Cartesian dualist discourse 
attempts to validate the transsexual subject's claim to be `man' or `woman', it does not 
provide a comprehensive account able to explain the complex web of gender 
identifications the transsexual has to negotiate during the formation of transsexual 
embodied subjectivity (see Chapter Five). 
11 
Despite the dependency upon the construction `born in the wrong body' within media 
sources we can, however, occasionally find within them more complex accounts of 
transsexual subjectivity. As the media becomes increasingly `conversationalized' 
(Fairclough, 1995: 9), more nuanced representations of transsexual experience are 
beginning to emerge. For example, we saw Jackie from Paddington Green describing 
herself as being `born in the wrong body', but in a second and more detailed interview 
that also appeared in The Mail on Sunday, Jackie expanded upon this explanation. The 
somewhat unsympathetic interviewer, Marianne MacDonald, wrote: 
But when I asked if she had thought that she had been born in the wrong 
body, she said it wasn't that simple. `As time has gone on, I've realised, yes, 
I was born in the wrong body, but I was born in this body, this little boy's 
body. And I had to take that on board. I can't blank that out. 
`So I can't really go round saying I'm a fully-fledged woman because, 
for one I'd be lying to myself, and secondly, I wouldn't be dealing with the 
way it's all worked out. So I've really tried to incorporate my past, this 
person that I use to be, this young lad. And I have to keep looking back and 
thinking: this person existed and, yes, he was a little boy and he was very 
unhappy, but Jackie's here and it's better now. ' 
This sounds a bit scary -- like Psycho -- but she says it isn't, `because it's 
basically coming to terms with your past' (The Mail on Sunday, 16 May 
1999). 
Unfortunately, the interviewer cannot resist an easy quip. This `pathologizing' reference 
to Psycho repositions the transsexual subject as `freak', `mad', `weird' and all the other 
connotations that can be wrung out from such a remark. Yet, to me, Jackie's attempt to 
grapple with her past history that was spent as a boy seems far more understandable than 
suggesting that her pre-formed gendered self was somehow spirited into the wrong 
physical shell. But, perhaps, in a culture dominated by heterosexist and heteronormative 
hegemonies, where everyone is expected to physically manifest and adhere to the 
appropriate signifying system for one, and only one, gender in a two gender model, the 
notion that a transsexual woman could admit to having, at one time, been male may be 
too disturbing. 
Thus, in order to present a complex and compelling account of the experience of Being 
Transsexual, I break away from the more established notion of theorizing transsexualism 
conceptually that tends to dominate most feminists' and queer theorists' engagement 
with the phenomenon (e. g. Raymond, 1980; Lorber, 1995; Hausman, 1995; Wilton, 
2000). Of course, medical discourses of transsexualism do have the effect of attempting 
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to regulate the binary gender. However, detailed research into transgender phenomena 
that is sensitive to the lived experiences of transsexual and transgendered people will 
reveal that the material grounding of their new gender experiences can also unravel the 
certainty of particular pervasive discourses. The notion of `changing sex' does help to 
regulate a binary gender system, but the subsequent state of gender ambiguity in which 
many transsexuals reside, exemplified through the risk of not `passing', challenges, 
threatens and undoes gender certainty for us all. However, Tamsin Wilton (2000) prefers 
to stay within the more conventional realms of discourse. In Out/Performing Our Selves, 
she begins by professing that: 
... this article 
is not `about' transsexual people, but about medicalized 
discourses of MTF transsex and, although I recognize that such discourses 
both produce and are produced by transpeople, it is the discourses 
themselves and their wider effects on the gendered politics of sexuality that 
I am interrogating (Wilton, 2000: 237, emphasis in original) 
But, we might question the usefulness of isolating a specific set of discourses for 
understanding `the gendered politics of sexuality', particularly when attention to other 
discourses and material practices could easily unpick or counteract the claimed effects. 
Seemingly aware of this, Wilton goes on to note: 
It is important to acknowledge that claims of `being in the wrong body' 
mark only one strand of the many which currently characterize the 
transsexual/transgender experience. In recent years the performativities of 
those for whom attributed sex is at odds with their sense of self have 
proliferated beyond the always-fragile bounds of the medical model of 
trans-sex, to incorporate gender-transience, blurring and other 
transitionalities. Such strategies... do not concern me here (Wilton, 2000: 
238) 
Similarly, her "focus also excludes female-to-male trajectories, although FTM accounts 
complicate the politics of sexuality in intriguing ways" (2000: 238). Thus, the problem 
with Wilton's account for those of us who are interested in moving beyond conceptual 
accounts of transsexualism is obvious. Whilst she acknowledges that transsexual 
subjectivity is not simply produced by medical discourses, she continually fails to engage 
with those aspects of `trans' experience that will disturb the professed effects of medical 
discourses upon the politics of gendered sexuality. It is precisely the complexities and 
inconsistencies in the narrated accounts of male-to-female and female-to-male 
transsexuals that have the ability to unsettle the medical discourses that attempt to 
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regulate the binary gender system and heteronormativity. Hence, whilst Wilton focuses 
upon the medical discourses of transsexualism rather than `transsexual people', as if they 
could be anything else, I incorporate aspects found in accounts of transsexual embodied 
subjectivity that materially ground and often limit gender transgression. 
Thus, in this thesis I argue that Cartesian dualist constructions of transsexualism are over 
simplistic and fail to account for the processes of identification the transsexual has to 
negotiate. These discursive constructions promulgate the notion that selfhood is 
somehow separate from the material body and located only within the structures of the 
mind. Yet, these participants are transsexual precisely because of the changes that have 
been made to their physical bodies. To be `transsexual', by definition, necessitates a 
move from one gendered being to the other. However, Cartesian dualism is generally a 
more `acceptable' account because it also serves to reinstate and regulate the binary 
gender system of either male/masculine, or female/feminine, where brain `sex' and body 
`sex' should match. It also permits a means for circumventing the minefield of discursive 
positions and identificationary practices the transsexual subject has to surmount (Elliot & 
Roen, 1998). 
Secondly, I begin to engage with the necessary task of theorizing tran ssexual 
embodiment. I do this by not only attending to the complex identifications and 
positionings transsexuals have to negotiate when trying to explain their gendered 
subjectivity, but by also including an account of gendered subjectivity as an integrated 
process of formation, intrinsically tied to new presentations of corporeality. As such, I 
argue that radical shifts in gendered subjectivity cannot take place simply through the 
repositioning of a female identity within the discourses of masculinity, or a male identity 
within the discourses of femininity. Instead, it entails an embodied transition mediated 
through varying degrees of hormonal and surgical intervention. Inevitably, it can take 
many years before the hormones create the desired physical changes and the cultural 
practices that signify the new gender identity are learnt. Equally, the past, a past sense of 
self, past physicality and previous cultural practices of gendered embodiment do not 
always permit a secure attachment to the new gender identity. As Adam Phillips suggests 
"the past influences everything and dictates nothing" (1999: 29). Hence, I propose that 
Being Transsexual involves an ongoing process of becoming male or female. 
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Finally, after documenting the close theoretical relationship between gender and 
sexuality in both clinical (see Chapter Two) and socio-cultural accounts (see Chapter 
Three), the ways in which the participants' sexual orientation and sexual relationships 
impact upon ambivalence towards and anxiety about their gender identifications are 
discussed in Chapter Seven. Here, I argue that affiliations between transgendered and 
gay and lesbian communities based upon mutual rejection of heteronormative 
hegemonies will prove more politically rewarding than the current battles over identity 
borderlines which tend to plague already marginalized groups. The final chapter brings 
together all the strands of the thesis in order to make its concluding points. 
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2 
Clinical Perspectives: Critical reflections on the conception and 
treatment of transsexualism 
Patients whose subjective histories are subsumed under the unifying 
rhetoric of transsexualism win operations but no language adequate to 
express the disparate and diverse desires which lead them to body 
mutilation. These remain private, inchoate, unspeakable 
Dwight B. Billings & Thomas Urban, The Socio-Medical 
Construction of Transsexualism, (1995: 112). 
It is a well-established premise that the introduction to any psychological report or thesis 
follows a standard approach that aims to advance the understanding of scientific 
knowledge. This approach involves an in-depth coverage of existing literature, pointing 
out weaknesses and gaps in both theoretical and empirical understanding, which the 
proposed study then attempts to fill (Kitzinger, 1987). Celia Kitzinger offers an 
alternative approach in her book The Social Construction of Lesbianism. Rather than 
addressing the more traditional enquiry "What does the literature tell us about 
homosexuality? " she posed the questions "What can we learn from the literature about 
the construction of social scientific accounts? " and "What can we learn from the 
literature about attempts to manage and control homosexuality? " (1987: 1). In this 
chapter, this theoretical approach is employed and applied to the study of transsexualism. 
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So, instead of taking the category `transsexual' as given, I also follow the pioneering 
work of Ken Plummer who asked "does the `category' mirror or construct the 
phenomenon? " (1981: 75). Thirdly, I draw on the work of Dave King (1981; 1993; 1995), 
who illustrated the significance of the theoretical and empirical endeavour of establishing 
the socially constructed nature of transvestism and transsexualism. 
1.1 Setting the scene: The early sexologists 
The term `transsexual' was reportedly first used in 1949 by D. O. Cauldwell in a paper 
"Psychopathia transsexualis", which presented the case of a young girl who wanted to 
change sex (MacKenzie, 1994). However, a transsexual identity, as it is commonly 
perceived today, was not conceptualized until the widely publicized case of Christine 
Jorgensen (1953), and the medical response of Harry Benjamin (1953; 1966), Richard 
Green and John Money (1969), and Robert Stoller (1975). Notwithstanding, the roots of 
this identity can be traced back to the work of sexologists at the turn of the last century. 
By the close of the 19th Century, there had begun what Michel Foucault described as the 
`medicalisation of the sexually peculiar' (Foucault, 1979: 44). Central to Foucault's 
historical analysis of the genealogy of `sexuality' was the creation of a homosexual 
identity. As he states: `[T]he sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual 
was now a species' (1979: 43). Running parallel to this was a growing interest in cross- 
dressing and cross-gendered behaviour. Pauly (1992), in a historical overview, cites the 
first description of cross-gender behaviour in the medical literature by Friedreich in 1830. 
This was followed by subsequent German sexologists using terms like `the contrary 
sexual feeling' (Westphal, 1869) and `metamorphosis sexualis paranoia' (Krafft-Ebing, 
1877). However, it was the work of Magnus Hirschfeld and Havelock Ellis that pushed 
the study of cross-gender behaviour into the scientific arena. Whilst Ellis referred to 
cross-dressing as `eonism', famously named after the 18th Century aristocrat Cavalier 
d'Eon, it was the term `transvestite', taken from Hirschfeld's Die Transvestiten (1910) 
that was embraced by the English literature, and widely used to describe cases of cross- 
gender identity. 
Both these sexologists were concerned with separating the idea of transvestism from 
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homosexuality. Ellis originally employed the term `sexoaesthetic inversion' to describe 
an individual who felt like a person of the opposite sex and who, as far as possible, 
sought to adopt "the tastes, habits and dress of the opposite sex while the direction of the 
sexual impulse remains normal" (Ellis, 1920: 1-2). He later rejected this term in favour of 
eonism because he believed it was "too apt to arouse suggestions of homosexuality". 
Instead, he argued that "the majority of sexo-aesthetic inverts are not only without any 
tendency to sexual inversion but they feel a profound repugnance to that anomaly" (Ellis, 
1928: 102-3). In a similar vein, Hirschfeld defined `transvestism' as, "the impulse to 
assume the external garb of a sex which is not apparently that of the subject as indicated 
by the sexual organs" (quoted by Ellis, 1928: 13). He also drew a distinction between 
transvestism and homosexuality, criticizing Krafft-Ebing for perceiving transvestism as 
"nothing but a variant of homosexuality where as today we are in a position to say that 
transvestism is a condition that occurs independently and must be considered separate 
from any other sexual anomaly" (Hirschfeld, 1938: 188-9). 
Although united in their view that `eonism' and `transvestism' should be a separate 
category from homosexuality, there was some contention between Ellis and Hirschfeld's 
definitions of cross-gender behaviour. Dave King illustrates how Ellis's definition of the 
two main types of eonism comes very close to the distinction we have today, between 
transvestism and transsexualism: 
One, the most common kind in which the inversion is mainly confined to 
the sphere of clothing and another less common but more complete in 
which cross-dressing is regarded with comparative indifference but the 
subject so identifies himself with those of his physical and psychic traits 
which recall the opposite sex that he feels really to belong to that sex 
although he has no delusion regarding his anatomical conformation (Ellis, 
1928: 36: quoted in King, 1995: 82, emphasis in King). 
Ellis objected to Hirschfeld's term transvestite because it focused attention solely on 
cross-dressing behaviour, ignoring the `less common' element of eonism. Similarly, he 
rejected Hirschfeld's notion of `impulse of disguise' arguing that, in fact, the opposite 
was taking place. Rather than seeking disguise through adopting the attire of the opposite 
sex, the eonist "feels on the contrary that he has thereby become emancipated from a 
disguise and is at last real himself" (Ellis, 1920: 3). As we will later see, this definition 
confers closely with contemporary definitions of transsexualism. 
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Despite the authoritative approaches of Ellis and Hirschfeld, their work had little effect 
on mainstream medical literature, especially the literature available outside the German 
language. This was compounded by the persecution of the sexologist, Hirschfeld, at the 
beginning of the Nazi regime. Many files were destroyed, reportedly because they 
documented the cross-dressing of some leading Nazi officials (Benjamin, 1966), and 
Berlin, to put it mildly, no longer enjoyed the sexual liberalism that had taken place 
during the previous decade. Instead, by the Second World War, transvestism had become 
an established `perversion', steeped in pathologizing language, at least in the psychiatric 
field (King, 1995; Pauly, 1965). As has continued to be the case, when it came to 
establishing an etiological basis for cross-gender behaviour, the early sexologists were 
unclear and divided. Ellis favoured a biological theory although he was rather vague 
when it came to the specific mechanisms involved (King, 1995). An alternative 
explanation came from the psychoanalytic perspective, which both emphasized castration 
anxiety and the belief that homosexuality and transvestitism were somehow inherently 
linked by this `fundamental unconscious mechanism'. Otto Fenichel went on to argue 
that "the transvestite.. . has not 
been able to give up his belief in the phallic nature of 
women and, in addition, he has identified himself with the woman with a penis" 
(Fenichel, 1954: 168-169; quoted in King, 1995: 84). Although, there was little 
understanding of the etiology of this `perversion', some attempts were made to `cure' the 
transvestite - with both psychoanalytic and behaviouristic aversion therapy (Bockting & 
Coleman, 1992; King, 1981,1995) - but with little success. 
By the 1950's the idea of `changing sex' was not unknown. In an extensive literature 
review, Pauly (1965) cites sixteen cases of surgical intervention reported before the 
publication of the treatment given to Christine Jorgensen in 1953 (Hamburger, Sturup & 
Dahl-Iversion, 1953). The most frequently cited case of an early transsexual is Lili Elbe 
(e. g. Benjamin, 1966; Hoyer, 1933). However, this classification is ascribed 
retrospectively. At the time, Lili Elbe was depicted as a case of `sexual intermediacy' 
(Haire, introduction to Hoyer, 1933). In fact Christine Jorgensen, probably the most 
famous recipient of sex-reassignment treatment, was not diagnosed or described as a 
transsexual until after the completion of her surgery. This was because the category had 
not yet been fully conceptualized. 
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1.2 The emergence of transsexual identity 
As already suggested, Cauldwell (1949) first utilized the term `transsexual' in the paper 
"Psychopathia transsexualis", although later he employed the term `sex transmutationist' 
(1951) in reference to those who had a desire to change sex. Cauldwell was sympathetic 
towards transvestitism, which he described as a "personality quirk" (1949: 6), or a 
"harmless pastime of loveable eccentrics" (1949b: 20). His approach to those who 
actually wanted to change sex was not so embracing. He regarded them as "mentally 
unhealthy", the result of "an unfavourable childhood environment" and described the use 
of surgery as treatment as "criminal mutilation" (1949c cited in King, 1995: 86). 
However, a transsexual identity as it is commonly perceived today was not 
conceptualized until the widely publicized work of Harry Benjamin (1953; 1966). His 
work, alongside that of other prominent sexologists (e. g. Green & Money, 1969; Stoller, 
1975), had a huge impact upon how a transsexual identity was constructed through 
clinical and psychoanalytic theorizing. 
Harry Benjamin M. D. coined the term `transsexual' in 1953, and is frequently accredited 
with the title `father of transsexualism' (e. g.: Szasz, 1980; MacKenzie, 1994; Califia; 
1997). His article was issued in response to the widespread media coverage of Christine 
Jorgensen's sex reassignment operation in Denmark, as was the report made in the same 
year by the surgical team involved (Hamburger, Sturup & Dahl-Iverson, 1953). In his 
paper Benjamin argued for a distinction to be drawn between transvestites and 
transsexuals, such that: 
Transvestism... is the desire of a certain group of men to dress as women or 
women to dress as men. It can be powerful and over-whelming, even to the 
point of wanting to belong to the other sex and correct nature's anatomical 
`error'. For such cases the term transsexualism seems appropriate (1953: 
12). 
Despite the sensational publicity that surrounded the Jorgensen case pushing her into the 
new role of celebrity (Jorgensen, 1967), the coining of a new term did not result in an 
outburst of research and publications on the subject in the following decade (King, 1995). 
It was not until after the publications of The Transsexual Phenomenon (Benjamin, 1966), 
and possibly Jorgensen's autobiography a year later, that the concept really became 
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grounded in the medical domain. 
Although the purpose of his book was "to deal with transsexualism", Benjamin dedicated 
an extra chapter to transvestism "in order to let the picture of transsexualism emerge 
more clearly". Benjamin defined the transsexual male or female as "deeply unhappy as a 
member of the sex or (gender) to which he or she was assigned by the anatomical 
structure of the body, particularly the genitals" (1966: 13). As transsexuals find some 
appeasement to their unhappiness through dressing in the clothes of the opposite sex, 
Benjamin concluded that they are also transvestites. However, as cross-dressing only 
provides temporary relief to the transsexual, Benjamin drew a distinction between the 
`true transvestite', who is content with his morphological sex, and the `true transsexual', 
who feels: 
... they belong to the other sex, they want to 
be and function as members of 
the opposite sex, not only to appear as such. For them, their sex organs, the 
primary (the testes) as well as the secondary (penis and others) are 
disgusting deformities that must be changed by the surgeons knife (1966: 13; 
emphasis added). 
However, Benjamin did consider both transsexualism and transvestism to be 
symptomatic of the same underlying psychopathological condition which he defined as 
"sex or gender role disorientation or indecision" (1966: 17). The distinction lay in the 
transsexual's greater degree of sex and gender disorientation coupled with greater 
emotional disturbances than the transvestite. Moreover, the transsexual's disorientation 
took the form of feelings of disgust and hate towards his sex organs, hair distribution, 
masculine habits, male dress, and male sexuality. 
As well as drawing a distinction between transvestites and transsexuals, Benjamin also 
attempted to distinguish between homosexuality and transsexualism. He proposed that a 
psychiatrist's diagnosis of `homosexuality' could be problematic for the transsexual, 
arguing: "The `gay' life... is no solution for the transsexual. He does not like it. He 
actually dislikes homosexuals and feels he has nothing in common with them" (1966: 
65). A short excerpt from Christine Jorgensen's autobiography indicates support for this 
view: 
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During the months in [army] service, I had seen a few practicing 
homosexuals, those whom the other men called `queer'. I couldn't condemn 
them, but I also knew that I certainly couldn't become like 
them... Furthermore, I had seen enough to know that homosexuality brought 
with it a social segregation and ostracism that I couldn't add to my own 
deep feeling of not belonging (1967: 33). 
What is interesting here, and perhaps indicative of the times, is the idea that 
homosexuality would bring about social stigmatization whilst a `sex change' somehow 
would not. 
This notion that the `true' transsexual was not homosexual became one of the central 
tenets for the `Benjamin Criteria' for sex reassignment candidates. In fact, up until the 
last decade, individuals were turned away from this form of treatment if they stated their 
post-operative sexual preference as lesbian or gay (Bockting & Coleman, 1992; Nataf, 
1996). However, it is important to take into account Benjamin's theoretical stance on 
homosexuality. Having cited Kinsey, Pomeroy and Martin's (1948) estimate that 4% of 
the adult male population are exclusively homosexual, Benjamin appeared to prefer a 
more fluid interpretation of sexual orientation. He expressed dislike for the term 
`homosexual' which is "applied too often", preferring to speak "merely of homosexual 
behaviour, inclinations, and more or less frequent activities" (1966: 25). Concluding 
strongly that transsexualism and homosexuality are very different "problems", gender 
and sex problems respectively, the idea that a post-operative transsexual may want to 
enter into a relationship with a member of the same genital sex appears to have 
completely failed him. We can only speculate reasons why, but attention can be drawn to 
two factors, the McCarthyism of the 1950's and his research focus on male-to-female 
transsexuals. 
Much of Benjamin's research and theorizing was taking place against a political back 
drop of growing McCarthy hysteria that constructed the homosexual as a "sexually 
perverted" bogeyman, eager to betray the American government and harm the American 
family (MacKenzie, 1994). There is no doubt that Harry Benjamin had considerable 
sympathy for the plight of his patients. It is probable that less stigma would be afforded 
to transsexuals who were diagnosed in terms of a treatable medical disorder, if some 
distance could be put between them and the homosexual. Secondly, Benjamin's research 
was principally concerned with male-to-female transsexuals, because at this point in time 
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far fewer cases of female-to-male transsexuals had been reported. Given this research 
took place against a historical legacy that theorized lesbians as `masculine' (e. g. Ellis, 
1936) or `Mannish' (Krafft-Ebing, 1908), the idea that any man who took such drastic 
measures as having sex reassignment surgery would then enter into lesbian sexual 
relations may have appeared improbable, if not implausible. Richard Green supports this 
assumption. Describing one of the earliest occurrences of a transsexual who did not 
identify as heterosexual after surgery, he says: 
An additional complication described by one male seeking sex reassignment 
was that his erotic attractions are only to women. Males are not sexually 
stimulating him. This patient's primary motive in seeking sex reassignment 
appeared to be a gender one: that is, he wished to lead the social life of a 
woman but not the sexual one. He found himself in the rare situation of 
anticipating a life of lesbianism after surgery (Green, 1969: 288, my 
emphasis). 
Returning to the distinction between transvestites and transsexuals, Benjamin suggested 
they lie on a continuum - where the defining differential is the role of the medical 
profession. As Benjamin states, the transsexual "puts all his faith and future into the 
hands of the doctor, particularly the surgeon", whilst the transvestite "wants to be left 
alone". He clearly believed that the medical professions have the greatest influence in 
determining the life paths of those who present as transsexual. He saw psychological 
intervention as ineffective and argued that most attempts to use psychotherapy to cure 
transsexuals had proven futile, often resulting in: 
Some of them probably languishing in mental institutions, some in prisons, 
and the majority as miserable, unhappy members of the community, unless 
they have committed suicide. Only because of the recent advances in 
endocrinology and surgical techniques has the picture changed (1966: 14). 
This enthusiasm for surgical intervention is reiterated in the Preface to The Transsexual 
Phenomenon. Referring to Hamburger et al (1953), Benjamin praises "the courageous 
and compassionate Danish physicians who, for the first time, dared to violate the tabu of 
a supposedly inviolate sex and gender concept" (1966: viii). However, it is Christine 
Jorgensen that receives Benjamin's credit for publicizing both the transsexual `condition' 
and sex reassignment as the favoured therapeutic intervention. This is illustrated in 
Benjamin's emphatic acknowledgement: 
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Without her courage and determination, undoubtedly springing from a force 
deep inside her, transsexualism might be still unknown - certainly unknown 
by this term - and might be considered to be something barely on the fringe 
of medical science (1966: viii). 
The case of Christine Jorgensen was of crucial importance in the creation of transsexual 
identity. The widespread media attention of the Jorgensen story in 1952, culminating in 
the publication of her autobiography in 1967, was greeted with varying reactions from 
other physicians and the wider general public. Billed as "The candid and courageous 
story of an outstanding woman who pioneered an age of sexual awareness through her 
own astonishing sex transformation! ", Jorgensen narrated her path from confused youth 
to celebrity show-girl and film maker. Possibly the most interesting revelation in the 
book was that she was already self-administrating ethinyl-oestradiol, a female hormone, 
before she approached physicians about her `condition'. Jorgensen is not the only person 
who has self-administrated hormones before presenting themselves to medical 
professionals. Hausman (1995) documents the case of Agnes, a young woman who in 
1958 appeared at the Department of Psychiatry of the University of California, seeking 
plastic surgery to remedy an apparent endocrine abnormality. Agnes appeared as a 
typically `feminine' woman, with breast development, wide hips and small waist, long 
hair and smooth skin, but nevertheless had a fully developed penis and atrophic scrotum. 
The UCLA researchers involved, Robert Stoller, Harold Garfinkel and Alexander Rosen 
could find no physiological explanation for her genital aberration. Instead, they 
hypothesized that she suffered from "testicular feminization syndrome, that is extreme 
feminization of the male body (breasts, no body and facial hair, feminine skin and 
subcutaneous fat distribution) due to oestrogens produced by the testes" (Stoller, 1968: 
365). In due course, Agnes was given surgical treatment to remove the penis and testes 
and create a vagina. After the operation, Agnes was given oestrogen replacement therapy, 
as the testes, her perceived source of oestrogen had been removed. It was to the horror of 
the physicians involved, that eight years after first presenting at UCLA, Agnes revealed 
that she had actually been self-administrating her mother's hormone replacement tablets 
since the age of twelve (Hausman, 1995). Thinking they were dealing with an intersexed 
patient, a `natural mistake', the research team had been duped into carrying out sex 
reassignment surgery on a biological male. 
One is unsure as to how the twelve-year-old Agnes discovered that taking her mother's 
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hormone replacement tablets would give her the desired feminizing effects. Jorgensen, 
however, gained her knowledge of the role of hormones in body morphology through 
personal research, citing the discovery of Paul de Kruif s book, The Male Hormone as a 
critical turning point in her transformation. With the knowledge gained from this text, 
and experience drawn from a laboratory technician course at the Manhattan Medical and 
Dental Assistants School, she managed to purchase a course of `the strongest' ethinyl- 
oestradiol tablets from a drug store and began self-administrating in 1948. This was two 
years before she made contact with Dr. Christian Hamburger, who would later carry out 
her reassignment surgery in 1952. In response to her question "what is wrong with me", 
she cites Hamburger response: "Why, I believe that you are the victim of a problem that 
usually starts in early childhood, an irresistible feeling that you wish to be regarded by 
society and by yourself, as belonging to the opposite sex. Nothing is able to change this 
feeling" (Jorgensen, 1967: 92). He also advised her that although he would be able to 
treat her, she may be a guinea pig for the surgical procedure. The processes revealed in 
these cases are of particular interest because they illustrate just how dependent the notion 
of a transsexual identity is upon the medical profession, as both Jorgensen and Agnes 
could only go so far in their desire to transition. Yet, one cannot help but wonder how the 
psychiatric profession greeted the revelation that Jorgensen and Agnes had been able to 
move some way towards this transition unsupervised. 
However, perhaps more important, was the effect the Jorgensen case had on those who 
would subsequently present themselves to psychiatrists as transsexual. As Benjamin 
notes, the facts of Jorgensen's case "caused emotions to run high among those similarly 
effected. Suddenly they understood and `found' themselves and saw hope for a release 
from an unhappy existence" (1966). Drawing upon the ideas of Ken Plummer (1995), it 
could be argued that these individuals did not `find' themselves at all, rather they `found' 
a story to tell about themselves as they were able to identify similarities between 
Jorgensen's narrative and their own life histories. Through this identification with 
Jorgensen's past experience, they could conclude that they, like her, were transsexual, 
thus recreating themselves through Jorgensen's story. This would be particularly 
applicable after the publication of her autobiography in 1967. This possibility of `self- 
identity' or `self-diagnosis', whichever way it is put, has been one of central concern 
throughout the literature on transsexualism. Individuals suffering from varying degrees of 
gender confusion have been able to say, "yes, that's me", after exposure to the 
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appropriate material, and put themselves forward for reassignment surgery. Inevitably, 
affairs became even more problematic for the clinical professionals. Not only were 
prospective candidates for reassignment able to identify their experience with the 
autobiographical accounts of transsexuals such as Jorgensen, they also gained extensive 
knowledge of `what it means to be transsexual' from the psychiatric literature itself. 
1.3 Diagnostic contentions 
The term `transsexual' is unusual as a diagnostic category because it names the method 
of treatment and rehabilitation (i. e. moving from one sex to the other) rather than the 
syndrome (gender dysphoria). It's rather like a person suffering from depression saying `I 
am a Prozac person'. Furthermore, without a known cause, transsexualism is open to self- 
definition through personal suffering. Physicians, however, have their own criteria of 
symptoms that a patient must fulfill before they will accept their `self-defined illness' 
(Money, 1986). In 1973, Fisk summarized the following guidelines for recognizing the 
`true transsexual': 
A life-long sense or feeling of being a member of the `other sex'; the early 
and persistent behaviouristic phenomenon of cross-dressing, coupled with a 
strong emphasis upon a total lack of erotic feelings associated with cross- 
dressing; and a disdain or repugnance for homosexual behaviour (Fisk, 
1973: 8). 
Not only did these criteria determine who is, or can be a `true' transsexual they also 
provided justification for the category itself - by eliminating transvestite and homosexual 
behaviour. Yet, given the lack of organic indications of a `disease' and the self-diagnostic 
nature of transsexualism, physicians are dependent upon the accuracy and honesty of the 
patients' statements for diagnoses, as well as for their understanding of the disorder 
(Billings & Urban, 1995). As early as 1968, Kubie and Mackie wrote that patients 
demanding surgery "tailor their views of themselves and their personal histories to 
prevailing `scientific' fashions" (1968: 435). Having consulted the guidelines as to what 
constitutes a `textbook' transsexual, and knowing that reputable clinics only treated 
`textbook' cases, candidates had little choice but to present as a `textbook' case. As the 
psychiatrist's job is to assess how well patients' self-reported life histories fit the 
diagnostic criteria for transsexualism, it was not long before they caught on. As Fisk 
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states: 
Soon it became conspicuously and disturbingly apparent that far too many 
patients presented a pat, almost rehearsed history, and seemingly were well 
versed in precisely what they should or should not say or reveal. Only later 
did we learn that there did and does exist a very effective grape-vine (Fisk, 
1973: 8). 
The threat of deception had become so strong that Stoller also complained: 
Those of us faced with the task of diagnosing transsexualism have an 
additional burden these days, for most patients who request sex- 
reassignment are in complete command of the literature and know the 
answers before the questions are asked (1973a: 536). 
Billings & Urban (1995) describe this as `the con', arguing physicians reinforced this 
process by rewarding compliance with the desired surgery and turning away those who 
gave honest but unamended subjective histories. But, the idea that it is ever possible to 
give an accurate subjective account of one's past is highly debatable. Developments 
within social constructionist perspectives suggest that the analysis of memories tells us 
more about the ways in which people will attempt to construct their memories, in order to 
support their current situation and create a cohesive life story, than the truth of their past 
experiences (e. g. Crawford, Kippax, Onyx, Gault & Benton, 1992). Billings and Urban 
do, however, make a valid point when they argue how inadequately the medical image of 
a stable life-long transsexual identification fits some individual's experiences and 
motivations. This notion of a fixed, monadic, sexual identity is clearly contradicted by 
the self-reflexive fluidity in sexuality and gender identities expressed by "a (male-to- 
female) patient... whose lover was also a post-operative male-to-female transsexual": 
I thought I was a homosexual at one time; then I got married and had a 
child so I figured I was a heterosexual; then because of cross-dressing I 
thought I was a transvestite. Now [post-operatively] I see myself as 
bisexual (quoted by Billing & Urban, 1995: 111-2). 
A second problem that has plagued the study of transsexualism, which can loosely be 
defined as the morality debate, takes issue with whether physical treatment of what are 
considered healthy bodies should be offered to those who, arguably, have a psychological 
disorder. Thomas Szasz, who describes transsexualism as "a condition tailor-made for 
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our surgical-technological age" (1990: 86), is, as ever, critical of the psychiatric 
profession. He goes on to argue that "instead of scrutinizing the nature of 
`transsexualism', sexologists are now busily attacking and defending sex-change 
operations" (1990: 89). And, this has certainly been the case. News that a prominent 
centre for the surgical treatment of transsexualism had been set up at The John Hopkins 
University, sparked off a wave of opposition within medicine in the late 1960's (Billings 
& Urban, 1995). This attack was led by psychoanalysts in private practice, labelling 
transsexuals as `all border-line psychotics' and charging surgeons with `collaboration 
with psychosis' (Meerloo, 1967: 263). In response, it was necessary for `sex-change' 
proponents to legitimize surgical treatment. Billing & Urban (1995: 104) propose this 
was achieved through two methods: constructing an etiological theory which stressed the 
non-psychopathic character of the illness and rationalizing diagnostic and treatment 
strategies. 
Whilst many proponents of sex-reassignment favoured a biological predisposition for 
transsexualism (e. g. Benjamin, 1966), it was Robert Stoller (1967; 1973b; 1975) who, by 
spearheading early socialization, provided the much needed less pathological etiological 
justification for cross-gender identification. Stoller claimed the male transsexual was the 
outcome of an over-intense physical relationship between the boy and his mother, 
coupled with the absence of the father who should have interrupted `the process of 
feminization' (1967: 433). Furthermore, Stoller conceptualized transsexualism as a 
gender identity disorder, rather than a neurotic perversion, such as transvestism. As such, 
he argued that, due to parental factors, the male transsexual over-identifies with his 
mother to the extent that he believes he is the same as her, despite having different 
genitals. Stoller's theory is based on the notion of a `core gender identity', which is 
formed early in life. Despite proposing that this identity can vacillate at times between 
masculine and feminine expressions, he, nevertheless, suggested that its basis, the `core', 
would always remain the same. Thus, he argued that psychotherapy is pointless for the 
transsexual, as there is no psychological conflict. The distress they exhibit is the result of 
their core gender identity never corresponding to their biological sex (Stoller, 1975). 
Benjamin (1966) was in favour of permitting physical alteration of the visible genitalia 
and secondary sex characteristics if it had a beneficial effect on the individual's life. 
Frequently, the benefit gained is described in terms of reducing the risk of a transsexual 
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individual committing suicide. Thus, the early defenses of sex reassignment surgery, in 
particular, stressed the patient's intense anguish and the duty of physicians `to ease the 
existence of these fellow-men' (Hamburger, 1953: 373). Bockting & Coleman (1992), 
both clinicians currently working in the field, argue that this had the beneficial effect of 
swinging the treatment pendulum from attempting to `cure' the transsexual with 
psychoanalysis or aversion therapy to facilitating acceptance and management of gender 
role transition. However, they also point out negative aspects of such a stance. 
Unfortunately, Benjamin's initial emphasis on the intensity of the suffering of the 
transsexual often resulted in less severe co-morbid psychopathology being overlooked 
when decisions were taken regarding treatment and sex reassignment. Thus, depression 
and anxiety came to be seen as symptoms of the gender disturbance, which would be 
alleviated by the sex reassignment. However, thirteen years after Benjamin's work, a 
widely publicized study by Meyer and Reter (1979) indicated that, contrary to 
Benjamin's assertions, sex reassignment did not decrease distress and suicide among 
transsexuals, or improve their general life functioning. 
Jon Meyer, director of John Hopkins University's Gender Clinic was already becoming 
unsympathetic to the plight of transsexuals. In 1973, he complained that "the label 
`transsexual' has come to cover such a `multitude of sins"' (Meyer, 1973: 35 cited in 
Billing & Urban, 1995: 110). A year later he stated that amongst the patients who had 
requested, and on occasions received, surgery at John Hopkins were sadists, 
homosexuals, schizoids, masochists, homosexual prostitutes and psychotic depressives 
(Meyer, 1974). These findings were employed to support the decision at John Hopkins 
University in 1979 to decline further sex reassignment services. Based on the grounds 
that the patients they had operated upon were no better off than a sample of transsexual 
patients who received psychotherapy but no surgery (Meyer & Reter, 1979), this decision 
presented a mighty blow to those in favour of the medical treatment. One recent study 
(Green & Fleming, 1990) has reported more favourable follow up findings, but whether 
or not to advocate hormonal and surgical sex reassignment remains deeply controversial. 
A third problem with transsexualism, closely related to those already outlined focuses on 
the complicated relationship between diagnosis and treatment. I have already pointed to 
one unusual feature, in that the diagnosis `transsexual' is defined in terms of the 
treatment: to be `transsexual' presumes movement across or between sexes. Hence, the 
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flip side to this is that if a patient says `I am a transsexual', it already implies the course 
of treatment. For this reason, not only do the psychiatric profession have a problem in 
regulating the diagnosis of the disorder, the self-diagnosed transsexual may have already 
decided that sex reassignment surgery is the only viable treatment. Considerable attention 
has been paid to this problem in the clinically based literature, and significant effort has 
been made to regain control of both diagnosis and prescribed treatments. As Ross states: 
Unfortunately, many who present for treatment... request gender 
reassignment as the `cure'. It is necessary, however, for the professional to 
set aside this self-diagnosis and prescription for treatment, and to determine 
a diagnosis from a careful history and from other appropriate investigations 
(Ross, 1986: 1). 
Bockting and Coleman also support this view. They argue that: 
For many clients as well as professionals, this diagnosis [transsexualism] 
presupposes sex reassignment as the treatment of choice. Implying sex 
reassignment early on precludes the exploration of co-morbid 
psychopathology and of the various dynamics and motivations for sex 
reassignment. This approach has potentially disastrous consequences given 
the irreversibility of hormonal and surgical sex reassignment (Bockting and 
Coleman, 1992: 136). 
Ross (1986a) suggests it is not uncommon for individuals who are homosexual to present 
as transsexuals, predominantly because they are unable to accept their homosexuality. In 
fact, of the many transsexuals presenting for treatment, it seems that gender reassignment 
may not always be the most common treatment. Lothstein & Levine (1981), who began 
discussing the importance of recognizing co-morbid psychopathology in the assessment 
and treatment of individuals with gender identity disorders, suggested that up to 70% of 
transsexual patients reject gender reassignment treatment following long term 
psychotherapy. Morgan (1978) gives the harsher summary that of those presenting to 
clinics as `transsexual', 10% will have a major mental illness, 30% will be homophobic 
homosexuals, and 20-25% will be sexually inadequate individuals with ambiguous 
gender identity. Having highlighted three specific dilemmas faced by clinicians, it 
becomes apparent that a common thread links all of these issues. This is itself the greatest 
problem in theorizing transsexualism and concerns the lack of an etiological basis for the 
classification. 
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It is not an unusual occurrence for a diagnosed psychological disorder to lack an 
etiological basis, even when methods used to treat it have been found to be effective - 
take depression (Clark, Beck & Alford, 1999), for example. The problem with the 
treatment of transsexualism is the invasive and controversial nature of the treatment 
involved, coupled with the question of whether a post-operative transsexual has any 
claim or right to be recognized as a `real' man or woman. Critics of the procedure would 
say no. For example, Janice Raymond in The Transsexual Empire, provided a very 
scathing account of male-to-female transsexuals as "misguided and mistaken men", who, 
"are not women". In her view, `[T]hey are deviant males' (1980: 183). Thomas Szasz 
argues along similar lines that the medical procedure is "simply turning men into fake 
women, and women into fake men" (1990: 87). Meyer & Hoopes (1974) also express this 
view in an elaborate quote, describing the situation of a disappointed post-operative 
male-to-female transsexual: 
... 
in a thousand subtle ways, the reassignee has the bitter experience that he 
is not - and never will be -a real girl but is, at best, a convincing simulated 
female. Such an adjustment cannot compensate for the tragedy of having 
lost all chance to be male and of having, in the final analysis, no way to be 
really female (1974: 450, quoted in Billings & Urban, 1995). 
Perhaps of most interest is an account given by Harry Benjamin in the Preface to The 
Transsexual Phenomenon. He wrote: 
There exists a relatively small group of people - men more often than 
women - who want to "change their sex" (1966: viii). 
It is surprising that his first offering of a definition for transsexualism negates its very 
possibility. By placing the explanation in scare quotes he illustrates the assumption that 
underlies each of these accounts: that sex is immutable, a given, which can only be 
`changed', not changed. Later, he develops and confirms this position by stating: 
No actual change of sex is ever possible. Sex and gender are decided at the 
moment of conception, when either two X chromosomes... insure the 
foundations for a future girl, or when one Y chromosome and one X 
chromosome... insure the birth of the boy (Benjamin, 1966: 46). 
This reference to a biological explanation for `sex' demonstrates his understanding of sex 
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as a fixed category. Thus, for some, it seems the only sure way for clinicians to convince 
critics of the legitimacy of sex reassignment surgery, would be to find a biological 
explanation for, or predisposition to, cross-gender identity. 
Unfortunately for them, there has been little supporting evidence to support a biological 
explanation (Coleman, Gooren & Ross, 1989). In his article, `How does transsexualism 
develop and why? ', Michael Ross (1986b) concludes that, to date, there is no evidence 
that suggests genetic and endocrinological factors feature amongst the causes of gender 
disorientation. However, a recent series of publications by Dick Swaab and his 
colleagues (Swaab & Hofman, 1995; Swaab et al, 1997) has shown preliminary 
indications that there may be some difference in the brain structure of transsexuals. These 
findings were greeted enthusiastically by some members of the transsexual community. 
But, the reporting of a minute region of the hypothalamus as smaller in six post-operative 
male-to-female transsexuals than in a `normal' man (whilst being similar in size to a 
`normal' woman) is hardly conclusive that these transsexuals had the brain structure of a 
female all along. It should also be noted that these findings were based on the autopsies 
of transsexual subjects who, presumably, had been consuming known and, inevitably in 
some cases, unknown quantities of hormones over their life span. Furthermore, as Ross, 
Wälinder, Lundström and Thuwe (1981) argue, if there was a biological basis for 
transsexualism, occurrences would be expected to be fairly stable across similar western 
cultures. However, their study, comparing prevalence rates in Sweden and Australia, 
found marked variations in the incidence of transsexualism. The existence of a genetic or 
biological basis for their identity may seem attractive to some transsexuals - as is does to 
many homosexuals - as a means of defending themselves against discrimination. Yet, it is 
relevant to bear in mind that many feminists have argued that there are dangers in 
grounding identity and personal narratives in biological difference. As Jennifer Terry 
states, "biological explanations have historically been deployed to keep women in a 
subordinate position to men" (1997: 281). 
In the search for the cause of transsexualism, evidence seems to be more supportive of 
psychological, social and environmental explanations, but again, this is not conclusive 
(Ross, 1986b; Coleman et al, 1989). Some cases seem to have shown support for Stoller's 
(1975) psychoanalytic etiological account of transsexualism (e. g. Lothstein, 1979), but 
many applicants appear not to have had the dysfunctional family dynamics that the theory 
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is based upon. Moreover, Stoller has little to suggest as an explanation for the 
developmental pattern of female-to-male transsexualism. This is the case with much of 
the clinical and psychiatric literature, where female-to-male transsexualism remains 
under-theorized and under-represented. Victoria Prince (1976) offers an alternative 
explanation, proposing that transsexualism should be seen as a `communicable disease'. 
She suggests that sex reassignment is often grasped at around the same time as contact 
with, or publicity about, transsexual surgery. Unfortunately, there seems to be little 
widespread research that has been carried out to support this view. Again, favouring a 
social explanation, Ross, Rogers & McCulloch (1978) have argued that in some instances 
transsexuals are homosexual males who rationalize their preference for a male partner 
into the socially acceptable form of a heterosexual relationship by altering their gender. 
Ross (1986b) draws support for this suggestion from Lothstein (1979) who states, 
perhaps surprisingly, that society usually accepts a transsexual adaptation more readily 
than a homosexual one. How valid these conclusions are today is debatable. It should be 
remembered that these articles were written in the shadow of the removal of 
homosexuality from The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) in the US in the 
1970's. One might like to think that acceptance of homosexuality has progressed 
sufficiently during the last twenty years for men not to feel the need for recourse to their 
own surgical castration in order to have same-sex relations, but homophobia and 
discrimination against gays and lesbians is still commonplace. 
Research suggests transsexuals have very rigid views on gender roles (McCauley & 
Erhardt, 1977), but this may be less revealing than it seems. There is no guarantee that 
this is because male-to-female transsexuals do have rigid ideas about what it means to be 
a woman, since they may express rigid, stereotypical notions because they need to justify 
their own position as a `real' woman. However, Ross et al (1981) did find that in 
societies that were more gender role rigid and which are also more hostile to 
homosexuality, there were three times more clinical consultations by individuals who 
labelled themselves as `transsexual', than in less restrictive societies. Similarly, in an 
epidemiological study of transsexualism, Hoenig & Kenna (1973) indicated that most 
transsexuals came from lower socio-economic families, where gender roles are, 
reportedly, more fixed. However, it is apparent from the tenor of the debates surrounding 
the search for an etiological basis for transsexualism that the determinants of the 
`disorder' remain hypothetical and controversial. Thus, with the lack of an etiological 
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justification for the diagnosis and treatment of transsexuals, clinicians have yet to solve 
the dilemmas outlined above. Instead, it has been argued that the clinical profession have 
attempted to regulate and control these issues through the re-labelling, re-categorization 
and re-classification of transsexualism. 
1.4 Exit the transsexual 
In recent years there have been a series of shifts in the conceptualization of 
transsexualism that eventually saw the term disappear from the DSM classification 
altogether (DSM IV, APA, 1994). Billing & Urban suggest that in the light of patients' 
revelations of acquiring sex reassignment by deception, proponents of this surgical 
treatment were "dangerously close to the accusations made by psychoanalytic critics - 
collaboration with psychosis" (1995: 110). They argue that rather than questioning the 
conceptual, clinical and diagnostic substructure of the `disease', practitioners in the wake 
of Fisk (1973: 8) simply replaced the term `transsexual' with `gender dysphoria 
syndrome'. Hence, critics have argued that the category `gender dysphoria' was created 
by the medical profession in order to reclaim the act of diagnosis, whilst proponents 
suggest that it provides an effective method of weeding out cases that present for sex 
reassignment inappropriately. In this format the mental health professions have come to 
regard transsexualism as a symptom of an underlying disorder rather than the disorder 
itself. Gender dysphoria is now seen as the underlying disorder, whilst transsexualism, 
the belief that one is, or should be, a member of the opposite biological sex, is the 
presenting symptom. With this new diagnostic label in place, transsexualism entered 
DSM III (APA, 1980) under the subsection Gender Identity Disorders (GID), subsumed 
under the broader category of psychosexual disorders. DSM III provided a diagnostic 
criteria for: GID/Children, Transsexualism; GID/Adolescent and Adult, Non-transsexual 
Type (GIDAANT); and GID/Not Otherwise Specified (GID/NOS). Transsexualism was 
also further subtyped, as homosexual, heterosexual, or asexual. 
Ira Pauly, an early proponent of transsexualism, was delighted that the inclusion of GID 
"further legitimized these forms of gender dysphoria by formally recognizing them as 
conditions worthy of evaluation and treatment" (1992: 3). He believed the new 
classification provided the required validation of sex reassignment surgery, as it was now 
presented as a `legitimate treatment' rather than as `elective, cosmetic surgery'. Finally, 
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after many years, transsexualism had become a worldwide, classified mental disorder 
with its recognized treatment intact, although now under the guise of `gender identity 
disorder'. However, Pauly was less keen on the changes to the GID classification 
introduced in the revised edition of DSM III in 1987. The removal of GID from the 
category of `Sexual Disorders' to be place in the more ambiguously titled section 
`Disorders Usually First Evident in Infancy, Childhood, or Adolescence' resulted in GID 
becoming "somewhat lost, since they had no place in the table of contents" (1992: 3). His 
principal concern with this new classification system was that it may fail some 
individuals, known as secondary transsexuals (Person & Ovesey, 1974), who present 
themselves to clinicians as adults, having in some cases never suffered from gender 
dysphoria as a child. His other point of contention involved the chaos that the subtyping 
of homosexual and heterosexual transsexuals seemed to be causing. Unfortunately, DSM 
III-R was classifying sexual orientation on the basis of genetic sex, or the pre-operative 
anatomy of the individual, rather than the gender identity or sexual anatomy after sex 
reassignment (Coleman and Bockting, 1988; Pauly, 1992). 
In the early 1990's recommendations for the next entry in DSM IV (APA, 1994) included 
the proposal to do away with the classification `transsexualism' altogether by creating a 
single, broad category of GID. This proposal was justified by the wave of concern that 
the term `transsexualism' automatically incorporates a recommendation in favour of sex 
reassignment surgery (SRS) (Levine, 1989). This view was supported by an interim 
report constructed in 1991, which stated: 
Transsexualism appears designed for gender dysphoric individuals who 
have decided upon surgical sex reassignment as the solution to their inner 
distress (Bradley, Coates, Green, Levine, Mayer-Bahlburg, Pauly and 
Zucker, 1991: 334). 
Although part of this subcommittee, Pauly categorically opposed the suggestion that the 
term transsexualism be eliminated, describing it as "a serious mistake" when "(M)aking 
the diagnosis is not synonymous with the clinician recommending the person for sex- 
reassignment surgery (Pauly, 1990a, 1990b)" (1992: 5). Drawing on the `Standards of 
Care' set out by the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, Pauly 
argues that sufficient measures have been taken to assure the treatment assigned is 
appropriate, citing that: 
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Hormone treatment and/or SRS on demand is contra-indicated. It is herein 
declared to be professionally improper to perform hormonal sex 
reassignment or SRS without careful evaluation of the patient's reasons for 
requesting such services, and evaluation of the beliefs and attitudes upon 
which such reasons are based (Walker, Berger, Green, Laub, Reynolds and 
Wollman, 1985, cited by Pauly, 1992: 5-6). 
Furthermore, the `Standards of Care' state that before recommending sex reassignment 
surgery the clinician is advised to meet the following criteria: 
1. Have known the patient for at least six months before endorsing the 
patient's request for genital surgery. 
2. Require the patient to be evaluated by another psychologist or 
psychiatrist, who will have recommended in favour of SRS. At least one of 
two must be a psychiatrist. 
3. Require the patient to have lived successfully in the opposite gender role, 
for at least one year. 
4. Require the patient to have undergone a urological examination (Cited in 
Pauly, 1992: 7). 
Pauly's argument is based on the reasonable belief that some connection with past 
terminology, specifically `transsexualism', should have been maintained in DSM IV in 
order to avoid unnecessary confusion, when the term will, undoubtedly, continue to be 
used in medical literature. However, contrary to Pauly's wishes, "The desire to uncouple 
the clinical diagnosis of gender dysphoria from criteria for approving patients for SRS" 
by merging these categories "under the single heading of `GID"'(Bradley et al., 1991: 
335) was upheld. As such, there is no classification under the term `transsexual' in DSM 
IV, only a brief reference to explain the change. 
One change in the classification that appears to be more helpful involves the recognition 
of different sexualities. Heterosexuality used to be one of the defining characteristics of 
`what it meant to be a transsexual'. Gender reassignment would certainly not have been 
permitted if candidates had indicated any homosexual inclinations. This view has slowly 
changed over the years, and now it is widely recognized that many (estimates of up to 
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50%) post-operative male-to-female transsexuals pursue relationships with lesbian 
women (Pauly, 1991; Nataf; 1996). After important changes to the terminology employed 
in DSM IV, transsexual relationships are now recognized in terms of gender status, rather 
than the genetic composition of the individuals involved. As recently as 1987, in DSM 
III-R, a post-operative male-to-female transsexual and her lesbian partner would have 
been referred to as `heterosexual'. More usefully, this has now been replaced with the far 
simpler `sexually attracted to females'. 
Recently, some clinicians have begun to debate the relevance of sexual orientation in 
understanding their client's gender identity and dysphoria, suggesting the current 
classification system overemphasizes sexual orientation (Coleman, Bockting & Gooren, 
1993). They disagree with many theories of sexual and gender identity development, 
particularly the notion that a same-sex sexual orientation implies a certain degree of cross- 
gender identification, correctly arguing that such theoretical frameworks imply a 
stereotypical view of the homosexual and one that fails to be born out. Instead, it is 
suggested that future revisions of DSM should stop defining gender identity disorders in 
relation to a person's sexual orientation. They believe that this distinction has been used to 
discriminate against natal female gender dysphoric individuals who might be candidates 
for reassignment but are attracted to men, and hence would become, post-operatively, gay 
men (Coleman, Bockting & Gooren, 1993). In fact, Bockting & Coleman advocate: 
... a clear separation of gender 
identity, social sex role and sexual 
orientation, which allows a wide spectrum of sexual identities and prevents 
limiting access to sex reassignment services to those who conform to a 
heterosexist paradigm of mental health (1992: 149). 
Furthermore, they favour restricting the term `transsexual' to those who have undergone 
a gender role transition, including anatomical changes. If it were possible to make such a 
restriction, the move might have some effect in challenging the pathological undertones 
of the identity `transsexual' since post-operatively the gender dysphoria, or the disorder, 
should have been `cured'. However, like Pauly (1990a; 1990b; 1992), they believe that 
gender identity disorders do have a place in classification systems of disorders, as many 
individuals who partake in cross-dressing or cross-gender behaviour present with 
significant levels of distress due to their gender non-conformity. 
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Meanwhile, these clinicians were not the only ones who desired the removal of the term 
`transsexual' from DSM IV. Over recent years we have seen the growing politicization of 
the transgendered community as a whole, which takes the position that classification even 
of GID as a psychiatric disorder stigmatizes individuals. This feeling is highlighted in 
moves to reclaim transsexual identity through acts such as the re-spelling of `transsexual' 
as transexual - note the missing `s'. The rationale behind this subtle change concerns the 
aim to alleviate the medicalized connotations the term invokes when taken as a personal 
identity (MacKenzie, 1994). The idea of freeing an identity from the pathologizing 
psychiatric discourse that surrounds it is not new. Most of the arguments utilized include 
the same points made by advocates who campaigned to remove homosexuality from 
DSM III in the 1970's. However, if that is the desired outcome, there are undeniable 
differences between a homosexual's and a transsexual's relationship with the medical 
profession, given the transsexual's reliance upon hormonal and surgical treatment. 
Pauly presents a taster of the clinical establishment's position, arguing that GID should 
remain classified within the DSM manuals. Drawing a comparison between the 
prevalence of transsexualism and homosexuality, he proposes that the relative 
infrequency of transsexualism prevents us from seeing a gender identity disorder as "a 
variation of the human condition" (1992: 10). Secondly, whilst homosexuality was 
removed from DSM III because non-clinical samples of homosexuals demonstrated no 
more psychopathology than heterosexuals, Pauly (1990a) argues that gender dysphoric 
individuals have a higher significant incidence of mood disorders as well as evidence of 
Axis II pathology (Levine, 1989). Thus, it would appear that the efforts of campaign 
groups to de-pathologize the identity `transsexual' are hampered, given that members of 
the clinical establishment are reluctant to challenge or dismiss contrary evidence. The 
defining difference between removing homosexuality and gender identity disorders from 
DSM IV, however, concerns the role of the medical practitioner. As Pauly (1992) points 
out, an individual who identifies as homosexual has no need to engage with the medical 
or psychiatric profession in order to pursue his or her lifestyle. Conversely, as we have 
already seen, if an individual identifies as transsexual, firstly they have to convince the 
psychiatrists they are `genuine' in order to receive a referral for sex reassignment 
surgery. Secondly, they are reliant on the surgical skills of the surgeon for the final 
outcome of their treatment. Yet, it should be remembered that the clinician specializing in 
GID could also stand to lose if the category were to be totally removed. In many ways 
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these psychiatrists would become redundant if transsexualism was recognized as 
subjectively diagnosed and sex reassignment was seen as an `option' for the self- 
identified transsexual. In what is already becoming a predominantly privately financed 
field, the transsexual would only be dependent upon the skills of the surgeon and the size 
of their bank balance. 
Nevertheless, many of the psychiatric clinicians do appear to be genuinely concerned 
about the welfare of their clients. At the same time, much energy appears to centre 
around the question of who regulates the diagnosis of transsexualism and who controls 
access to sex reassignment surgery as the treatment of choice. It would have been 
simpler, for the sake of gender theorists if `transsexualism' had survived as a clinical 
entity, but the fact that it did not tells us something about current trends in the scientific 
study of sexuality. It is not that those who argued for the removal of `transsexualism' 
from DSM IV did not have the same faith in the Benjamin `Standards of Care' - cited 
earlier by Pauly (1992) - but that they wanted to introduce tighter restrictions regarding 
the practice of these standards. Moreover, the study of transsexualism has always been 
on the fringe of medical science, and frequently attacked from both within and, more 
recently, from the community it set out to treat. 
In their seminal essay, The Socio-Medical Construction of Transsexualism, first 
published in 1982, Billings and Urban concluded their critique by suggesting that: 
By substituting medical terminology for political discourse, the medical 
profession has tamed and transformed a potential wildcat strike at the 
gender factory (1995: 115). 
I do not entirely agree. Certainly, providing sex reassignment surgery rather than 
encouraging people to live at or between the borders of the two sexes has the effect of 
normalizing a binary gender system. But, one of the problems with taking such a stance is 
that it completely denies transsexual agency in the construction of their own access to 
medical treatments. It has not been simply a matter of medical and psychiatric 
professionals re-classifying the diagnostic criteria for transsexualism. In the preface to a 
Special Issue on Gender Dysphoria, published by the Journal of Psychology and Human 
Sexuality, the editors commented: 
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In the context of a growing political movement in transgender communities 
across North America and Europe arguing for a depathologization of cross 
gender behavior (including removal of transvestism and transsexualism 
from DSM classification), the task of the clinician remains to provide up-to- 
date health care and ongoing support for gender dysphoric clients. This 
includes, but is not limited to, providing professional consultation regarding 
sex reassignment procedures. An interdisciplinary approach to treatment, 
research and education is essential for continuing progress (Bockting & 
Coleman, 1992: xix). 
Frequently these shifts have not only been beneficial for the transsexual individual but 
have also taken place in response to transsexual efforts to reclaim and depathologize their 
`condition'. Moreover, in recent years, transsexuals themselves have served on the 
steering committees of organizations such has The Harry Benjamin International Gender 
Dysphoria Association. The distinction between the transsexual subject and the clinical 
or academic expert is no longer so easy to discern. One would, perhaps, be naive to 
interpret these shifts and re-classifications as part of an objective scientific process - the 
result of an increased understanding of gender non-conformity. Yet, attempts to regulate 
and control access to surgical intervention have been increasingly underpinned by a 
genuine concern to provide choices and the means with which to carry these through 
thus, enabling those with complex gender identifications to lead full and successful lives. 
In the next chapter I provide a detailed discussion of socio-cultural accounts of 
transsexualism and locate transsexualism within a historical overview of gender studies. I 
then build upon the final themes of this chapter by exploring in greater detail the impact 
of queer theory and transgender politics upon the emergence of a new discipline, `trans- 
studies'. 
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3 
Socio-cultural perspectives: From Gender to Transgenderl 
"If the women's movement is so into freeing up the definitions of 
gender, why not start with us? " 
Politically aware transsexual quoted by D. H. Feinbloom, 
Transvestites and Transsexuals: Mixed Views, (1976: 159) 
"Transgender theories" are those ideas and arguments that are 
articulated by transgenderists, ideas that inform and are informed by 
transgender political movements... These theories articulate ideas 
about sex, gender, bodies and sexuality that constitute transgender 
theorizing as part of queer theorizing more broadly. 
P. Elliot & K. Roen, GLQ, (1998: 231) 
In this chapter I have two aims, firstly, to provide a brief overview of the conceptual 
history of gender studies and, secondly, to locate `transsexualism' within these debates. 
Furthermore, I illustrate how `transsexualism' rather than being studied in its own right is 
frequently used conceptually to facilitate, or to interrogate, shifts and moves in gender 
theory. Thus, I trace the emergence of `gender' as a separate conceptual category from 
`sex', through the subsequent critiques of the `sex/gender' distinction, to the radical 
1 Lynne Segal's phrase (August, 2000) 
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possibilities of Queer Theory. I then document the emergence of a new discipline `trans- 
studies' - where the majority of academics and authors are themselves transgendered - 
and the potential it heralds for theorizing embodied subjectivity. I then return to the 
social sciences investigating how some feminist psychologists have engaged with 
transsexualism since the publication of Kessler and McKenna's seminal text: Gender: An 
Ethnomethodological Approach. I conclude by looking at some of the prominent 
empirical studies that have informed and guided the research principles for this project. 
3.1 A sex/gender distinction? 
When Simone de Beauvoir (1949/1953) wrote in The Second Sex that "one is not born a 
woman, but rather becomes one", her pronouncement would facilitate the theoretical 
viewpoint that gender is an acquisition rather than inherent. The influence of de 
Beauvoir's philosophical thesis over the last fifty years has been profound. Both directly 
and indirectly: from early social constructionist accounts of gender such as Suzanne 
Kessler and Wendy McKenna's important text, Gender: An Ethnomethodological 
Approach, originally published in 1978, to the prolific usage of Judith Butler's notion of 
`gender performativity' in much queer and feminist research since the publication of 
Gender Trouble in 1990. Whilst paving the way for a feminist conceptualization of the 
socially constructed nature of gender, de Beauvoir was, however, willing to affirm that 
one was born with a `sex' - defined in terms of male or female anatomy. During the 
1970s and early 1980s, enthused by Robert Stoller's (1968) account of transsexualism - 
in which he claimed that the biological sex of a person has a tendency to augment, rather 
than determine the appropriate gender identity for that sex - the 'sex/gender system' 
(Rubin, 1975) became central to much feminist theory. Lynne Segal describes that the 
"... initial purpose of `gender' was thus to displace the role of biology in determining 
`masculinity' and `femininity"', whilst its "... immediate consequence was to deny or 
minimize the existence of any fundamental differences between the sexes" (1999: 39). 
Thus, feminists such as Kate Millett (1971), Ann Oakley (1972), and Nancy Chodorow 
(1978) directed their political struggles towards neutralizing the sexually specific body 
via an agenda that sought gender equality through the reorganization of practices such as 
child-raising and socialization. So, as Elizabeth Grosz summarized: 
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... while male and female 
bodies remained untouched by and irrelevant to 
such programs, the associated gender traits of masculinity and femininity 
would, ideally, be transformed and equalized through a transformation of 
ideology (1994: 17). 
Yet, whilst this school of feminism remained committed to a biologically determined, 
fixed and ahistorical notion of the body - in contrast with a socially and ideologically 
informed mind -a Cartesian dualist and implicitly rationalist account of personhood was 
maintained. Hence, by the middle of the 1980's there was much discord with the notion 
of a sex/gender distinction, particularly amongst those feminist proponents of `sexual 
difference'. For-example, Moira Gatens suggested that: 
[T]heorists who uncritically use the mind/body distinction consistently 
characterize the human subject as either predominantly (or wholly) 
determined by biological forces, that is, heredity, or predominantly (or 
wholly) determined by the influence of social or familial relations, that is 
environment. Both these positions posit a naive causal relation between 
either the body and the mind or the environment and the mind which 
commits both viewpoints, as two sides of the same coin, to an a priori, 
neutral and passive conception of the subject. If we conceive the body to be 
neutral and passive and consciousness to be socially determined then we are 
at least halfway to a behavioural conception of subjectivity (1983: 8). 
Instead, Gatens argued that rather than there being a neutral body, there are at least two 
kinds of bodies: the male body and the female body. Gatens, whilst trying to avoid both 
the essentialist and ahistorical, a priori accounts of the sexed body (which she attributed 
to those she criticized), suggested that some bodily experiences and events although 
"lacking any fixed significance, are likely, in all social structures, to be privileged sites of 
significance". For example, if menstruation, is seen as one of these `privileged sites', 
"then there must be a qualitative difference between the kind of femininity `lived' by 
women and that `lived' by men". So, Gatens proposed that if the subject is "always a 
sexed subject", "[G]ender is not the issue; sexual difference is" (1983: 9, emphasis in 
original). In order to further substantiate her critique of the sex/gender distinction, Gatens 
re-examined Robert Stoller's original thesis on transsexualism that provided those earlier 
feminists with the means to argue that gender inequality was the result of socialization. 
In his groundbreaking book, Sex and Gender, Stoller (1968b) claimed that a person's 
gender identity is primarily the result of post-natal psychological influences. Thus, in 
most instances this gender identity will develop in line with the individual's biological 
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sex. However, in some rarer cases, like that of the transsexual, these psychological 
influences can supersede the biologically determined sex of the person. However, Gatens 
points out (as argued in Chapter Two) that Stoller's psychoanalytic account for the 
genesis of transsexualism is far more complete for the case of the male-to-female 
transsexual than the female-to-male transsexual. She suggests that because the 
explanation for MtF transsexualism cannot simply be reversed for FtM transsexualism, it 
illustrates the asymmetry between masculinity/femininity and male/female: 
The case of the female transsexual cannot be symmetrical. The relation of 
the female infant to the mother's body is not and cannot be problematic in 
the same way... Female transsexualism is much more likely to be a reaction 
against oppression... The transsexual knows, most clearly, that the issue is 
not one of gender but one of sex. It is not masculinity per se that is 
valorized in our culture but the masculine male. (Gatens, 1983: 15, 
emphasis in original) 
Gatens's simplistic explanation for FtM transsexualism as a seemingly voluntaristic 
`reaction against oppression' seems to me to be as problematic as Stoller's 
underdeveloped psychosexual account. However, she does raise the important point that 
gender attributes, encapsulated as masculine or feminine, are qualitatively different when 
performed by different kinds of bodies. Certainly, masculinity, when enacted by a male 
body will be read and interpreted differently than if that same masculinity could be 
enacted by a female body: a point which is crucial for the greater understanding of 
transsexual embodied subjectivity. However, Gatens concludes by warning that: 
... the sex/gender 
distinction lends itself to those groups or individuals whose 
analyses reveal a desire to ignore sexual difference and prioritize `class', 
`discourse', `power' or some other `hobby-horse'... as if women's bodies 
and the representation and control of women's bodies were not a crucial 
stake in these struggles (1983: 17, emphasis in original). 
Whilst I agree that in certain `liberal' discussions the body tends to be either ignored or 
treated as sex-neutral, I find Gatens's dismissal of important aspects of most feminist 
projects somewhat hasty. To concentrate solely on sexual difference indicated by specific 
`sites of privilege' such as menstruation or childbirth - as Gatens seems to imply - is 
itself rather reductive. Elizabeth Grosz describes how `sexual difference' feminists, such 
as herself and Moira Gatens, see the body as "crucial to understanding woman's 
psychical and social existence", but within a sexual difference framework "the body is no 
longer understood as an ahistorical, biological given, acultural object" (1994: 18). This is 
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a welcome development from formulating the body as a tabula rasa upon which 
meanings are inscribed. Yet, surely for a more nuanced analysis, the body should not 
displace other points of departure such as `class', `discourse' or `power', but rather be 
incorporated alongside these concepts which are always profoundly imbricated with 
subjectivity and gendered embodiment. 
3.2 Queer Theory and its critiques 
The shift from `gender' to `queer' is usually traced back to Gayle Rubin's (1984) 
argument that the category sexuality should be politically and analytically separated from 
that of gender (Segal, 1999). Whilst Rubin acknowledged that divergent feminist 
positions on sexuality made for an interesting discussion of `sex', she attempted to: 
... challenge the assumption that 
feminism is or should be the privileged site 
of a theory of sexuality. Feminism is the theory of gender oppression. To 
automatically assume that this makes it the theory of sexual oppression is to 
fail to distinguish between gender, on the one hand, and erotic desire, on the 
other (1984: 307). 
So, whilst Rubin argued that sex and gender are related, as gender inevitably affects the 
functioning of the `sexual system' and, at times, the sexual system manifests itself 
through gender specific forms, she concluded that they are not the same thing. However, 
it was Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1990: 16) who argued most emphatically for a "certain 
irreducibility" of sexuality to gender. In Epistemologies of the Closet Sedgwick 
formulates a substantive critique of the sex/gender distinction. She questions the way in 
which the term `sex' has been used by many feminists to represent chromosomal `sex' as 
"immutable and immanent in the individual". This is in contrast to `gender', which "is 
seen as culturally mutable and variable, highly relational (in the sense that each of the 
binarized genders is defined primarily by its relation to the other), and inextricable from 
a history of power differentials between genders" (Sedgwick, 1990: 28). But, rather than 
only being concerned with the problematic notion of theorizing the body ahistorically - 
like those `sexual difference' feminists described earlier - her critique focused, primarily, 
on the way that `sex' can be used to imply so much more than chromosomal `sex': 
namely, how `sex' is often indistinguishable from `sexuality'. Hence, aligned with Gayle 
Rubin, Sedgwick suggested that the questions of sexuality and the questions of gender - 
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although inextricable from one another, as each can be expressed only in terms of the 
other - are not the same question. Thus, Sedgwick's theoretical account assumed that: 
... there is always at 
least the potential for an analytic distance between 
gender and sexuality, even if particular manifestations or features of 
particular sexualities are among the things that plunge women and men 
most ineluctably into the discursive, institutional, and bodily enmeshments 
of gender definition, gender relation, and gender inequality (1990: 30). 
In her subsequent collection - Tendencies - Sedgwick suggests that one of the benefits of 
`queer' is that it can be used to refer to "the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, 
dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent 
elements of anyone's gender, of anyone's sexuality aren't made (or can't be made) to 
signify monolithically" (1994: 8, emphasis in original). Whilst `queer' may have 
emerged, at least politically, as a result of the reclamation and redeployment of an 
offensive term by some gays and lesbians, for Sedgwick (as a straight woman), `queer' 
was not necessarily dependent on same-sex desire. Rather, she suggested that: 
`Queer' seems to hinge much more radically and explicitly on a person's 
undertaking particular, performative acts of experimental self-perception 
and filiation... One possible corollary: that what it takes - all it takes - to 
make the description `queer' a true one is the impulsion to use it in the first 
person (1993: 9, emphasis in original). 
Hence, within this conceptual framework, anyone whose sexual orientation is 
heterosexual could also be queer, if they chose to describe themselves as such. Thus, 
explicit to Sedgwick's notion of queer is its intrinsic relationship to gender, as her queer 
project is about "desires and identifications that move across gender lines, including the 
desires of men for women and of women for men" (1994: 11, emphasis in original). In 
addition, Sedgwick engages with the proposal that `linguistic performativity' has become 
a site for reflection upon the way language can produce effects of, for example, identity, 
enforcement, seduction or challenge. Consequently, utterances that do not simply 
describe, but perform, the actions they name have implications for gender and sexuality. 
In part, this project entails attending to "powerful linguistic positions", which leads her 
to question whether the semantic force of a term such as queer is determined by subject 
position. For example, does the shift from using queer in the first person to directing it at 
a second or third person change the way we understand its meaning? This project is 
presented under the working title `Queer Performativity' and is inevitably, as Sedgwick 
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acknowledges, informed by the work of Judith Butler. 
Undoubtedly, Judith Butler's (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of 
Identity had the single greatest influence, not only upon Queer theory, but also upon the 
subsequent emergence of a field of transgender studies. This may seem surprising as her 
own relationship to queer theory remains rather ambivalent and she vehemently opposes 
those queer theorists who argue for the radical separation of sexuality from gender 
(Osborne & Segal, 1993). Despite this, the impact of Gender Trouble on Queer Theory 
has been immense. In this text, her central thesis, certainly the one that was most heavily 
drawn upon by her readership, revolved around the notion of `gender performativity'. 
Butler suggested that the appearance of a gendered self, a stable core gender identity, 
was, in fact, produced by the regulation of specific `attributes' along "culturally 
established lines of coherence". Thus: 
There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is 
performatively constituted by the very `expressions' that are said to be its 
results (1990: 24-25). 
Furthermore, when theorizing the relationship between sex, gender and sexuality, she 
proposed that if gender is the cultural interpretation of a sexed body, then it cannot be 
said that a specific gender should follow from a specific body. Even under the 
assumption of a stable binary gender system it cannot be assumed that the construction 
`man' exclusively reflects a male body, or that `woman' is the only gender interpretation 
of a female body. Instead, Butler (1990) draws upon Monique Wittig's (1987) notion of a 
`heterosexual contract' to formulate her own conceptual term, the `heterosexual matrix', 
which she subsequently employs to demonstrate the way in which bodies, genders and 
desires have been naturalized. Hence, the `heterosexual matrix' assumes that: 
... for bodies to cohere and make sense there must 
be a stable sex expressed 
through a stable gender (masculine expresses male, feminine expresses 
female) that is oppositionally and hierarchically defined through the 
compulsory practice of heterosexuality (1990: 151, n6). 
Butler proposes that bodies, genders and desires are naturalized through the repetition of 
acts, gestures and spoken desires that produce the illusion of an internal essence; an 
illusion that is discursively maintained for the sole purpose of regulating sexuality within 
the confines of reproductive heterosexuality. However, the most profound effect Butler's 
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thesis was to have upon subsequent accounts of transgender was, perhaps, due to her 
employment of `drag' to illustrate this notion of `gender performativity' - her argument 
that there was no original for `drag' to imitate; `drag' reveals that all gender is a parody. 
As Butler states: 
The performance of drag plays upon the distinction between the anatomy of 
the performer and the gender that is being performed. But we are actually in 
the presence of three contingent dimensions of significant corporeality: 
anatomical sex, gender identity, and gender performance... In imitating 
gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself - as 
well as its contingency (1990: 137, emphasis in original). 
One of the initial critiques of Butler's proposition, perhaps in response to this 
exemplification of `drag' and exacerbated by many subsequent misreadings, was that 
Butler appeared to purport a voluntaristic aspect to `gender performativity': that one is 
free to take up and exchange gender performances at will. These types of interpretations 
tend to figure in what Elspeth Probyn has described as "the sort of feel-good gender 
discourse at large". Where, "it is said that we can have whatever type of gender we want, 
and that there are as many genders as there are people, and that we wear our genders as 
drag" (1995: 79, cited in Lloyd, 1999: 199). However, a closer reading of Butler's work 
reveals that gender performativity is not seen as a choice, rather that gender identities 
achieve a certain degree of stability and coherence via a range of discourses available for 
delineating the body (Segal, 1999). As Butler herself suggests: 
... gendered bodies are so many 
"styles of the flesh". These styles all never 
fully self-styled, for styles have a history, and those histories condition and 
limit the possibilities. Consider gender, for instance, as a corporeal style, an 
"act", as it were, which is both intentional and performative, where 
"performative" suggests a dramatic and contingent construction of meaning 
(1990: 139; emphasis in original). 
By counterpoising `intentional' and `performative' as two aspects of gender, 
`performative' must be something other than `intentional'; more than a voluntaristic act. 
Rather, performative is "that aspect of discourse that has the capacity to produce what it 
names" (Osborne & Segal, 1993: 112, emphasis in the original). 
A second and related criticism of Gender Trouble focused on the way that by 
conceptualizing gender as `performative', Butler appeared to ignore the category `sex'. 
In Gender Trouble, `sex' is formulated, like `gender', as a cultural construction - to the 
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extent that we may find that "perhaps it was always already gender, with the 
consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at 
all" (1990: 7). Indeed, statements such as: "acts, gestures, and desire produce the effect 
of an internal core or substance, but produce this on the surface of the body", or "[T]hat 
the gendered body is performative suggests that it has no ontological status apart from 
the various acts which constitute its reality" (1990: 136, emphasis in original), certainly 
give the impression that Butler fails to attend to the material constraints that anatomical, 
biological differences may pose for bodies and the plausibility of particular gender 
identifications. In her subsequent book, Bodies that Matter, Butler sets out a partial 
"rethinking of some of the parts of Gender Trouble that have caused confusion" (1993: 
xii), specifically, addressing the question of whether it is possible to link gender 
performativity to the materiality of the body. 
Butler begins with an analysis of materiality that challenges her critics' claims that a 
recourse to matter and the materiality of sex is necessary to ground feminist practice. 
Rather, Butler suggests that matter itself has a history: materiality cannot ground feminist 
claims because matter is already "fully sedimented with discourses on sex and sexuality 
that prefigure and constrain the uses to which that term can be put" (Butler, 1993: 29). 
As such the materiality of the body is never prior to discourse, but rather also its effect. 
As Butler proposes: 
If the body signified as prior to signification is an effect of signification, 
then the mimetic or representational status of language, which claims that 
signs follow bodies as their necessary mirrors, is not mimetic at all. On the 
contrary, it is productive, constitutive, one might even argue performative, 
in as much as this signifying act delimits and contours the body that it then 
claims to find prior to any and all signification (1993: 30; emphasis in 
original). 
This time, Butler is careful to pre-empt potential criticism from her feminist peers who 
might suggest that she is arguing for a simple and singular notion of the body as a 
`linguistic effect' that is reducible to a set of signifiers. Whilst she acknowledges that 
`problematizing matter' risks a certain degree of epistemological uncertainty, she rejects 
the premise that it will result in political nihilism. Instead, she is attempting to destabilize 
materiality by calling into question the presupposition that the body pre-exists discourse 
in an attempt to initiate "new possibilities, new ways for bodies to matter" (Butler, 1993: 
30). As such, Butler proposes a rethink of the premise that the subject assumes or adopts 
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a bodily norm. Instead, she suggests that the subject or the speaking "I" is formed by the 
very process of assuming a `sex'. Thus, the forming of a `subject' requires identification 
with the normative spectre of `sex', which is necessarily reliant upon the rejection of 
other identifications. This repudiation results in the production of "a domain of 
abjection" which incorporates those "`unlivable' and `uninhabitable' zones of social life 
which are nevertheless densely populated by those who do not enjoy the status of the 
subject". Moreover, the materialization of a given sex will be dependent upon "the 
regulation of identification practices" to produce a continued disavowal of any 
identification with the `abject' (Butler, 1993: 3, emphasis in original). 
Butler's revised position on the body proposes a shift away from the notion 
`construction' that was so prevalent in her earlier account (Butler, 1990), and from the 
proposition that the body is a discursively inscribed site or surface. As such, Butler 
rejects formulations that juxtapose discursive constructions on the one hand with lived 
bodies on the other. Rather, she posits that "discourses (do) actually live in bodies. They 
lodge in bodies; bodies in fact carry discourses as part of their lifeblood" (Meijer & 
Prins, 1998: 282). Thus, in Bodies that Matter, Butler proposes: 
... a return to the notion of matter, not as a site or surface, 
but as a process of 
materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, 
fixity, and surface we call matter (1993: 9; emphasis in original). 
Whilst clarifying that `construction' is not a singular act or a voluntaristic process 
affected by the subject, Butler argues that construction takes place in historically located 
time. Furthermore, construction "is itself a temporal process which-operates through the 
reiteration of norms; sex is both produced and destabilized in the course of the 
reiteration" (Butler, 1993: 10, emphasis added). Thus, whilst the practice of repetition 
serves to create the naturalized effect of sex, it also creates its instability. Butler argues 
that the reiteration of norms opens up gaps or fissures in the very constructions that seek 
to define and fix those norms. Thus, `sex' is a temporal process of `becoming' - yet never 
attaining -a fixed and idealized `sex'. Later, in an analysis of `drag' portrayed in the film 
Paris is Burning, Butler - influenced by Lacanian theory - suggests that: 
`Realness' is not exactly a category in which one competes; it is a standard 
that is used to judge any given performance within the established 
categories. And yet what determines the effect of realness is the ability to 
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compel belief, to produce the naturalized effect. This effect is itself the 
result of an embodiment of norms, a reiteration of norms, an impersonation 
of a racial and class norm, a norm which is at once a figure, a figure of a 
body, which is no particular body, but a morphological ideal that remains 
the standard which regulates the performance, but which no performance 
fully approximates (1993: 129). 
Thus, there is no `real' male or female body. Just an unattainable ideal to aspire to 
become - an ideal maintained through the reiteration and embodiment of gender norms 
and bound together by heterosexuality. Continuing her analysis, Butler suggests that this 
particular drag performance only works because it cannot be `read' as performance. 
Here, parallels can be drawn with the common concern amongst many transsexuals to 
`pass', where in order to `pass', the transsexual must not be `read'. For, as Butler 
describes, "`reading' means taking someone down, exposing what fails to work at the 
level of appearance, insulting or deriding someone". As, for Butler at least, all gender is 
performative, it would seem that the transsexual subject is entrenched in the very same 
process as all of us - striving for the effect of `realness'. 
In the final chapter of Bodies that Matter, Butler remains resistant towards the 
ontological notion of `being' that was originally expressed in Gender Trouble. Drawing 
on Lacan, she suggested that `being the Phallus' is a masquerade that reduces all forms 
of `being' to the form of `appearing'; that gender ontology itself is reduced to the play of 
appearance (Butler, 1990: 47). In Critically Queer, Butler builds upon this account, 
stressing again that there is no ontological `truth' to gender, even that aspect of gender 
that is `performed'. Here, Butler draws an important distinction between `performance' 
and `performativity', insofar as performativity comprises of 
... a reiteration of norms which precede, constrain, and exceed the performer 
and in that sense cannot be taken as the fabrication of the performer's `will' 
or `choice'; further what is `performed' works to conceal, if not disavow, 
what remains opaque, unconscious, unperformable. The reduction of 
performativity to performance would be a mistake" (1993: 234, emphasis 
added; see also Osborne & Segal, 1996: 112). 
Thus, it appears that by counterpoising `performance' - which permits a degree of agency 
although no ontological `truth' - and `performativity' - which permits neither - Butler is 
attempting to navigate a necessary, but somewhat tricky philosophical path between a 
determinist and a voluntaristic/humanistic conception of the subject. Within this 
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conception, Butler suggests that: 
[G]ender is neither a purely psychic truth, conceived as `internal' and 
`hidden, ' nor is it reducible to a surface appearance; on the contrary, its 
undecidability is to be traced as the play between psyche and appearance 
(where the latter domain includes what appears in words). Further, this will 
be a `play' regulated by heterosexist constraints though not, for that reason, 
fully reducible to them (1993: 234; emphasis in original). 
The lesbian feminist Biddy Martin (1996) is also concerned with these questions of 
gender, sexuality and identity. However, whilst welcoming some of the developments 
that have been made by feminist, queer and lesbian theorists, Martin takes issue with 
particular aspects of Sedgwick's and Butler's work. For example, she is critical of the 
way that many queer theorists - and both Butler and Sedgwick exemplify this trend - 
fudge the distinction between `sex' and `gender' to the extent that they become collapsed 
into one another. Martin is concerned that when Sedgwick announces that she will use 
gender to denominate "the whole package of physical and cultural distinctions between 
women and men" (1990: 29), she is sliding into a position where "sex is now gender is 
now sex is now woman's reproductive potential and the political battles over its control" 
(Martin, 1992: 76). Similarly, Martin is also worried that the way in which Sedgwick 
moves to make "sexuality irreducible to gender" results in sexuality becoming so distinct 
from gender that it seems "strangely exempt from the enmeshments and constraints of 
gender ... and, thus, even from the 
body" (1992: 77). Turning to the work of Judith Butler, 
Martin suggests that "Butler displaces the distinction in quite another way: by 
questioning the facticity of sex that is said to underlie the social constructedness of 
gender, and by emphasizing reconfigurations of the norms that govern sex and sexuality" 
(1996: 79). Thus, whilst Sedgwick conceptualizes gender as sex, for Butler, sex becomes 
gender. Martin argues that although the collapsing of sex and gender, often because of 
the difficulty in separating them, indicates some similarity between Butler's and 
Sedgwick's accounts, Butler "more explicitly connects the reconfiguration of bodily 
gender with the possibility of discursive resignification". As such, Butler is frequently 
charged by her critics for "failing at times to make the body enough of a drag on 
signification" (Martin, 1992: 80). Consequently, Martin suggests that: 
... we pay more respect to what's given, to 
limits, even as we open the future 
to what we think is now unthinkable or deligitimated, that we do this in 
order to generate a notion of difference that is not fixed or stable in its 
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distribution across bodies, but is also not dispensable (Martin, 1992: 82). 
Hence, Martin is critical of attempts, such as Sedgwick's, that she perceives as making 
the body irrelevant and thus constituting too radical a separation between feminist and 
queer projects. However, she is rather more supportive of Butler's approach which 
construes sex/gender and sexuality as the product of discursive practices - even at the 
level of the body, but only if "the body, the material is conceived as a drag or limit as 
well as a potential" (Martin, 1992: 92). This should certainly be heeded for any analysis 
of transsexualism. 
Susan Bordo is another feminist theorist whose work has had a significant impact upon 
the twists and turns in the theorizing of gendered bodies. She is also sceptical of what she 
describes as "postmodern tendencies to `textualize' the body" which frequently result in 
"giving a kind of free, creative rein to meaning at the expense of attention to the body's 
material locatedness in history, practice, culture" (Bordo, 1993: 38, emphasis in 
original). The problem of materiality and the related theme of mind/body dualism are 
comprehensively discussed in Unbearable Weight (1993) -a collection of articles, 
written over of number of years - that present a rich cultural analysis of bodily practices 
and theoretical positions. Bordo posits that, despite a long history of philosophical 
debate, Cartesian dualism has become a contemporary construction of self that shapes 
experience. As she states: 
Dualism, of course, was not invented in the twentieth century. But there are 
distinctive ways in which it is embodied in contemporary culture, giving the 
lie to the social mythology that ours is a body-loving, de-repressive era. We 
may be obsessed with our bodies, but we are hardly accepting of them... My 
aim, however, is not to portray these obsessions as bizarre or anomalous, 
but rather, as the logical (if extreme) manifestations of anxieties and 
fantasies fostered by our culture (Bordo, 1993: 15, emphasis in original) 
Bordo suggests that contemporary culture is high on "a postmodern intoxication with 
possibilities", with its emphasis upon the unstable, fluid, fragmented and heterogeneous, 
rather than the fixed and stable. This is affecting a transformation in discourse "that is 
gradually changing our conception and experience of our bodies, a discourse that 
encourages us to `imagine the possibilities' and close our eyes to limits and 
consequences" (1993: 38-39). Bordo welcomes the insights provided by some 
poststructuralist work, particularly that informed by Foucault. However, she takes issue 
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with those poststructuralist strands that, at times, eulogize the `disembodied ideal' and 
fantasize about "capturing that heterogeneity in our `readings' by continually seeking 
difference for its own sake, by being guided by the pure possibilities of interpretation 
rather than an embodied point of view" (1993: 39-40, emphasis in original). Thus, Bordo 
suggests that cultural transformation can only be affected by shifts in "real, historical 
changes in the relations of power, modes of subjectivity, the organization of life" (1993: 
41; see also Parker, 1992). Consequently, Bordo urges that to avoid both practical and 
representational repetition of the cultural production of dualism, feminism, and gender 
theory in general, must be underpinned by a struggle to incorporate "our histories of 
embodied experience" (Bordo, 1993: 42). 
Hence, it would appear that feminist and queer attempts to reconceptualize gender theory 
beyond simply distinguishing sex from gender have been extremely useful. As Biddy 
Martin explains: 
... the sex/gender split 
has had the consequence of leaving the assumption of 
biological sexual difference intact and of introducing a damaging 
body/mind split (1996: 72). 
As we have seen, these problems have been theorized and challenged in a variety of 
conceptual and political ways. Yet, nowhere is a potential challenge to the mind/body 
split or discontinuity in the sex/gender system better exemplified than in the accounts of 
transsexual individuals. Thus, the resultant effects of shifts in gender theory have been of 
great benefit in the enabling as well as elaborating the content of social and cultural 
accounts of transsexualism and transgender - both because, and in spite of, the disputes 
they have unleashed. 
3.3 From Queer to Transgender Studies 
Queer theory set out to replace `gender' with the theorizing of `sexuality', as the 
theorizing of gender had, on occasion, operated to marginalize those individuals whose 
subjectivity and embodiment deviated from the dominant discourses of gender. Thus, 
queer subjects can include not only gays, lesbians, bisexuals, but also sadomasochists, 
transsexuals and transgenderists: as all of these are seen as crossing the boundaries of 
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gender, illustrating the infinite capacity of gender to mutate and create more possibilities 
for its expression (Kidd, 1999). But, as we will see, queer theory has not had an 
unproblematic relationship to the burgeoning work that is emerging from the new 
discipline `trans-studies'. However, it will be suggested that the very emergence of 
`trans-studies' was contingent upon both queer as a political movement as well as on the 
impact of `queer studies' upon the theoretical conceptualizations of gender, subjectivity 
and embodiment. In this next section I present some of the debates that are currently 
taking place in this field, highlighting the way queer theory has, in diverse ways, 
informed them. 
In the recent Transgender Special Edition of the academic journal GLQ the inspirational 
guest editor, Susan Stryker, proposes that at least two pronounced sets of factors have 
determined the academy's growing interest in `transgender'. The first she describes as 
the `postmodern condition'; the second, she suggests is, in part, due to the proliferation 
of individuals who "lay claim to some form of transgender identity" within "cultural 
zones where postmodern representational systems are well established" (1998: 147). 
Both provide new configurations of discourses for critical theorists to dissect. 
Accordingly, Stryker argues that: 
Transgender phenomena have achieved critical importance (and critical 
chic) to the extent that they provide a site for grappling with the problematic 
relation between the principles of performativity and a materiality that, 
while inescapable, defies stable representation, particularly as experienced 
by embodied subjects (1998: 147, my emphasis). 
Undoubtedly, the impact of Judith Butler's work over the last decade is implicit in this 
extract. However, the effect of `queer-studies' upon the emergence of `trans-studies' 
cannot be entirely reduced to theoretical debates. Queer, particularly in the United States, 
also manifested as a new political movement. Queer politics - incited by the devastating 
effects of AIDS upon the gay male community and the US government's apparent 
willingness to ignore it - emerged in April 1990 when a group in New York City met to 
discuss the series of homophobic attacks committed upon lesbians and gay men in the 
East Village. Reappropriating a term that was historically soiled by shame and 
degradation, this group began to mobilize under the banner `Queer Nation'. Queer 
Nation's strategy was one of confrontational politics that aimed to "put perversion in the 
public's face" and "embrace the diverse lesbian, gay, and bisexual identities that had 
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been suppressed or marginalized by a restrictive politics of identity" (Bristow & Wilson, 
1993: 9). 
Within two years transgendered activists had also begun a similar process of political 
mobilization aimed at challenging pathologizing discourses and public intolerance acted 
out through discrimination, violence and harassment. For example, Stryker describes 
how as "a member of Transgender Nation -a militantly queer, direct action transsexual 
advocacy group -I was at the time involved in organizing a disruption and protest at the 
American Psychiatric Association's 1993 annual meeting in San Francisco" (1994: 237). 
Other groups such as Transsexual Menace and Transgender Rights were also formed in 
direct response to transphobia. One such incident that has received a great deal of public 
attention - culminating in a Hollywood adaptation, Boys Don't Cry, and an Oscar for the 
leading actress, Hilary Swank - was the brutal rape and subsequent murder of Brandon 
Teena, a cross-dressing FtM and two of his friends in Humboldt, Nebraska in December 
1993. It is difficult to place Brandon Teena in terms of gender identification, and it is 
unlikely that Brandon ever named himself as a FtM transsexual or as transgendered. 
Likewise, according to his mother, neither did Brandon, as some press reports claimed, 
ever identify as lesbian (Nataf, 1996). However, it is clear that Brandon, a biological 
female, was murdered for the transgender practice of `passing' as male. Judith 
Halberstam, quite rightly, warns against appropriating the lives of the dead for identity 
politics (Halberstam & Hale, 1998; Halberstam, 1998). But, the frequently distorted 
media reporting that referred to Brandon as `she' and as a `cross-dressing lesbian' proved 
to spur on the politicization and the establishment of organizations to defend transgender 
human rights (Nataf, 1996: 29). 
Mary Brown Parlee suggests that new representations of gendered embodiment that have 
begun to emerge from the discourses of the `transgender liberation' movement (Leslie 
Feinberg's term, 1993) are "strikingly different from psychological theories of gendered 
embodiment emanating from the academy" (1996: 633). Parlee argues that activists who 
are committed to accounting for the variety in transgendered persons' embodied 
subjectivities have had to move beyond such bedrock concepts as `man', `woman', 
`male', `female', `lesbian', `gay' and `straight'. Parlee draws upon the writings of Riki 
Anne Wilchins, founder of the activist group Transsexual Menace, to illustrate how 
transgender activists have been engaged in "rethinking - re-theorizing - sex and gender 
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categories, developing new terms" (Parlee, 1996: 633). Wilchins states: 
I don't believe in `male' and `female' or `man' and `woman' either. 
Certainly I believe in them as political accomplishments, cultural categories 
instituted to cause us to read the body in a specific way: promoting and 
sustaining the imperative that the most important thing bodies can do is 
reproduce. But I don't view them as the so-called `natural facts' they are 
interminably and predictably proposed to represent... The point is all these 
names reflect the political aims of a cultural regime which produces certain 
gender `realities' for its own changing, and historically specific, needs... So, 
if we are to disrupt the regime, we must take control of language, take 
control of (corrupt) the definitions, disturb the structure. This brings us to a 
number of terms coming into increasing coinage in the `gender community', 
such as `gendertrash, ' one `S' transexuals, `genderqueer' etc. (1995: 46; 
cited in Parlee, 1996: 635). 
I sense a Butlerian at work. And, inevitably, Wilchins goes on to make explicit the 
influence of Judith Butler. Parlee suggests that "(G)iven her analysis, where and how she 
positions herself in the moral order, and her reasons for theorizing, Wilchins selectively 
makes use of `official' knowledge produced from within the academy to clarify further 
her own and others' situation" (1996: 635). I am unsure about this `chicken and egg' 
style argument, which suggests Wilchins simply draws upon Butler's thesis in order to 
support her own position. Rather, I believe that Butler's work has provided the discursive 
means by which transgendered individuals can begin to express and direct their `rage', as 
Susan Stryker (1993) would describe it, at medical and scientific discourses that have 
sought to create uniformity in, or annihilation of their embodied gendered subjectivities. 
Certainly, in the exciting and edifying days of early queer politics, the political climate 
was ripe for the emergence of transgender activism. But, this activism, and the radical 
challenge it endeavoured to make, was also dependent upon the articulations of `queer' 
theorists - Judith Butler, in particular. Contrary to Parlee's claim, Wilchins makes this 
explicit: 
Feminist philosopher Judith Butler has pointed out that to define any 
categories, to create a grid of intelligible identities, you must inevitably case 
out and obscure others. These others become what she calls an `abject' 
region: those identities which become unspeakable, even unthinkable, 
within the grid because there are no terms or names for them. So defining 
this grid means making decisions (in other words, having the power) to 
decide what kinds of gendered bodies `matter' and which don't ... It 
is 
inevitably the outside (i. e. `us'), in remaining outside, that makes the inside 
possible. Because once the outside intrudes, neatness and coherence 
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immediately vanish and are quickly replaced with messy, disordered 
multiplicity. From this viewpoint, transgendered bodies and genders are that 
outside, and it is precisely by discarding us as `gendertrash' if you will, by 
stigmatizing us or by deligitimating us off the grid as merely `aberrant' or 
`deviant' or (Virginia Prince here) `defective' or `pathological, ' which 
enables the binary grid to appear as immaculate, uncontaminated, and 
`natural' (1995: 47; cited in Parlee, 1996: 635). 
Parlee is, however, correct to criticize those psychological theories of sexed/gendered 
embodiment, particularly, as she cites, of the ilk of Rom Harre (1991), which leave both 
`gender' and the `body' seriously under theorized. They also seemingly serve "to 
reproduce as scientific knowledge common-sense beliefs about gendered embodiment". 
Within these theories, Parlee argues that sex/gender categories are perceived as `natural'. 
Thus, those individuals who trangress them "are to be spoken of, thought of and treated 
as objects (pathological, rare, anomalous) rather than as persons with moral standing and 
agency" (Parlee, 1996: 639). However, by attributing important shifts in the 
conceptualization of gender theory solely to the activities of politicized transgendered 
subjects, she does, I feel, somewhat over-look the historical locatedness of the 
emergence of `trans-studies' and its contingency upon both queer politics and queer 
theory. 
A somewhat different interpretation of the influence of queer studies upon `trans-studies' 
is offered by Jay Prosser in the opening chapter of his narrative account of 
transsexualism, Second Skins. Rather than accepting the premise that queer sought to 
represent the transgendered subject, Prosser suggests that: 
... queer studies 
has made the transgendered subject, the subject who crosses 
gender boundaries, a key queer trope... (1998: 5, my emphasis). 
Whilst acknowledging that "transgender would not be of the moment if not for the queer 
moment" (1998: 6), Prosser argues that queer theory has elevated the transgendered 
subject above and beyond the transsexual subject. This, he suggests, is the result of queer 
theory's particular interest in those who cross gender lines, rather than in those who cross 
the lines of sex. Thus, Prosser attempts to redress what he sees as queer theory's 
omission of embodiment - in favour of gender performativity - by concentrating on 
transsexual narratives. He suggests that `transition', in queer theory, may be explored in 
order to evidence the sex/gender system as a construction and thus, indicate the 
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impossibility of identity. However, for transsexualism, in contrast, `transition' may be 
"the very route to identity and bodily integrity" (Prosser, 1998: 6, my emphasis). 
Prosser's project is an important one. Having himself transitioned from female to male, 
his position is both sentient and sensitive to the experience of being transsexual. As such, 
he questions the growing trend for transsexuals to give up on `passing', to `come out', 
which he posits as an effect of the transsexual community engagement with 
transgendered politics. Prosser acknowledges that a politically driven `coming out' 
rhetoric is important for creating both transgendered and transsexual as specific and, 
importantly, allied subjectivities. However, Prosser argues that rather than revealing 
gender categories as a fiction, as most `queer' accounts would assert, both transsexual 
and transgendered narratives, to paraphrase, produce the sobering realization of the 
ongoing functional power that the categories of man and woman still carry for a sense of 
cultural belonging (Prosser, 1998: 11). Thus: 
[W]hile coming out is necessary for establishing subjectivity, for 
transsexuals the act is intrinsically ambivalent. For in coming out and 
staking a claim to representation, the transsexual undoes the realness that is 
the conventional goal of this transition. These narratives return us to the 
complexities and difficulties that inevitably accompany real-life experiences 
of gender crossing and to the personal costs of not simply being a man or a 
woman. In accounts of individual lives, outside its current theoretical 
figuration transition often proves a barely livable zone (1998: 11-12, my 
emphasis). 
Thus, Prosser is sceptical of many postmodern or poststructuralist informed accounts, of 
which Judith Halberstam's well known article F2M is a good example. In true queer 
celebratory style - and, paradoxically, using the same mantra as Jean Baudrillard (1992; 
discussed in Chapter One), Halberstam declared that: 
We are all transsexuals except that the referent of the trans becomes less 
and less clear (and more and more queer). We are all cross-dressers... It is 
just that for some of us our costumes are made of fabric or material, while 
for others they are made of skin; for some an outfit can be changed; for 
others skin must be resewn. There are no transsexuals (1994: 212). 
Halberstam's argument was that the resultant effect of a postmodern fracturing and 
fragmenting of the concept `sexual identity' would ensure the disappearance of the 
59 
specificity of transsexual identity. As such, she proposed that all "elective body 
alterations" should be subsumed under the rubric cosmetic surgery (Halberstam, 1994: 
216). Unsurprisingly, the response to her paper was predominantly critical - and, at 
times, hostile - particularly, from members of the San Francisco based transsexual men's 
group, FTM International (Halberstam, 1998). To her credit, Halberstam has taken these 
criticisms seriously and endeavoured to address them by "reconsider[ing] the various 
relations and nonrelations between FTM and butch subjectivities and bodies" (1998: 
289). As such, she describes how her original presumption that some forms of 
transsexualism represented `gender essentialism' was interpreted, unintentionally, as 
suggesting that she perceived "butchness as postmodern and therefore subversive while 
transsexualism was dated and deluded". Instead, Halberstam claims that she was 
attempting to produce a theoretical and cultural space for `transgender butch' that had a 
distinct epistemological frame from transsexuality: in effect, "the possibility of the 
nonoperated-upon transgender-identified person". Unfortunately, Halberstam's original 
thesis is typical of the type of analysis of transsexualism that seeks to use it in a 
conceptual fashion to support alternative agendas: in this case, theorizing female 
masculinity as transgender butch. Of course, what is lost is the transsexual subject, their 
subjectivity and sense of (dis)embodiment. Halberstam heeds this and thus concludes 
with a substantial reformulation of her previous position: 
There are transsexuals, and we are not all transsexuals; gender is not fluid, 
and gender variance is not the same wherever we find it. Specificity is 
all.. . gender variance 
in and of itself (like sexual variance in and of itself) 
cannot be relied upon to produce a radical and oppositional politics simply 
by virtue of representing difference (1998: 306). 
Consequently, the analysis offered by Prosser that draws upon texts that "engage with 
feelings of embodiment", or "stories that not only represent but allow changes to somatic 
materiality" (Prosser, 1998: 16) is a much needed development if we are to dig ourselves 
out of the current impasse. Certainly the debate that seemingly oscillates between 
transsexualism as trangressing/reinstating the binary gender system - or, as Prosser 
describes it literalizing/deliteralizing; subversive/hegemonic, is a frustrating one. 
Drawing on Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank's paper - Shame in the Cybernetic 
Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins - Prosser suggests that these types of binaries saturate 
poststructuralist methods to the extent that it is impossible to simply "move `beyond' 
them" (1998: 16). Instead, he suggests that we should begin to read transsexual 
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narratives in an attempt to rupture the binaries between literalizing/deliteralizing, 
reinscriptive/transgressive and subversive/hegemonic, with the aim of opening up a 
transitional space between them. All too often, and to its detriment, the sole purpose of 
poststructuralist theory has been to distinguish between that which is essentialist (bad) 
and that which is anti-essentialist (good). Thus, Prosser suggests that: 
[T]o the extent that transsexual narratives cannot be read without our 
accounting for the subjective experience of being transgendered, reading 
them necessitates our taking at every step what Sedgwick and Frank term - 
it's a phrase that's been much circulated recently - "the risk of essentialism" 
(513). That is, to the extent that they are written out of experience, the body, 
sex, feeling, belief in immanent self, reading transsexual body narratives 
necessitates our using these categories that we have come to believe require 
deconstructing a priori (1998: 16). 
Whilst this is a noble move, the unequivocal distinctions that Prosser is trying to draw 
throughout the book between transsexual, transgender and queer, in an attempt to ground 
a particular transsexual `essence', are difficult ones to maintain. In a later chapter, No 
Place Like Home, Prosser separates the three terms arguing that the transgender 
movement has, problematically, attempted to queer transsexuality resulting in a radical 
overthrow of many of the features of "transsexuality's body narrative" (1998: 174). He 
continues by suggesting that: 
... even as the style of transgender cuts and pastes 
bits and pieces of queer to 
produce a troubling performativity, the very fact of transgender's naming -a 
transgender studies, a transgendered movement, a transgendered subject, 
and so on - still marks transgender's irreducibility to these queer correlates. 
Most obviously, as the term `transgender' suggests, this irreducibility pivots 
on the category of gender and an approach to transgender as the grounds of 
an identity (Prosser, 1998: 175, my emphasis). 
In a critique of this account, Judith Halberstam suggests that the opposition that Prosser 
sets out between transgender and queer identities is false and that the distinctions he 
makes between queer, transgender and transsexual are confusing and inconsistent: 
Sometimes transgender and transsexual are synonymous for him, and he 
sets them in opposition to queer, which is presented as maintaining the same 
relationship between gender identity and body morphology as is enforced 
within heteronormative culture. Sometimes transgender and queer are 
synonyms whose disruptive refigurations of desires and bodies are set in 
opposition to (non homosexual) transsexuality's surgical and hormonal 
recapitulation of heteronormative embodiment - its tendency to straighten 
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the alignment between body and identity (1998: 291, emphasis in original). 
Although debates ensue about what is and what is not queer, it is transgender that is the 
difficult term here; what transgender means and how it relates to queer. Susan Stryker 
might suggest "transgender can in fact be read as a heterodox interpretation of queer, 
that it is a conceptualization of queerness based on the understandings of people who 
contest naturalized heteronormativity in ways that might include, but are not limited to, 
homosexual orientation or object choice" (1998: 149, emphasis in original). Thus, queer 
can incorporate both transgender and transsexuality. But, Jay Prosser would argue that 
"at the heart of transgender's project lies a contradictory dynamic in relation to queerness 
and transsexuality: both differentiating against and inclusive of them". Consequently, 
"`transgender' needs to be read in relation to, but not reduced to, transsexual and queer 
narratives" (1998: 176). Definitional dilemmas, indeed. Postmodernity may have set the 
stage for the emergence of queer and transgender, but it certainly does not permit a 
definitive explanation for the way in which they can be employed. In fact, these types of 
language games and border battles seem to contradict the very premise they set out to 
promote - unless, like Prosser, the aim is to ground these identities. Inevitably, the 
circularity of these arguments almost always results in frustrating loops, passing 
increasingly familiar points of reference, with little notion of the distance from the target 
destination, or even where that destination originally was. 
Certainly, the work of Judith Butler (1990; 1993), particularly her two book publications 
of the early 1990's, has had a profound influence upon the emergence of trans-studies, 
not least, upon the conceptual language that is employed. Heeding the pertinent 
criticisms made by Biddy Martin and Susan Bordo (discussed in the previous section), I 
would like to suggest that Butler's importance for the development of trans-studies has 
been precisely because of her failure to fully acknowledge the body as a drag upon 
gender signification (Martin, 1992: 80). In the next section, I look at how this 
interpretation has impacted upon transgendered theorists accounts as they move from 
theorizing transsexual subjectivity to incorporating "our histories of embodied 
experience" (Bordo, 1993: 42). 
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3.4 Transgender Studies: theorizing transsexual embodied subjectivity 
Certainly the impact of queer has been of crucial importance to the way in which `trans' 
subjectivities and embodiment are beginning to be theorized. But it was, perhaps, only 
after the success of Marjorie Garber's (1992) ground breaking social and cultural 
analysis of cross-dressing - Vested Interests - that there began to be a sea change in the 
publication pattern for academic accounts of transgenderism. As Garber proposed: 
The transsexual body is not an absolute insignia of anything. Yet it makes 
the referent ("man" or "woman") seem knowable. Paradoxically, it is to 
transsexuals and transvestites that we need to look if we want to understand 
what gender categories mean (1992: 110, emphasis in original). 
But, as Susan Stryker (1998) quite rightly points out, Garber's socio-cultural analysis 
was, like many previous feminist and queer accounts, solely concerned with how 
transsexuals and transvestites were constructed through the `cultural gaze' with 
absolutely no regard for transsexual subjectivity. Instead, for the development of a field 
of `trans-studies', Stryker suggests that: 
First, transgender should be something more than the mere elaboration of 
certain already-established discourses on transgenderism - the medico- 
juridical discourse of gender dysphoria inforced by members of the 
HBIGDA, for example, or moral discourses such as Janice Raymond's that 
masquerade as objective critique while passing judgment on the truth or 
justice of particular gender identities. Secondly, the field should also be 
predicated on an explicit recognition of transgendered people as active 
agents seeking to represent themselves through any number of strategies, 
rather than as passive objects of representation in a few dominant discourses 
(1998: 148). 
In an early paper, Stryker (1994) provides a more detailed account of these issues 
suggesting that the transsexual body is not simply a creation of modern science, nor does 
the medically constructed nature of transsexual bodies preclude them from viable sites 
for subjectivity. Moreover, whilst medical science may enable the very means to 
transsexual embodiment, Stryker argues this does not guarantee the transsexual subject's 
complicity with a conservative and heteronormative agenda which, undoubtedly, upholds 
sex reassignment surgery as the establishment's treatment of choice: 
As we rise up from the operating tables of our rebirth, we transsexuals are 
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something more, and something other, than the creatures our makers intend 
us to be. Though medical techniques for sex reassignment are capable of 
crafting bodies that satisfy the visual and morphological criteria that 
generate naturalness as their effect, engaging with those very techniques 
produces a subjective experience that belies the naturalistic effect 
biomedical technology can achieve. Transsexual embodiment, like the 
embodiment of the monster, places its subject in an unassimilable, 
antagonistic, queer relationship to a Nature in which it must nevertheless 
exist (1994: 242). 
Thus, the `trans-project' was to begin by exploring the ebbs, flows, complexities and 
discontinuities of transgendered subjectivity and embodiment, in all its rich and 
multifaceted ways. No longer were transsexuals or transgenderists to be banished to short 
paragraphs, called up to support specific theoretical or moral positions whilst feminists 
and queer theorists contested the conceptualizations of gender and sexuality. The 
transsexual and transgenderist had arrived: finally subjects in their own right, engaged in 
their own battles and boundary wars. 
"Its an exciting time here at the beginning of a movement", declares `gender outlaw' 
Kate Bornstein in one of the best examples of a misreading of Butler's notion of `gender 
performativity'. In a style more celebratorary and, unfortunately, less empathetic to the 
plight of most transsexuals, Bornstein embarks upon an enthusiastic and deconstructive 
assault on the `rules' of the gender system where: 
Gender fluidity is the ability to freely and knowingly become one or many 
of a limitless number of genders, for any length of time, at any rate of 
change. Gender fluidity recognizes no borders or rules of gender (1994: 52). 
Although Bornstein's Gender Outlaw: On men, women and the rest of us possesses an 
energy that, at times, makes it fun to read, many of her theoretical goals are problematic. 
For example, one of Bornstein's principal concerns is to distinguish between those 
transsexual or transgendered individuals who appear to contest the gender system, 
`gender outlaws' such as herself, and those individuals who appear to uphold the gender 
order, `gender defenders'. As such, transsexuals who `pass' are devalued because in 
appearing to conform to gender rules they reinstate the very rules that their act of 
transition undid. But, as Patricia Elliot and Katrina Roen correctly point out, "the 
opposition Bornstein constructs for the purpose of privileging the outlaws denies the 
complexity and fluidity of identity she hopes to affirm and denies the possibility of a 
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sexual politics that might find support in either group" (1998: 239). 
A second related problem with Bornstein's account concerns how she perceives the 
relationship between the body and gender fluidity. Bornstein argues that the body has no 
limit on gender signification, that gender identities can be taken on at will and are in no 
way dependent upon the physical manifestation of the body. But can gender identities 
simply be taken on in isolation from other's readings of our body? Even if this were the 
case, one might wonder why Bornstein was compelled to construct a female body, to 
signify to others her female identity. I must add that after reading her radical thesis, 
which divides the world between gender defenders and gender outlaws, I was somewhat 
dismayed to see how this `gender outlaw' manifested physically. She seems to hold the 
rather privileged position of being able to `pass' as a white, straight female - unless, of 
course, she comes out as `Kate Bornstein, the MtF transsexual, lesbian, performance 
artist' in every transient interaction. However, those who seek to `pass' on a daily basis 
are criticized for reinstating the binary gender system. I think that perhaps the most 
disappointing aspect of Bornstein's thesis is that these claims are made retrospectively. 
She has transitioned, and does manifest to all intents and purposes as female, despite her 
claim to be a gender outlaw. Yet, she begins to argue against those who, for what must 
be a variety of social and economic factors, try to live their lives within the structures of 
a binary gender system. Unfortunately, I believe that Bornstein's work whilst admirable 
for attempting to provide an account of transgender experience outside of socio-medical 
discourses feeds into an unhealthy and divisive tendency for the `transgenderist' to be 
valorized over and above the transsexual. 
Sandy Stone (1991), in her exciting and exuberant article The Empire Strikes Back, was 
one of the first transgendered academics to draw on Judith Butler's work. Employing 
Butler's concept of cultural intelligibility, Stone suggested that in the case of the 
transsexual, "the varieties of performative gender, seen against a culturally intelligible 
gendered body which is itself a medically constituted textual violence, generate new and 
unpredictable dissonances" (1991: 296, emphasis in original). These dissonances would 
be created by juxtaposing the transsexual's `refigured body' with conventional gender 
discourse which, Stone argued, would result in the fragmentation and reconstitution of 
gender into new and unexpected fields. Thus, she suggested that transsexuals should not 
be constituted as a class or `third gender', but: 
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... rather as a genre -- a set of embodied texts whose potential 
for productive 
disruption of structured sexualities and spectra of desire has yet to be 
explored (1991: 296, emphasis in original). 
However, in order for this to take effect it would require transsexuals to make themselves 
visible, which in turn has serious implications for transsexual stories. The one factor that 
best indicates a successful transition is to `pass'. Yet, `passing' requires what Stone has 
described as the `effacement of the prior gender role' and the construction of a plausible 
history. Thus, whilst more sympathetic to `passing' transsexuals than Bornstein, Stone is, 
I believe, quite right in criticizing the seeming acceptability of `wrong body' as an 
adequate descriptive category for transsexual experience. As she says: "[I]n fact `wrong 
body' has come, virtually by default, to define the syndrome" and whilst academics, 
clinicians and transsexuals continue to "ontologize both sexuality and transsexuality in 
this way, we have foreclosed the possibility of analyzing desire and motivational 
complexity of individual lived experience" (1991: 297, emphasis in original). 
Jay Prosser (1998) agrees that the `wrong body formula' has become the nub of 
transsexual rhetoric deployed in order to obtain access to hormones and surgery. Yet, he 
claims that the proliferation of the wrong body figurative cannot be attributed singularly 
to its discursive power and cohesion with medical narratives. Instead, he suggests that 
many transsexuals continue to use this aphorism simply because it gives a very good 
representation of their feelings of disembodiment. As he states: 
If the goal of transsexual transition is to align the feeling of gendered 
embodiment with material body, body image - which we might be tempted 
to align with the imaginary - clearly already has a material force for 
transsexuals. The image of being trapped in the wrong body conveys this 
force. .. The image of wrong embodiment 
describes most effectively the 
experience of pre-transition (dis)embodiment: the feeling of a sexed body 
dysphoria profoundly and subjectively experienced (1998: 69). 
Thus, Prosser is concerned with the correspondence between material body surface and 
body image, or to paraphrase, the feeling of being at home in one's skin. For Prosser, 
skin appears as an organ both illustrating and enabling the "psychic/corporeal 
interchange of subjectivity". Thus, subjectivity cannot be said to be only about having a 
physical skin, but rather subjectivity is a matter of "psychic investment of self in skin" 
(1998: 73). Hence, as the skin is the organ that facilitates the sense of touch, Prosser goes 
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on to ask the question: how is one touched when the skin doesn't feel like it is one's 
own? A traditional part of transsexual narrative represented in the autobiographies of, for 
example, Caroline Cossey (1992) and Renee Richards (1983) is that, pre-surgery, the 
genitals remain untouchable in sexual relations. Prosser suggests that the delimitation of 
untouchable areas refuses "to sex" these areas. Hence, "the genitals remain unsexed, both 
nonerogenous and not included in the imaginary `true sex' morphology". Yet, at the 
same time, Prosser proposes that this "nonerogenization implicitly acknowledges those 
genital parts as already materially sexed (that is male or female)" (Prosser, 1998: 77, my 
emphasis). Thus, it is the disavowal of sexual genitals that, paradoxically, substantiates a 
material sex that is incommensurable with gender identity. Hence, Prosser argues that the 
wrong body formula captures precisely this fundamental sense: the transsexual subject's 
conceptualization of sexed morphology as not the property of the subject's body image. 
Consequently, he explains that as this sense of inappropriateness is located in the 
material body, the transsexual subject seeks surgical intervention to alter their physicality 
rather than psychotherapy to re-conceptualize their body image. 
As is becoming an increasingly important point in much social and cultural theory, one 
of Prosser's aims is to contribute to the theorizing of embodiment: particularly the 
exigent feelings of disembodiment that constitute much of transsexual lived experience. 
Another excellent article that also argues for the incorporation of these 
phenomenological aspects of experience for theorizing transsexual subjectivity, is Henry 
Rubin's (1998) Phenomenology as Method in Trans Studies, which appeared in the 
Transgender Special Edition of the academic journal GLQ. Rubin suggests that 
phenomenology provides a framework for making sense of transsexualism in a way that 
also attends to and recognizes transsexual agency and subjectivity: 
Phenomenology recognizes the circumscribed agency of embodied subjects 
who mobilize around their body image to sustain their life projects. A 
phenomenological method works to return agency to us as subjects and to 
return authority to our narratives. It justifies a turn to the self-reports of 
transsexual subjects as a place to find counterdiscursive knowledge (1998: 
271). 
Whilst he acknowledges that Foucauldian approaches have made it impossible to see 
these subjects and knowledges as anything but discursively conditioned, he is, I believe, 
correct to criticize discursive accounts that slide far too easily from analyzing social 
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structures into erasing subjectivity. Rubin cites Bernice Hausman's (1995) Changing 
Sex: Transsexualism, Technology, and the Idea of Gender as exemplifying this type of 
degeneration. In a similar vein to Billing and Urban (1995; see Chapter Two), 
Hausman's critique of transsexualism relegates the transsexual to a passive subject 
position who, as Rubin describes, "should somehow know better than to `believe' in 
gender (while letting nontranssexuals off the hook)" (1998: 271). 
Perhaps, of even more importance, Rubin's essay signals another `strike back' from the 
Transsexual Empire (Stone, 1991). Rubin's critique highlights what I also see as the 
growing gulf between the way many feminists and queer theorists have expected 
`transgender' to not only represent an occasion for gender transgression, but to actually 
breakdown and demolish the existing binary gender system. This poses a stark 
comparison with the lived experience of many of those who might actually describe 
themselves as transgendered. From Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna2 (1978), via 
Janice Raymond (1979) to Tamsin Wilton (2000), and with many others in-between, 
feminists and queer authors have frequently complained that transsexuals reaffirm rather 
than transgress the binary gender system - leaving their own normative, congruent 
gender identities and sexed bodies unexamined. As Rubin argues: 
Nontranssexuals assume the coherent legibility of their gendered 
embodiment or their identities and are not expected to carry a share of the 
revolutionary burden of over throwing gender or imagining what to replace 
it with. They do not walk around, as they seem to be asking us to do, 
without gender identities or legible bodies... They are not called upon to 
account for the fact that their gender is something they achieve. Somehow it 
has become our responsibility alone as transsexuals to shatter these norms. 
Somehow these critics think that because we `know the rules' we should be 
the vanguard in charge of breaking them. It disappoints them that we have 
not made this connection between our knowledge and their program (1998: 
273). 
Coincidentally, perhaps, one of the most theoretically nuanced accounts of transgendered 
embodiment - Transgenderism and the Question of Embodiment - appears in the same 
journal, and attempts to move beyond these types of debates. Patricia Elliot and Katrina 
Roen's (1998) article and preliminary findings have greatly informed the direction of this 
research. They argue that whilst "it is extremely important to be critical of medical 
2 They acknowledge this oversight in a recent reappraisal of Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach. See 
Kessler & McKenna (2000) 
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approaches to the body and to transsexuality, we share (Biddy) Martin's view that the 
`complex relations between the body and psyche (must not) disappear'. That is treating 
the body as a manipulative thing suggests there are no psychic investments in it that 
require consideration". Furthermore, they reject theories that "read gender identities and 
bodies as effects of historically specific constructions or that valorize crossing as a way 
to escape historical constructions" (Elliot & Roen, 1998: 243). Accordingly, they turn 
their attention to psychoanalytic concepts to enrich their analysis of transgendered 
embodiment. In a critique of the views of Judith Butler, they suggest that despite Butler's 
claim that psychoanalysis "is the best account of the psyche - and psychic subjection - 
that we have", she is unable "to escape the cultural determinism she explicitly hopes to 
avoid". Consequently, they suggest that: 
When the major concern of feminist, queer, or transgender theorists is with 
the ways in which a given society stigmatizes, oppresses, or excludes its 
nonnormative others, it is necessary to employ a sociological or historical 
analysis. What poses problems. .. is that sexuality and psychic life cannot be 
understood with historical tools alone. To do so is to produce a limited 
reading that cannot adequately theorize a given subject's relation to his/her 
own embodiment, to unconscious desire, and to the particular history of a 
subject's own psychic life (Elliot & Roen, 1998: 246). 
While a detailed psychoanalytic reading is most certainly beyond the remit of this 
research, I agree that for a full and rich understanding of transsexual embodied 
subjectivity there must be some recourse to psychic life. In their analysis of interviews 
with both MtF and FtM transsexuals, Elliot and Roen recorded that some participants had 
difficulties with notions that were being promoted by transgender theorists. These 
difficulties included: the desire to `pass' as the other gender, the demand for anatomical 
congruity with gender through surgical intervention, and the reluctance to politicize what 
is also an intensely personal experience (Elliot & Roen, 1998: 257). In a particularly 
poignant excerpt taken from an interview with Babe, who was born with a female 
anatomy but identifies as a man, the authors describe how he has to negotiate a range of 
contradicting and powerful discourses: 
It is possible to perceive Babe as being caught painfully among these 
opposing discourses: medical discourses that hold out a promise of surgery 
that might never actually be available; transgender discourses that challenge 
him to live as a man, or better, as a transgendered person, without relying on 
the promise of surgery; and the Christian discourses of his home and family, 
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which encourage him to love and respect his (female) body as a creation of 
God. It is little wonder that the Cartesian view of oneself as "trapped in the 
wrong body" is of greatest comfort and therefore of immediate use to Babe 
(Elliot & Roen, 1998: 250). 
This sympathetic and complex account of just some of the difficulties this transsexual 
subject has to negotiate sets the tone for the analysis presented in subsequent chapters of 
this thesis. In this section it has been illustrated how a new academic discipline has arisen 
in an attempt to gain a greater understanding of transsexual subjectivity. The 
disagreements between those promoting a transgender agenda, where they argue for a 
rejection of `passing' and in some cases the refusal of bodily alteration (e. g. Bornstein, 
1993; Stone, 1991), and those who embrace and theorize the experiences of those who do 
transition, perhaps even investing in a return to identity and essence (e. g. Prosser, 1998), 
have pushed forward the project of understanding embodied `trans' subjectivities. 
Transsexualism is so often theorized conceptually in an attempt to gain a better grasp of 
the relationship between sex, gender and sexuality. These new debates should, however, 
not only be of benefit for a greater knowledge of transsexualism, but should also yield a 
more nuanced understanding of the embodied gendered subjectivities of us all. However, 
I now want to return to the social sciences, feminist psychology in particular, to ascertain 
their particular input into the theorizing of transsexualism in the last thirty years. 
3.5 Feminists' engagement with transsexualism: A promising start 
It was 1978 when Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna published Gender: An 
Ethnomethodological Approach. Although its immediate impact may have been slight 
(Kessler & McKenna, 2000), over the years this text has taken on a seminal status. 
Proposing a radical shift from the gender theorists of the day, Kessler and McKenna 
drew on a study of transsexualism to argue that both sex and gender were social 
constructions. As they stated in the preface: 
What does it mean to say that the existence of two sexes is an `irreducible 
fact'? In this book we will show that this `irreducible fact' is a product of 
social interaction in everyday life and that gender in everyday life provides 
the basis for all scientific work on gender and sex (Kessler & McKenna, 
1978: vii; cited in Crawford, 2000). 
It would seem two feminist psychologists, Kessler and McKenna, had pre-empted the 
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developments of queer theory by more than a decade. More surprisingly, it has only been 
in the last few years that they have begun to be accredited with this (e. g. Lundgren, 2000; 
Golden, 2000; see Kessler & McKenna, 2000). Years before either Moira Gatens, Gayle 
Rubin or Judith Butler began the task of critiquing the sex/gender distinction, Kessler 
and McKenna proposed that "the constitutive belief that there are two genders not only 
produces the idea of gender role, but also creates a sense that there is a physical 
dichotomy". Thus, drawing upon an ethnomethodological approach, they suggest that: 
... gender is a social construction, that a world of two 
`sexes' is a result of 
the socially shared, taken-for-granted methods which members use to 
construct reality (1985: xi). 
Kessler and McKenna employ `gender', rather than `sex', "even when referring to those 
aspects of being a woman (girl) or man (boy) that have traditionally been viewed as 
biological". This highlights their proposal "that the element of social construction is 
primary in all aspects of being female and male". Consequently, they only used the term 
`sex' to refer to reproductive and sexual activities (Kessler & McKenna, 1985: 7, 
emphasis added; see also Crawford, 2000: 8). 
What is apparent here, is the way in which Kessler and McKenna - as Sedgwick and 
Butler were to repeat and Martin to critique - also collapsed together the categories sex 
and gender. In a recent Feminism & Psychology Special Edition, Eva Lundgren takes up 
this issue arguing that, retrospectively, the problem with Kessler and McKenna's thesis 
"is that `sex' remains something `pure', a fixed and given biology which is not relevant 
to the construction of gender" (2000: 59). The problem with this approach mimics many 
of the critiques of gender theory that we have seen so far - they neglect to see the body as 
a culturally formed dimension that is both construing and construed by experience 
(Lundgren, 2000). More recently, in response to this criticism, Kessler and McKenna 
state: 
By neglecting to problematize the body, itself, as a culturally formed 
dimension, we may have given the impression that we believe that the 
construction of the body has no significance in the process of gender 
construction... We do not believe that there is a `purely biological body' 
(2000: 71). 
Certainly the critique that Kessler and McKenna failed to problematize the body should 
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be heeded, particularly in the light of the last twenty years of feminist and gender 
research. But, they still provided one of the best feminist analyses of transsexualism to 
date, and were responsible for beginning the task of engaging with cultural practices of 
gender construction. Moreover, their research represented a significant shift away from 
traditional studies of transsexualism that focused on etiology (e. g. Stoller, 1968,1975), 
or social deviance (e. g. Feinbloom, 1976), or treatment (e. g. Benjamin, 1966), yet also 
avoided the moralistic diatribe that dominated critiques such as that of radical feminist 
Janice Raymond (1979). Rather, their prime focus was to investigate "what 
transsexualism can illuminate about the day-to-day social construction of gender by all 
persons" (Kessler & McKenna, 1985: 112). Their ethnomethodological analysis of 
interviews with fifteen transsexuals produced six beliefs that focused upon practices of 
`passing' that contributed to the `naturalization of gender'. They suggested that by rarely 
referring to themselves as `transsexual' and by claiming to have always been one gender, 
transsexuals, like all of us, supported the `natural' binary gender system. However, the 
transsexual has to consciously employ particular techniques for `passing' as this gender, 
which include: creating gender attributes; general talk; public physical appearance; the 
private body; the personal past. 
In order to expand upon the concept `passing', Kessler and McKenna drew upon the 
theoretical work of Garfinkel (1967), who suggested that passing is an ongoing practice. 
However, they proposed an amendment Garfinkel's thesis that most of the gender `work' 
in order to `pass' needs to be done by the displayer, rather than the perceiver. Instead, 
they suggested that: 
[I]n short, there is little that the displayer needs to do once he/she has 
provided the initial information, except maintain the sense of "naturalness" 
of her/his gender. Passing is an ongoing practice, but it is practiced by both 
parties. Transsexuals become more "natural" females or males and less self- 
consciously transsexuals when they realize that passing is not totally their 
responsibility (1985: 137). 
Thus, whilst the transsexual can, to some extent, rely upon the fact that the perceiver 
tends to stick to their original gender reading - unless it is seriously challenged - the task 
of maintaining their own gender coherence must be seen as more problematic. This is 
particularly the case for the last `passing' technique. Kessler and McKenna argued that 
whilst genitals are the major insignia of gender, if our genitals are incongruous with our 
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gender presentation, it is necessary that everything is done to protect the body. However, 
because so few of our interactions actually involve a public viewing (or potential 
viewing) of our genitals we only need give the impression of having the appropriate 
genitals to people who will undoubtedly never see them. As such: 
[T]his is the same as saying we must give the impression of being and 
always having been the gender we lay claim to. Gender is historical. In 
concrete terms this involves talking in such a way that we reveal ourselves 
to have a history as a male or female. Transsexuals must not only conceal 
their real past (in most cases), but they must also create a new past (1985: 
132). 
As we have seen from the analyses of transsexual subjectivity, it is precisely this 
technique of `passing' - denying a different gender history; refusing to identify as 
transsexual - that is increasingly being challenged. Thus, there appears to have been a 
shift in the last twenty years, inspired by queer and transgender studies, where refusing to 
`pass' not only allows for a greater understanding of the specificity of transsexual 
embodied subjectivity, but also contributes to a day-to-day denaturalization of gender. 
Kessler and McKenna's project must be acknowledged for the role it has played in this. 
3.6 Feminist Contentions: the disengagement from transsexualism 
Whilst feminist psychologists were off to such a blistering start in the attempt to 
deconstruct the apparent naturalness of gender - via an analysis of transsexualism - we 
might wonder why it has taken so long for them to re-engage seriously with this topic. 
Perhaps this is due, in part, to the fact that the very `gender' of Gender Studies has 
become almost synonymous with `woman', underpinned by a variety of feminist political 
positions. Thus, the transsexual subject has rarely been theorized within many 
contemporary feminist accounts of gender and when she or he is, the debates are often 
conceptually confused, particularly when retreats are made into essentialist accounts of 
`woman' in order to refuse the male-to-female transsexual's claim to be female. A good 
example of this can be found in Germaine Greer's latest feminist offering The Whole 
Woman, in which she attacks just about everything that seems to annoy her. In the 
chapter `Pantomime Dames', Greer concludes that: 
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Whatever else it is gender reassignment is an exorcism of the mother. When 
a man decides to spend his life impersonating his mother (like Norman 
Bates in Psycho) it is as if he murders her and gets away with it, proving at 
a stroke that there was nothing to her. His intentions are no more 
honourable than any female impersonator's; his achievement is to gag all 
those who would call his bluff. When he forces his way into the few private 
spaces women may enjoy and shouts down their objections, and bombards 
the woman who will not accept him with threats and hate mail, he does as 
rapists have always done (1999: 74). 
Serious accusations, indeed. Undoubtedly, Greer is making some tacit reference to the 
dispute that ensued after the appointment of a male-to-female transsexual at her 
Cambridge college and may have led to her own resignation. Here, male-to-female 
transsexuals are constructed as the bastard of the feminist movement: infiltrating and 
penetrating female spaces, impersonating and annihilating their mothers, not just in a 
`weird' or `freakish' sense, but in the fashion of the ultimate psychopath - Norman Bates. 
However, as Gayle Rubin argued as long ago as 1984: 
... transsexuals are as 
likely to exhibit sexist attitudes or behavior as any 
politically random social grouping. But to claim that they are inherently 
anti-feminist is sheer fantasy. A good deal of current feminist literature 
attributes the oppression of women to graphic representations of sex, 
prostitution, sex education, sadomasochism, male homosexuality and 
transsexuality. Whatever happened to the family, religion, education, child- 
rearing practices, the media, the state, psychiatry, job discrimination, and 
unequal pay? (Rubin, 1984/1994: 302) 
In this section I focus specifically upon some feminist psychologists' lack of engagement 
with transsexualism and the more recent concept of transgenderism over the last decade. 
I take as my point of departure the academic journal Feminism and Psychology, one of 
the most successful feminist journals to publish and serve feminist psychologists. Since 
its genesis in 1991 (and prior to the year 2000 Special Feature referred too earlier), this 
journal published only two papers including `transsexual' or 'transgender' in the title. 
Moreover, both of these appeared in the Observations and Commentaries section rather 
than as a lengthier central article. The first, The Politics of Transgender, written by the 
radical feminist Janice Raymond, repeats and builds on the caustic criticism of 
transsexualism she originally penned in her infamous text The Transsexual Empire 
(1979/1994b): 
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... transsexual surgery and treatment 
do nothing to challenge gender 
conformity but rather reinforce it by encouraging the individual to become 
an agreeable participant in a role-defined society, substituting one sex-role 
stereotype for the other. What ultimately happens in the transsexual 
fabrication process is that men are turned into artifactual women. Although 
transsexuals are in many ways what a patriarchal society's stereotype of 
femininity is, they are not real women (Raymond, 1994: 628). 
Here, Raymond attempts to get to grips with recent developments in the field, in 
particular, the emergence of a new identity, namely `transgendered'. Maintaining the 
combative writing style of her earlier text, Raymond vehemently rejects the notion that 
transgender politics offer a way to transcend gender. Acknowledging that on the personal 
level it can be provocative, she suggests that at the political level it fails as dismally as 
transsexualism to move beyond sex-role stereotypes: 
Instead, transgenderism reduces gender resistance to wardrobes, hormones, 
surgery and posturing - anything but sexual equality. A real sexual politics 
says yes to a view and reality of transgender that instead of conforming to 
gender, really transforms it (1994: 632). 
But, maybe this is because `sexual politics', in the single and reductive radical feminist 
sense, is not the purpose of transgender activists. Instead, as we have seen, their work is 
primarily informed by a Butlerian (1990) feminist critique of hegemonic gender norms. 
By illustrating the performativity of gender they challenge the notion that a specific 
gender should, necessarily, follow from a definitive body. 
The second paper Women's Self Starvation, Cosmetic Surgery and Transsexualism 
written by another radical feminist, Tania Lienert (1998), similarly attacks the notion that 
transsexualism is transgressive, whilst illustrating another trend in feminist theorizing of 
transsexualism. Here, transsexualism is used conceptually to strengthen the author's 
politically motivated arguments against women's bodily alteration. Inevitably, this 
approach to transsexualism perpetuates simplistic and sometimes cliched understandings 
of transsexual experience. For example, Lienert argues for: 
... radical solutions developed from radical 
feminist ideas: (such as) 
education and counselling aimed at the empowerment of women and 
transsexuals to reject surgical and hormonal solutions to their bodily 
dilemmas and accept themselves as they are (1998: 245). 
This argument fails to acknowledge that transsexuals are immediately offered and do 
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undergo psychotherapy as set out in the Harry Benjamin International Gender 
Dysphoria Association's Guidelines (HBIGDA, 1998). Significantly, continuing along 
the path towards reassignment surgery implies, as Prosser (1998) has also suggested, that 
counselling fails to effect a sufficient sense of relief for those individuals with severely 
fragmented gender identifications. Furthermore, transsexuals undergo radical changes in 
body morphology. These include, for male-to-female transsexuals, penectomy, 
vaginoplasty, and hormone replacement tablets every day for life, and for female-to-male 
transsexuals, bilateral mastectomy, hysterectomy, monthly testosterone injections and 
attempts at phalloplasty that frequently result in poor surgical outcomes. This, in addition 
to deed poll name changes and legal status effects, is hardly on a par with a nose job or 
breast augmentation. In fact, some post-operative transsexuals will strongly object to 
alternative forms of `cosmetic' surgery after reassignment, because they do, ironically as 
it may seem, just want to be `themselves' - albeit with a new embodied gender identity. 
This is illustrated by an extract from one of the interviews with a male-to-female 
transsexual that I conducted as part of this research: 
K: can you describe how you feel about your body since your transition? 
A: umm (...... ) I would like to have bigger breasts but umm I'm not going to 
have plastic surgery umm I don't (. ) I mean I am who I am and I don't 
believe that er I want to be improved in anyway by, by artificial means 
(Artemis, MtF, 50,3/306-309, see appendix 3 for notes on transcription). 
Of course, others will report that "[T]ranssexuals, whose legitimacy has been, in part, 
created by the possibility of genital surgery, already think of it as at least partly 
cosmetic" (Kessler, 1998: 116). This type of totalizing talk is extremely unhelpful. As 
Sandy Stone so sharply puts it: 
There are no subjects in these discourses, only homogenized, totalized 
objects -- factually replicating earlier histories of minority discourses in the 
large. So when I speak the forgotten word, it will perhaps wake memories of 
other debates. The word is some (1991: 298, emphasis in original). 
Of course some transsexuals may regard reassignment surgery as cosmetic, particularly 
given the unswerving influence of capitalism and the resultant effect that most 
reassignment surgery is now conducted privately, paid for by the trans-person. But, for 
many others, surgery will be cited as not simply life changing, but also life-saving. 
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Not surprisingly then, theorizing `transsexualism', and more recently, `transgenderism', 
are contentious areas for feminism. I have chosen to use the articles by Raymond (1994) 
and Lienert (1998) as a springboard because they illustrate clearly one of the central 
problems for some feminist analyses of transsexualism and transgenderism: whether or 
not a male-to-female transsexual can identify as `woman'. This question is of particular 
interest because it alludes to the conflict and contradictions inherent in feminists' own 
deliberations over the ontological status of `woman'. Yet, from the discussion so far, it 
should be clear that theorizing the embodied subjectivities of transsexual and 
transgendered individuals may provide the perfect site for the meeting of the various 
debates that feminist psychologists are engaged with when theorizing the relationship 
between sex, gender and sexuality. Hence, in this study I move away from a radical 
feminist vilification of transsexualism for upholding a heterosexist patriarchal gender 
system. Instead, I attempt to demonstrate some of the contradictions and complexities 
inherent in the identification practices of both male-to-female and female-to-male trans- 
people and, in a more general sense, add to a small but growing collection of socio- 
cultural empirical accounts. These accounts are generally motivated by an interest in 
transsexual subjectivity and embodiment and what they can tell us about broader 
concepts such as sex, gender and sexuality. 
3.7 Empirical studies 
The problem with most of the accounts of transsexualism discussed is that - whilst being 
of great interest - they rarely engage in empirical research that actually gathers data about 
transsexual individuals' own subjective experience. Surprisingly, this is even the case 
with many of those transgendered academics who are themselves urging for more 
theoretical accounts that attend to transgendered embodied subjectivity. However, there 
are a few exceptions. As discussed earlier, Kessler and McKenna, employing an 
enthnomethodological approach, underpinned by a social constructionist epistemology, 
began the trend for engaging in empirical accounts of transsexualism in the attempt to 
evidence the socially constructed nature of sex/gender. In the late 1980's Ann Bolin 
published her very useful study In Search of Eve: Transsexual Riles of Passage, which 
employed the method of participant-observation as sixteen male-to-female transsexuals 
went through the process of transition. Her findings challenged several assumptions that 
77 
emanated from the medical establishment: 
Transsexuals were shown not to have family histories with dominant 
mothers and absent fathers, exclusive homosexual orientation, effeminate 
childhoods, nor did they view their penises as organs of hate and disgust. In 
addition, contrary to reports in the literature, transsexuals generally were not 
hyper-feminine in gender identity or role (1988 : xii). 
Perhaps the best aspects of this research is that Bolin provides one of the earliest reports 
of transsexualism that challenges the notion that male-to-female transsexuals have been 
women all along; with "fully crystallized feminine identities" prior to transition. Rather, 
she perceives "these identities as gradually emerging in conjunction with changes in 
social identity and physical appearance" (1988: xii). Yet, whilst theorizing gendered 
embodiment as a process of becoming, Bolin, somewhat problematically, suggests that at 
a later stage, the transsexual actually arrives at the identity `woman', and then drops the 
identity transsexual. Thus, within this theoretical account, `transsexualism' is 
conceptualized as a transient and temporary category that the individual passes through 
on their way to becoming male or female. As Bolin proposes: 
Their transformation is a multifaceted one in which the unachievable is 
achieved. By participating in this gender violation, these renegades of the 
male role paradoxically support the societal tenet that there are only two 
genders, and one cannot be in between. Their passage is one into normalcy, 
where after the surgery, they can disappear into their culture as natural 
women. The rite of transition is therefore a temporary sojourn of 
transformation; once they have passed and endured it, transsexuals can 
assume the status of those born female (1988: 8-9, emphasis added). 
So, again, within this type of conceptualization male-to-female transsexuals are shown to 
be maintaining the binary gender system where, once they have had surgery and their 
genitals match their gender identity, they can `disappear' with a secure female 
identification. This, like many accounts, fails on three levels. Firstly, to engage with 
transsexuals' narratives of having a differently gendered history; secondly, to engage 
with the transitional process of female-to-male transsexuals who frequently do not have 
genital surgery; thirdly, and most importantly, to acknowledge that the body places limits 
upon gender presentation other than that defined by the genitals. For example, a forty 
year old, 6ft tall, biological male with thick dark body hair will have more difficulty 
disappearing into their culture as a `natural' woman than a small framed biological male 
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who began transitioning in his late teens, before the effects of testosterone had marked 
his body to such a degree. 
More recently, Richard Ekins (1993; 1997) has also conducted qualitative research to 
produce Male Femaling: A grounded theory approach to cross-dressing and sex- 
changing. In a huge study, theoretically informed by social interactionism (e. g. Goffman, 
1959), involving 200 informants, with data collection conducted over set periods since 
1979, Ekins attempts to consider "cross-dressing and sex-changing from the standpoint 
of a systematic and empirical explanation of the interrelations between sex, sexuality and 
gender" (1997: 26, emphasis in original). As such, he formulates the notion of `male- 
femaling', which consists of five phases that "enable justice to be done to the processual 
and emergent nature of much cross-dressing and sex-changing phenomena" (1997: 163). 
These are `beginning femaling', `fantasying femaling', `doing female', `constituting 
femaling', and `consolidating femaling'. It is indeed, a very rich and interesting analysis. 
Yet, as Ekins himself notes: 
Had I started the study in the early 1990's, for instance, I might well have 
been more sensitive to the idea of gender as performance as opposed to 
category or identity (Butler 1990; Bornstein 1994). Had I begun as late as 
1995, when the book was in its final stages, I might well have been 
influenced by Ken Plummer's important Telling Sexual Stories (Plummer 
1995). Again, back in the 1980's the significance of decoupling sex, 
sexuality and gender had not been grasped. I had to labour hard on this. It 
may be that this decoupling will become the common currency of those 
working in the vanguard of the emerging field of `transgender studies' 
(1997: 164). 
Ekins's self-reflections have been given serious consideration in the formulation of this 
research project which provides another example of empirical research into social and 
cultural aspects of transsexualism and the broader task of theorizing the relationship 
between sex, gender and sexuality. This research began in the aftermath of all the 
developments Ekins cites. As such, these have, theoretically and conceptually, 
profoundly informed this study. Furthermore, this research differs from most existing 
empirical studies as it engages with the experiences of both male-to-female transsexuals 
and female-to-male transsexuals, never assuming that their process of transition simply 
reflects one another. This time, discourse analysis is the principal method of choice. By 
employing a different methodological tool from these empirical studies, underpinned by 
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an alternative epistemological framework that blends poststructuralism with 
phenomenology and particular psychoanalytic conceptions, I intend to build upon these 
existing accounts, ultimately facilitating a greater understanding of transsexual embodied 
subjectivity. These methodological considerations are discussed in the next chapter. 
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4 
Methodology and Method3 
For all its detachment and freedom from emotion, our science is still 
the dupe of linguistic habits; it has never yet got rid of those 
changelings called "subjects". 
Neitzsche, Genealogy of Morals, (1887, trans. 1956: 179) 
This chapter is concerned with formulating a methodological approach that, firstly, draws 
upon poststructuralist thinking to trace the discursive constructions that shape and mould 
transsexual identity, and secondly, moves beyond a purely textual analysis in order to 
inform the social and cultural study of self, identity and embodiment. A theoretical 
framework for the study of identity (Woodward, 1997) is outlined and the 
poststructuralist assumptions which underpin this approach are highlighted. Two forms 
of discourse analysis, usefully distinguished as discourse analysis and the analysis of 
discourses (Burr, 1995), employed within the discipline of psychology are critically 
evaluated - pinpointing some of the problems for theorizing embodied subjectivity from 
within discursive psychology. A more nuanced analysis of transsexual experience must 
pay heed to the differences between the transitional processes of male-to-female and 
female-to-male transsexuals, the possibilities for embodied subjectivity and accessibility 
3 Some of the ideas and text in this chapter have been published. See Katherine Johnson (2001). 
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to the new gender position they take up, as well as their individual life trajectories. In an 
attempt to address these issues and provide a rich account of the experience of Being 
Transsexual, I construct a more eclectic methodological approach. This entails 
incorporating alongside an analysis of discourses psychoanalytic concepts for theorizing 
subjectivity (Hollway, 1989; Hollway & Jefferson, 2000) and phenomenological notions 
for researching embodiment (e. g. Csordas, 1999). I conclude the methodology section of 
this chapter by providing a summary of the ways in which the key concepts of this thesis 
are mobilized throughout the analysis chapters. The final part of the chapter presents a 
detailed account of the method, introducing the participants, data collection, data 
analysis, and ethical considerations. 
4.1 Theoretical framework for studying `identity' 
The term `identity' is increasingly used in conjunction with variously defined groups, 
whether they are youths, gays or transsexuals. Given the prolific usage of the term 
`identity', it is important to try to specify exactly what one means by identity. Therefore, 
an approach originally outlined by Kathryn Woodward (1997) will be drawn upon to 
illustrate the stance taken in this thesis. Firstly, this framework incorporates a shift away 
from essentialist notions of belonging instead focusing on non-essentialist definitions of 
identity that highlight difference, as well as common or shared characteristics. For 
example, if we look back at the definition of transsexualism provided in the excerpt by 
Roberto (1983, see Chapter One), we can see a criterion for transition that is effective in 
shaping a very fixed and rigid account of transsexual experience. This stands in stark 
comparison to an excerpt taken from a Transgender community leaflet: 
Some (but not all) transgender people may use hormones or surgery, but 
these have serious effects on general health, mental and emotional well- 
being, and sexual pleasure and function. Many express their gender 
without medical aid, and most do not have genital surgery. Some identify 
as male, female, both (bi-gender), or neither; as male to female, female to 
male, transsexual, man or woman of transgender background, or person with 
transgender qualities; as gay, straight, lesbian, bisexual, heterosexual or 
other. However we may identify, and whatever medical options we choose, 
we all deserve to be treated with equal dignity and respect (norrie mAy- 
welby, 1997). 
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This extract provides a diverse account of transgendered experience. In contrast, the 
excerpt taken from Robert (1983) emerges from the theorizing of the transsexual 
condition within the traditional `medical model' (Kando, 1973). This entails the 
collection of biographical and in-depth psychological data followed by a period of 
analysis, classification, diagnosis and etiological theorizing (Ekins, 1997). Arguably, it is 
necessary to challenge these types of accounts and allow for diversity in experience if we 
are to establish a greater understanding of how certain individuals position themselves in 
relation to the discourses of transsexualism. 
A second feature of Woodward's theoretical framework is that an identity is always 
perceived as relational. An identity can only be formed, not necessarily in opposition to 
somebody else, but in relation to, or differing from, somebody else. This identity can be 
established through symbolic marking. For example, badges or uniforms are two methods 
of marking a specific identity. In the case of transsexual identity, individuals wearing 
Transsexual Menace T-shirts (the North American political lobbying group for 
transsexual and transgendered individuals) have proved an effective means of 
symbolically marking a transsexual political identity. However, it is not vital that the 
marking of an identity be physically identifiable because identity is also maintained 
through social and material conditions. For example, legal discourses mark transsexuals 
as `outsiders', as `different' or even taboo. In the UK, transsexuals cannot entirely take 
up the position of male or female whilst the legal right to change their birth certificates, 
marry, and become the adoptive parents of their partner's children, are not permitted. 
Furthermore, since the case of P V's S and Cornwall County Council, where the 
European Court of Justice ruled that P's dismissal because of her intention to transition 
was unfair on the grounds of sex, the government has sought to introduce amendments to 
the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 regarding cases of transsexualism. The proposed 
amendments focus upon the interim period of six months to one year when the individual 
is in transition. For example: 
14c) During the period and six months afterwards, it will be lawful to 
exclude the individual from jobs involving contact with members of the 
public or customers who are changing e. g. staff in health clubs, clothes shop 
assistants, home helps, swimming attendants etc. 
(DfEE: Consultation Paper. January 1998, my emphasis) 
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Whatever one's opinion about the validity of such proposals which attach specific 
conditions to the legal protection of transsexuals, these changes to employment 
legislation could have very real effects for the transsexual, including social exclusion and 
material disadvantages. 
Finally, this framework purports that identities are not unified. There may be 
contradictions that have to be negotiated, both within the individual, and between the 
individual and other group members. For example, contradictions may arise between the 
political identity adopted by Press for Change or Transsexual Menace, and the individual 
identities of those living in a shared culture. This point can be illustrated through a 
comparison of some of the visual images used to portray Press for Change's political 
campaign, and photographic art coming out of the transgender community. Press for 
Change presents the conservative, conformist face of transsexuality, exemplified in 
slogans such as "Gail and Pete are in love. Why not let them get married? " This is 
superimposed upon a picture of a very ordinary looking heterosexual couple. 
Underpinning this image is the promise that Gail and Peter will not offend the status quo, 
they just want to blend in with heteronormativity (see Chapter Eight for critique of this 
campaigning style). In contrast, images such as those produced by the FTM photographer 
Loren Cameron (1996) can be read as trangressive. Here, Cameron poses naked for the 
camera. His muscular, gym-honed body with clearly defined pectorals and washboard 
stomach indicates a male body. Everything about him exudes maleness. But, a closer 
inspection of the genital area reveals that he has no penis. The figure is confusing, is he a 
woman who has had a bilateral mastectomy, taken hormones and worked out in the gym, 
or a man who has had a penectomy? Thus, the image provides a radical challenge to our 
gender assumptions and becomes more opaque as we try to search for the socially and 
culturally mediated markers of sexual difference in order to categorize him as male or 
female. 
4.2 Conceptual assumptions of poststructuralism 
The theoretical framework outlined for researching identity is informed by the principles 
of poststructuralist theory. Poststructuralism emphasizes that when conceptualizing 
identity it is necessary to attend to different dimensions of identity, by highlighting these 
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differences both between individuals and within the individual. In addition a 
poststructuralist approach entails incorporating the notion that subjectivity is constituted 
through language. Poststructuralism makes certain assumptions about language, 
subjectivity, knowledge and truth (Weedon, 1987). Its founding principle is that language 
is thought to constitute our social reality, rather than reflect a social reality that is already 
given. There is no universally shared meaning for any given concept, as meaning can 
vary from language to language, culture to culture, and across time. Therefore, a 
poststructuralist account assumes that meaning is composed within language and is not 
guaranteed by the subject that speaks it. Thus, within this approach, language is 
paramount for the study of transsexual identity, as it is the place where a sense of self and 
subjectivity are constructed. Who we are, and how we understand ourselves does not 
originate in `pre-packaged' forms inside us. Our identities are all effects of language, as 
the structure of language determines the way that experience and consciousness are 
structured (Woodward, 1997). Therefore, it follows that given language is a social 
phenomenon, identity is not an internalized `entity' that belongs to the individual, but an 
interactive, inter-relational ongoing process of construction. Hence, the construction of 
identity is dependent on exchanges between people, whether this is through face-to-face 
dialogue, or via the communicative mediums of reading, radio, or television. An example 
taken from an interview with a male-to-female participant clearly illustrates the central 
role of language in her process of transition: 
K: how long did the reassignment take you? 
S: (. ) umm (.. ) well I, I'd realized from speaking to Dina exactly who I was. 
That I wasn't a drag queen, I wasn't a transvestite, umm, that I was like she 
was. I was actually transsexual (Sally, MtF, 35,3/93-95). 
Language is visibly a crucible of change for her identity. It was only after talking with a 
friend, also a transsexual woman, when Sally says she realized who she was. She came 
across her identity as transsexual through language, in conversation with a friend. It is 
this point that brings to the fore one of the most potentially `liberating' aspects of this 
approach. If language is the place where identities are built and maintained, then 
poststructuralist theory sees language as the major site where oppressive identities can be 
challenged or changed. What it means to be a transsexual, woman, or man, can all be 
transformed and reconstructed. 
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4.3 What is discourse analysis? 4 
Psychological research traditionally exerts great effort to adhere to methods that are more 
commonly found in the physical sciences. This raises questions and debates that are 
particularly pertinent to the study of mental states and human experience. Within a 
positivistic approach, researchers attempt to isolate specific mental states or behaviours 
in order to test pre-determined hypotheses. The application of this type of research 
approach to social phenomena has long been a contentious area (see Nietzsche, 1887, 
p. 80). Can social scientists really control for all the possible variables that may be 
involved when considering a particular aspect of behaviour? Moreover, can the self ever 
be reduced to a "true" entity as research of this kind implies? Here, true is placed in scare 
quotes as some researchers, usually those influenced by poststructuralist or postmodernist 
perspectives, question the notion that there really is a truth out there waiting to be 
discovered. These theorists (e. g. Gergen, 1985; 1991; Shotter, 1993) draw, to a varying 
degree, on the assumptions of social constructionism which argues that knowledge is 
socially and culturally specific. Thus, in what has been documented as `the turn to 
language' (Parker, 1989), there has become an increasing trend for social scientist to 
critique positivistic approaches. Rather, their emphasis is upon documenting the 
inconsistencies and fluctuations in selfhood by including methods of discursive analysis 
within their research. 
Discourse analysis is almost synonymous with critical and in some cases feminist 
research. Michel Foucault defined `discourse' as `the practices that systematically form 
the objects of which we speak' (1969: 49). Others use it to cover all forms of spoken 
interaction, formal and informal, and written texts of all kinds (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; 
Potter & Wetherell, 1987), as well as visual texts and social practices (Fairclough, 1995; 
Parker, 1992). The method provides us with a useful analytic tool that can be employed 
to identify and tease apart the discourses that are at work in a particular text. These can 
then be used, amongst other things, to comment on social processes that participate in the 
maintenance of structures of oppression. Foucault was, perhaps, the most influential 
proponent of this approach to emerge from the French poststructuralist tradition. In the 
Judith Halberstam's question, September 1999. 
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light of his account of `genealogies of power', notions of power and oppression have 
undergone major transformations. As Elizabeth Grosz (1995) describes, Foucault has 
rendered the notion of oppression considerably more sophisticated by alerting us to the 
idea that the attribution of social value is not simply a matter of being depicted as passive 
and compliant, stripped of all forms of resistance. Rather, a position of subordination 
"exerts its own kind of forces.. . its own practices, and knowledges, which, depending on 
their socio-cultural placement and the contingencies of the power game that we have no 
choice but to continue playing, may be propelled into positions of power and 
domination" (Grosz, 1995: 210). Accordingly, the work of Foucault has provided an 
inspiration for some of those classified as oppressed, for there is always the possibility of 
a certain agency which will enable them to both challenge and transform their position 
(Weeks, 1985,1989; Halperin, 1995). In fact, Foucault's work has been drawn on 
heavily by many feminists and queer theorists in their struggles against gender and 
sexuality inequities, informing both their political ideas and practices. Thus, attention to 
discourse facilitates many goals: an historical account of knowledge, a critique of 
psychological/legal/medical practices by challenging their truth claims, and an analysis 
that informs political practice and struggles (Burman & Parker, 1993). 
Discourse analysis is used in many variants from cognitive linguistics to deconstruction, 
affording the analysis of language and texts. In psychology, discourse analysis is now a 
well-established method (Bannister, Burman, Parker, Taylor & Tindall, 1995), but there 
are two distinct approaches which Vivian Burr (1995) usefully distinguishes between as 
`discourse analysis' (e. g. Potter & Wetherell, 1987), and the `analysis of discourse' (e. g. 
Hollway, 1989; Parker, 1992). 
Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell's (1987) Discourse and Social Psychology: 
Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour is perhaps one of the most influential research methods 
publications in recent times, ushering in a new era for psychological research. Rather 
than using the term discourse, they refer to `interpretative repertoires' that highlight the 
way an individual frames an issue. In a similar vein, they are looking to analyze the 
`performative qualities of discourses' in order to theorize what people are doing with 
their talk and writing, deciphering what they are trying to achieve. This notion of 
language function is one of the central suppositions of discourse analysis. However, the 
analysis of function cannot be seen in the simplistic terms of categorizing pieces of 
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speech because it is very much dependent upon the analyst's `reading' of the context in 
which the speech occurs. Furthermore, a person's account will often vary in accordance 
with its function or the purpose of the talk. This notion of variation is the second major 
component of discourse analysis. In discourse analysis variation is as important, if not 
more important than consistency. This stands in stark contrast to the near fetishism for 
homogeneity of variance within traditional quantitative research, where it is not 
uncommon for researchers relying on statistical methods to discard outliers, or those that 
vary too much, in an effort to return a significant result. But, as Potter and Wetherell 
point out, if talk is orientated to many different functions, any examination of language 
over time will reveal considerable variation. This variation takes place because, on every 
occasion, people are using their language to construct versions of the world. This leads us 
to the third crucial component of discourse analysis, the assumption that talk and writing 
are constructed out of pre-existing resources. Inevitably, this will involve the exclusion 
of some resources. Reflecting on what has been left out is of as much value to the 
researcher as the analysis of what is included, because absences will aid in the 
construction of a particular version of `reality'. 
These principles are common to most forms of discourse analysis. However, the 
approaches differ in their consideration of subjectivity. For Potter and Wetherell nothing 
exists outside of the text. The sole purpose of their analysis is to determine the action 
orientation of any given rhetoric. As they state: 
The researcher should bracket off the whole issue of the quality of accounts 
as accurate or inaccurate descriptions of mental states... Our focus is 
exclusively on discourse itself: how it is constructed, its functions and the 
consequences which arise from different discursive organization (1987: 
178). 
But in doing so, they appear to completely bypass the notion of subjectivity. In fact, 
frequent criticism has been directed at this approach, occasionally charging Potter and 
Wetherell with returning to some form of behaviourism, where the mind is only 
perceived as a black box. Despite their wish to avoid these charges, Potter and 
Wetherell's critics suggest they fail to move beyond acknowledging the limitations of 
`blank subjectivity' (e. g. Hollway, 1989, Parker, 1997). Consequently, this approach does 
not seem sufficiently encompassing for many of those endeavouring to undertake 
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psychological research where mental states, consciousness, unconsciousness or notions 
of how an individual experiences their self, identity and world are of utmost importance. 
The second approach, the `analysis of discourses' (e. g. Parker 1992; Hollway, 1989), has 
developed out of attempts to solve the problem of theorizing subjectivity. Within this 
approach, prevalent discourses of, for example, gender and sexuality are examined and 
their identity and power implications are brought to the fore. Often this involves 
identifying the positions offered by different discourses, spelling out the identity and 
political implications of these. It incorporates a Foucauldian approach, analyzing how 
specific discourses become grounded in social and material reality. Foucault, through his 
analysis of institutions such as the asylum, illustrated how discourses that originated in 
the institution are taken up by the subject, which then loop back to both legitimize and 
perpetuate the institution (Foucault, 1973). With the clinical classification of 
transsexualism in mind (see Chapter One), precisely this type of `looping' process took 
place with the early psychiatric diagnostic and classificatory systems for transsexualism. 
It has been well documented that by the 1970's, clinicians had been concerned about the 
lack of variation in prospect reassignment candidate's personal accounts (Stoller, 1973a; 
Billing & Urban, 1995; see Chapter Two for a more detailed discussion). After the 
clinical establishment of a rigid classification system that needed to be adhered to, those 
requiring reassignment simply accessed the necessary documentation and presented 
themselves as textbook cases. Thus, the clinicians positioned transsexuals within specific 
discourses that were then reinforced by those who, necessarily, positioned themselves in 
the same discourses when presenting themselves for reassignment. Therefore, this 
Foucauldian approach also allows us to illustrate how subject positions are constructed 
through discourse. 
Wendy Hollway (1989) draws on the notions of `positioning' and `multiple subjectivity' 
to explain the experience of being a subject. For Hollway, positioning refers to how 
subjects are constructed through identifying their subjective experience within specific 
discourses, positioning themselves within those discourses (for an alternative approach to 
positioning theory see Harre & Langenhove 1999). Furthermore, she found that subjects 
position themselves within varying and often contradictory discourses, invoking the term 
multiple subjectivity, and lending support to the poststructuralist attack on the Western 
philosophical notion of a rational and unified self. This image of the self as multiple 
89 
challenges more traditional models, such as those proposed by trait theory, role theory 
and humanistic accounts, most of which perceive the self as an entity, with one true 
nature which is waiting to be discovered. These theories have been paramount to 
psychology's conception of the individual person, making it possible to contrast the 
individual with society, as natural pairs in a balanced dichotomy (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987). Moreover, under the encompassing heading of social constructionism, a whole 
new branch of critical psychology has emerged dedicating considerable effort to re- 
conceptualize the subject (e. g. Gergen, 1985; Henriques et al., 1984). This incorporation 
of different linguistic practices into conceptualizing the self is arguably, a radical, 
political and potentially emancipatory activity (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), because if 
subjectivity is constituted through language, then it allows for the possibility of change. 
As Hollway states: 
... 
it is possible to transform the meaning of experience by bringing a 
different set of assumptions to bear on it... in consciousness-raising groups, 
women learn to position themselves in a feminist discourse (1989: 97). 
One problem with this approach is that the ability to change has to be seen as only a 
potential ability. We must remember that some positions are not easily transformed, and 
some people will hang on ferociously to particular discursive positions, even when they 
are consciously aware that it produces a negative, oppressed, or even destructive sense of 
self (Parker, 1992). As Lynne Segal perceptively writes in response to Judith Butler's 
(1990) notion of gender performativity: 
Mostly we can only enact those behaviours which have long since become 
familiar and meaningful to us in expressing ourselves... Challenge to our 
gendered `identities' may be more than we can handle (Segal, 1994; 208). 
Despite the potentially liberating qualities of this approach for theorizing subjectivity and 
identity, if we only view the subject as a set of multiple and contradictory positionings or 
subjectivities, how can we account for continuity of the subject and their subjective 
experience of identity? To only see the subject as bound up in, and the effect of, multiple 
and varying discourses does not provide all the necessary components for a 
comprehensive theory of self, identity and subjectivity. 
One means for accounting for continuity in the subject is provided by Ian Parker (1992). 
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In Discourse Dynamics, prompted by Foucault, Parker reminds us that discourses are 
always grounded in social and material structures. Consequently, he argues, strategies for 
self-change that rely solely upon the modification of discourses are curbed by their 
inherent idealism. Instead, Parker suggests that discursive change is shackled by four 
material constraints: direct physical coercion; the material organization of space; the 
habitual, physical orientation of the individual to discourse of different kinds; the 
constitution of subjectivity in language (1992: 38-39). Thus, he proposes that access to 
alternative discourses is contingent upon changes in real conditions outside of the text. 
For example, if we take the limit upon discursive change `the constitution of subjectivity 
in language' and apply it to the material grounding of gender discourses, we will see that 
certain gender subject positions can become associated with certain emotional responses 
and practices of self. Thus, it may appear appealing to encourage the transsexual 
individual to take up the gender position for his or her biological sex (Lienert, 1998 see 
Chapter Three), but these positions, undoubtedly, will fail to mobilize the same desires or 
level of identification with particular cultural practices of gender. Thus, the complex 
dynamics of desires and identifications cannot be neglected if new and potentially 
empowering discourses are to replace old and possibly constraining ones (Parker, 1992)5. 
And, as Biddy Martin argued (1992, see Chapter Three for further discussion), the body 
must also be seen as a limitation - particularly for those individuals who are attempting 
to re-position themselves with the discourses of the opposite gender (more about this 
later). 
In Subjectivity and Method in Psychology, Wendy Hollway (1989) also attempts to 
account for why individuals position themselves within a specific set of discourses and 
why they may hold on to these positions even when they know they are detrimental to 
their sense of self. Hollway, like Parker, is influenced by the work of Foucault and also 
incorporates a poststructuralist critique of idealism. As such, she argues that: 
... people's subjectivities are produced within 
discourses, history and 
relations, and the meanings that they produce in accounts of their experience 
and themselves both produce and reproduce these subjectivities and can 
modify them (1989: 41). 
s1 am grateful to Carla Willig for providing me with a summary of this work. 
91 
However, where Hollway differs from Parker, is in her deployment of psychoanalytic 
theory, particularly Melanie Klein's (1960) account of inter-psychic defenses 
encapsulated in the concepts `splitting' and `projection', to account for why individuals 
take up specific discursive positions. Hollway is drawn to the psychoanalytic theories of 
Klein because Klein privileges the defensive processes that work between people. Thus, 
Hollway suggests that positions are taken up "through the continuous, everyday, 
defensive negotiation of intersubjective relationships within the field of effects of 
power/knowledge relations" (1989: 84). 
Hollway again draws upon the theories of the psychoanalyst Melanie Klein (1988a; 
1988b) in her more recent book, Doing Qualitative Research Differently, co-authored 
with Tony Jefferson (2000). Here, Hollway & Jefferson reiterate the notion that the self 
is forged from unconscious defenses against anxiety. They suggest that illuminating the 
way conflict and suffering impact upon the psyche will enable us to ascertain why 
individuals invest in particular discourses, rather than others. This premise forms the 
crux of their theory of the defended subject. As such, they propose that "(T)he idea of the 
defended subject shows how subjects invest in discourses when these offer positions 
which provide protection against anxiety and therefore supports to identity" (2000: 23). 
Hollway and Jefferson's project is both ambitious and contentious. Yet, it is also a much 
needed development within social psychology as it currently supplies one of the only 
methodological approaches that attempts to theorize a psychosocial subject - via the 
blending of poststructuralist informed ideas with psychoanalysis. 
4.4 Beyond Discourse: criticisms and developments 
One of the most potent fears when employing social constructionist arguments is that a 
critic will misuse them to the further detriment of an already oppressed group. Carol 
Vance (1984) clearly illustrated this in the case of homosexuality, describing how right- 
wing proponents of `family values' interpretation of the theory led them to conclude that 
individuals had the ability to change. In a similar vein, this type of critique could be 
levelled against transsexuals. If gender identity is socially constructed, then they can 
change their identity, removing the need for hormone prescriptions, reassignment surgery, 
and the legal recognition of their `new' gender. This is, of course, a gross 
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misinterpretation of the theory (as well as actual experience), and as it has already been 
pointed out, individuals often do not have the power to change their sexual and gender 
identities. Therefore, it is important to be aware that the discursive constitution of 
subjectivity is more than the individual consciously choosing to identify with particular 
subject positions within a discourse. Rather, some have argued that we need to move 
beyond discourse by attending to psychic processes (e. g. Segal, 1990,1994; Woodward, 
1997; Hollway 1989), as well as symbolic marking and social and material conditions 
(e. g. Parker, 1992; Willig, 1999), if we are to conceptualize a persuasive theory of 
identity. It also needs to be registered that individuals are also placed in specific subject 
positions by others (Parker, 1992). This is especially important in the case of the 
transsexuals, as, inevitably, one will be allocated to the gendered position of male or 
female on the basis of others' readings of our appearance and physicality. Undoubtedly, 
the body plays a crucial role in the construction of an individual's self-identity, as the 
body acts as a symbolic marker of gender in all our social interactions. If a body is read or 
recognized as male, then the subject will be positioned within a discourse of masculinity, 
whether or not they would position themselves in that discourse. So, for male-to-female 
transsexuals, being read as male and positioned in the discourses of masculinity can be 
very distressing when they position themselves within a discourse of femininity. 
4.5 The turn to embodiment 
During recent years, we have witnessed a huge growth in the `technologization of the 
body' (Henriques et al, 1998), exemplified through practices from weight training to 
gender reassignment, where various techniques are used to shape and hone the body. The 
notion of an increasingly malleable body has introduced a new and exciting referent into 
the identity equation. To speak of subjectivity is simply no longer sufficient as it becomes 
ever more apparent that subjectivity is always already embodied. Yet, despite the 
influence of technologies of the body, with their endless possibilities for the construct of 
new identities, there remain very many bodily and material limitations that science cannot 
transcend (Henriques et al, 1998). Phalloplasty, for example, is not yet a viable option for 
many female-to-male transsexuals given the relatively poor surgical outcomes. 
I will argue here that it is essential to develop a theory of embodied subjectivity, partly 
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for studying the phenomenon of living a certain experience, but also because the body 
constrains our subjectivity. It is the body, through its fleshy physicality and the social 
processes that shape it, which restricts our ability to position ourselves within particular 
discourses, or identify with specific discursive constructs, without confusing or disrupting 
them. Whilst the definitions, the day to day interpretations of manhood and womanhood 
are so bound up with their biology, we cannot see our subjective experience of gender as 
anything but regulated and constrained by our physicality. It is therefore important to 
expand on a discursive approach to identity, which tends to overlook the role of the body 
in identity construction. We need to develop our methodological tools if we are to work 
towards a theory of embodied subjectivity, where we attend to the subjective experience 
of transsexuals, but where we also recognize that this experience is embodied. As Henry 
Rubin wrote in a recent Transgender anthology, arguing for the incorporation of a 
phenomenological approach in Trans Studies: 
... it seems particularly prudent to use a method that not only 
legitimates 
subjectively informed knowledge but also recognizes the significance of 
bodies for the lived experience of the I (Rubin, 1998: 268). 
4.6 Poststructuralism meets phenomenology 
The theoretical position taken in this study has been greatly influenced by some of the 
papers in a recent collection entitled Perspectives on Embodiment: The Intersections of 
Nature and Culture (Weiss & Haber, 1999), particularly, Thomas J. Csordas's 
contribution `Embodiment and Cultural Phenomenology'. For researchers like myself, 
who missed the `turn to language' during the late 1970's, Csordas usefully reminds us 
that the introduction of a semiotic, or more recently, a discursive approach was designed 
to increase our understanding of culture via the mantra: `text as metaphor. ' He goes on to 
argue that, unfortunately: 
... textuality has become, 
if you will, a hungry metaphor, swallowing all of 
culture to the point where it became possible and even convincing to hear 
the deconstructionist motto that there is nothing outside of the text. ... the 
text metaphor has virtually... gobbled up the body itself -- certainly we have 
all heard phrases like "the body as text, " "the inscription of culture on the 
body, " "reading the body. " I would go on to assert that for many 
contemporary scholars the text metaphor has ceased to be a metaphor at all, 
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and it is taken quite literally (Csordas, 1999: 146). 
This is a crucial point. It is important to resist seeing the body as a natural substance upon 
which culture carves its meanings. Instead, emphasis should be upon studying 
subjectivity, identities and culture from an embodiment standpoint - where individuals 
are always already embodied. Equally so, within this approach the role of biology is 
never denied but, at the same time, biology must be seen as always and already cultural. 
Thus, there is no Nature/Culture, only NatureCultures (Latour, 1993), where they are 
entwined and enmeshed, indivisible from one another. Consequently, embodiment is an 
exciting area of study because it is situated precisely at the multiple intersections of 
Nature and Culture (Weiss & Haber, 1999). 
Certainly, the body is not always forgotten about but, in recent years, it has usually been 
written about as an object for study or included as an appendage to our socially 
constructed identities and fragmented senses of self. The effect of representing the body 
in this way is two-fold. Firstly, in alignment with the feminist conception of a sex/gender 
distinction, the body, in either its male or female form, becomes synonymous with `sex', 
the biological bedrock upon which gender is inscribed. Meanwhile, `gender' is seen as 
socially constructed. What it means to be a man or woman is constructed through 
language and subject to change across time and culture. Although, a sex/gender 
distinction has been extremely useful, particularly in a feminist framework for 
challenging gender inequalities (see Chapter Three), it has left the body under theorized. 
The `body' or `sex' is still often seen as a biological given - the result of nature - immune 
to the cultural environment in which it lives. 
The second effect of conducting research that presents the body as a separate entity from 
who or what we think ourselves to be, is the perpetuation of Cartesian dualism. This 
effect is exacerbated by the previous outcome of drawing a distinction between sex and 
gender. As gender is seen as socially and culturally constructed and mapped onto a 
particular body, gender becomes associated with the mind, giving us a re-run of 
mind/body separatism (Martin, 1991). This is most clearly illustrated in the case of 
transsexualism. The notion of a sex/gender distinction allows for the conception that even 
though someone may have a male body (sex) they can have a female identification 
(gender). Female identification, how they think of themselves, is thus located in the 
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mind, while their biological `truth' is indicated by a male body. Some feminists have 
used this to challenge the ontological status of both `sex' and `gender' (e. g. Butler, 1990, 
1993, see Chapter Three for further discussion). Others, however, have attempt to locate 
this supposed incongruity within the actual structures of the brain/mind: for example, in 
biological studies that focus on locating gender in the divergent sizes of various nooks 
and crannies in the recesses of the brain (e. g. Swaab & Hoffman, 1995). 
Some social and cultural theorists have, however, started to make some headway into the 
problematic oversight of embodied subjectivity inherent in discursive approaches. 
Central to this development is the criticism that a social constructionist approach when 
staying with just talk and language may only serve to re-inscribe those dualisms, such as 
individual/society or mind/body, that it allegedly aimed to dismantle (Bayer, 1998). The 
linguistic tools available to us usually exacerbate this. Unfortunately, language is 
inherently dualistic which is one reason why concentrating on purely discursive 
representations often succeeds in reinforcing the dualisms that were intended to be 
deconstructed. Similarly, Edward Sampson is critical of constructionism, which may 
correctly emphasize that objects like the body are constituted in and through talk, but 
nevertheless, fails to attend to the fact that "when I talk about the body I must use that 
very body in this talk. In other words, talk conversation and discourse are embodied 
activities, not merely disembodied linguistic recitations" (1998: 24). Thus, embodied 
discourse must also be seen as deeply embedded within cultural practices, nowhere more 
so than in the culturally located bodily practices which define sexual difference. As 
Bourdieu comments, male-female differences are based on "a durable way of standing, 
speaking, walking and thereby of feeling and thinking... in posture, in the gestures and 
movements of the body" (Bourdieu, 1980: 70, cited in Sampson, 1998: 25). 
In the last few years an extraordinary number of texts have been published attempting to 
deal with questions about `materiality' or `the body' that appeared to be so frequently 
overlooked within some earlier poststructuralist accounts. Titles such as: Volatile Bodies 
(Grosz, 1994), Bodies that Matter (Butler, 1993), Embodied Practices (Davies, 1997), 
Body Talk (Ussher, 1997), Bodies of Thought (Burkitt, 1999), the list goes on. Very 
recently, frequent references are drawn to phenomenology, citing the work of Merleau- 
Ponty (e. g. Burr, 1999; Butt, 1999, Burkitt, 1999), in particular his use of Heidegger's 
phrase `being-in-the-world'. Vivien Burr explains how Merleau-Ponty was critical of the 
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empiricist notion that subjects acquire knowledge of external objects via mentalistic and 
disembodied perceptual processes. She proposes that: 
Merleau Ponty draws our attention to the way in which we apprehend our 
world always and inevitably through our bodies. Our bodies are our only 
means of knowing the world; our experience is given to us through our 
bodies. We inhabit the material world, we live in it and are not observers of 
it (Burr, 1999: 120, emphasis in original). 
Thus, within phenomenological perspectives, experience is given through the body. This 
contrasts with the poststructuralist interpretation where it is thought that experience is 
attained through language. However, Ian Burkitt usefully points out the problematic 
nature of the term `experience' within the social sciences because "used in its everyday 
sense, experience can suggest unmediated, first-hand knowledge which escapes power 
and ideology in one fell swoop, revealing the unalloyed truth about the world" (1999: 
105). Burkitt draws on the work of the feminist Iris Young (1990) to suggest that 
`experience' is still a useful phrase for those working within an embodiment perspective. 
Young suggests that: 
No experience or reality is unmediated by language and symbols; 
nevertheless, there are aspects of perception, action and response that are not, 
linguistically constituted. By the term `experience' I also wish to evoke a 
pragmatic context of meaning. Meaning subsists not only in signs and 
symbols, but also in the movement and consequences of action; experience 
carries the connotation of context and action (cited in Burkitt, 1999: 105). 
Thus, with this notion of experience in mind, it is not surprising that, many of those 
engaged in theorizing embodiment pitch their theoretical stance somewhere between 
poststructuralism and phenomenology. There is by no means a whole-sale ditching of 
many of the positive elements of social constructionist theory, rather a serious 
undertaking to answer some of the challenges that have been levelled at discursive 
psychology. Hence: 
In building a more phenomenological approach to embodiment... [A]ccount 
is taken of the effects of power on the body, particularly in terms of habitual 
actions that create dispositions and contribute to a sense of identity, and yet 
the performative is not reduced solely to the structures of the signifying 
system (Burkitt, 1999: 107). 
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However, often working within a theoretical perspective, many of these social theorists 
have little to say about how to empirically research embodiment, or these `bodily 
practices' that impinge upon subjectivity, self and identity. In order to meet the 
`empirical' requirements of our discipline we need to not only develop a methodological 
approach, but an approach that brings `bodiliness into method' (Csordas, 1999). Csordas 
directs our attention to the historian Morris Berman who posed the issue of engaging with 
data from an embodied standpoint like this: 
History gets written with the mind holding the pen. What would it look like, 
what would it read like, if it got written with the body holding the pen? 
(1989: 110; cited in Csordas, 1999: 149) 
He advocates a "visceral history" that conceptualizes history as made and experienced by 
the body, but also "requires the experiential engagement of the historian in the matter of 
history. A twinge in the gut as an indicator of inner accuracy of interpretation, or the 
experience of anger as a grounding for writing a history of anger, are examples he cites 
of bringing bodiliness into method" (Csordas, 1999: 149). This is, I'm sure, a method 
that most of us have used when handling large quantities of data - even if we are reluctant 
to admit it at the risk of appearing `too subjective'. Certainly there are dangers in using 
instinct to drive our interpretations of data, but as a yard stick for marking out data of 
particular significance that needs further explanation, an acknowledgement of gut 
reaction should not be that unusual. Importantly for this study, Csordas also refutes the 
notion that there is "an absolute methodological gulf between representation and being- 
in-the-world" (1999: 148). Thus, unlike Foucault (1970, cited in Ruben, 1998) Csordas 
does not see an inherent inconsistency between poststructuralist and phenomenological 
approaches. In fact, he suggests that being-in-the-world can be understood from 
representations because embodiment is about "neither behaviour nor essence per se, but 
about experience and subjectivity, and understanding these is a function of interpreting 
action in different modes and expressions in different idioms". Thus, in response to the 
question how do we study embodiment, he responds: 
There is no special kind of data or a special method for eliciting such data, 
but a methodological attitude that demands attention to bodiliness even in 
purely verbal data such as written and oral interview (Csordas, 1999: 148). 
Similarly, Susan Bordo encourages philosophers and other social theorists to move away 
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from the abstract `theory of the body' and bring "the concreteness of the body.. . into their 
own work" (1998: 84). Again, she does not advocate a complete rejection of the study of 
representations, rather she urges researchers to become far more involved with the body 
through attention to `bodily practices' - in addition to 'representations' and `discourses': 
... I believe that the study of representations and cultural 
`discourse' - while 
an important part of the cultural study of the body - cannot by itself stand as 
a history of the body. Those discourses impinge on us as fleshly bodies, and 
often in ways that cannot be determined from a study of representations 
alone. To make such determinations, we need to get down and dirty with the 
body on the level of its practices - to look at what we are actually eating (or 
not eating), the lengths we will go to keep ourselves perpetually young, the 
practices that we engage in, emulating TV and pop icons, and so forth 
(Bordo, 1998: 91). 
In the following section this notion of `bodily practices' is explored using two examples: 
Eating and Hormone Replacement Therapy (HRT). I will attempt to argue that these 
practices have effects on our being-in-the-world above and beyond that which can be 
accounted for discursively. Bordo (1998) wrote that we need "to look at what we are 
actually eating (or not eating)" as one means of getting "down and dirty with the body at 
the level of its practices". Certainly, food has come to mean much more than an energy 
source needed for our survival - particularly in recent years. Television is often saturated 
with programmes in the genre of `The Naked Chef, `Can't Cook, Won't Cook', Ready 
Steady Cook, and who would have thought that Delia Smith would become a cultural 
icon. Elspeth Probyn (1999) writes inspiringly about the explosion of food culture as part 
of the creation of new national identities: linking `Mod Oz' cuisine to a new 
`multicultural' Australian identity and `Mod English' cuisine to `Cool Britannia'. 
Consequently, she suggests that individuals employ eating practices as a `technique of 
self' (in the Foucauldian sense) in order to differentiate themselves from others. Without 
a doubt, what, how, why, when and where we eat (or do not eat) are intrinsically linked 
to social and cultural structures such as class, gender, ethnicity, kinship and identity and 
the meanings these hold for each of us will, of course, be mediated discursively. 
Reflecting on `foodie' practices, such as eating and cooking, may provide an insight into 
"how we hope to produce ourselves as thoughtful and even ethical beings, connected to 
each other in sometimes pleasurable, often painful, and always regulated ways" (Probyn, 
1999: 422). But, food also has a material effect upon our corporeality. What we eat, or do 
not eat, may say something about who we are, but the actual break-down of the food, the 
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calories, the nutrients, the fat percentage and vitamin content, will have a very real effect 
on our embodiment and our being-in-the-world. If, for whatever reasons, we eat a 
healthier diet we will have a slimmer physique and quite possibly live longer. Whether or 
not this is seen as a good thing is, without doubt, socially constructed. Gluttony has 
shifted from being a sign of wealth to an individual trait that signifies a lack of self- 
control. But, despite its change in meaning, eating a greater number of calories will have 
an effect on body size, and therefore physical presence, that remains far more consistent 
across time, history and cultures. 
Similarly, a FtM transsexual may position himself, his gendered subjectivity, within the 
discourses of masculinity whilst his body reads female. His decision to take testosterone 
is, undoubtedly, mediated by the medical discourses that shape a transsexual identity and 
the societal expectations of male embodiment. Yet, the beard growth that will soon 
appear on his face cannot possibly be thought of as discursive. What beard growth means 
in determining a particular type of manhood, or - in the case of beard growth in some 
women - womanhood, is discursive but the relationship between testosterone and that 
beard growth has nothing to do with discourse. Here, we see an example of 
NatureCulture (Latour, 1993). Beard growth will always be interpreted in terms of 
cultural and social practices of gendered embodiment, as outside of these practices beard 
growth has no meaning or purpose (it needs to be interpreted). However, the beard 
growth itself, the coarse hairs that push up through the skin, cannot be accounted for by, 
or reduced to discourse. 
The notion of `cultural practices' is also central to Christine Griffin's (1999) critique of 
the current state of some discursive psychology. She argues that the cultural domain, in 
its wider sense, fails to impact upon much of the work in `critical' and `discursive' 
psychology, at both the theoretical and methodological levels. Instead, she proposes that 
ethnographic methods be employed alongside the more traditional discursive methods of 
data collection, such as interviews. These ethnographic methods would include the 
standard observational techniques and research field-notes that have been widely used in 
anthropological studies, but also the anomalies of research that are so often omitted from 
studies in psychology. Griffin illustrates this criticism, the failure to report such 
anomalies, by drawing on the work of Valerie Hey, who studied girls' friendships in 
school during the mid-late 1980's. Half way through her fieldwork Hey was informed 
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that she would have to leave the school she was researching since a number of male 
teachers found her presence in classrooms "too disruptive". I agree that these types of 
events, which can be so insightful, need to be both included and discussed. But, perhaps, 
this criticism is more pertinent to traditional psychological methods as, generally, these 
anomalies are included in any `good' qualitative research, under the rubric of 
`reflexivity'. Griffin's second criticism is more serious, and still one that critical 
discursive approaches have yet to come to grips with. Here, the problem is critical social 
psychology's failure to engage with the diverse cultural practices and unique trajectories 
through which individuals come to construct and imagine themselves as social beings. 
Attempting to acknowledge some of the complexity of the cultural domain, it is therefore 
also necessary in this study to engage with the disparate cultural practices of corporeality 
that facilitate and distinguish gender identification. More importantly, it highlights the 
need to explore how the transsexual subject negotiates cultural practices of gendered 
embodiment; learns new modes of physical deportment, gestures and speech patterns; as 
well as how they attempt to shake off those practices which will have already been 
subject to repetition and stored within the structures of the body during many years of 
socialization. Thus, although primarily discursive, the methodological approach also 
draws upon some of the principles of phenomenology and psychoanalysis in order to 
allow for a greater understanding of the experience of Being Transsexual. 
4.7 Mobilizing key concepts 
Before outlining the method, I present a brief summary of the meanings of the key 
concepts that are utilized in the analysis chapters (see Chapters Five, Six and Seven) 
4.7 (i) Identity 
I deploy the term `identity' to refer to a particular formation of self that is constructed 
through cultural and symbolic practices. It is assumed that identities are multiple, 
relational and open to change. 
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4.7 (ii) Identification 
Identification is deployed to imply the degree to which an individual may identify with 
or resist an identity category. For example, the experiences of these participants may fit 
well with the discourses and practices that construct a transsexual identity. However, 
they may, for a variety of reasons, resist identifying as transsexual. Similarly, although 
their past gender experiences may problematize their relationship to the identity 
categories `male' or `female', they may fully embrace these identifications. 
4.7 (iii) Discourse 
Discourse is used to refer to both textual and socio-cultural practices that constitute a 
particular phenomenon. For example, the phenomenon transsexualism is constructed 
through medical, biological, Cartesian dualist and psychoanalytic discourses, amongst 
others. 
4.7 (iv) Discursive construct 
Discursive construct is typically used to refer to a particular phrase when talking about a 
phenomenon. For example, `born is the wrong body' is a commonly found discursive 
construction that draws upon a Cartesian dualist discourse and is deployed to represent 
the experience of being transsexual. 
4.7 (v) Discursive position 
Positioning is used to refer to the way in which an individual will construct their 
experience by positioning it within a particular discourse. For example, some of the 
participants positioned themselves within biological discourses arguing that their 
transsexuality was the result of a birth defect. 
4.7 (vi) Embodied subjectivity 
Subjectivity refers to our sense of who we are. It is assumed that this is constituted 
through language and other socio-cultural practices. The conjunction of subjectivity with 
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embodiment highlights the need to acknowledge that we are fleshy physical beings and 
our sense of who we are will all ways be constructed and mediated through our 
intersubjective relationships as embodied beings. 
4.8 Method 
14 individuals who self-identified as either transsexual or transgendered, or sometimes 
both (see Chapter One and Chapter Five), were recruited through various sources. 
Advertisements were placed in the FTM Network quarterly journal Boys Own and The 
Pink Paper, a nationwide gay and lesbian weekly publication. Leaflets were also 
distributed at The Transgender Film Festival, London, during September 1998. In 
addition `snowballing' was deployed, where participants already enlisted introduced 
others that were willing to partake. An equal number of male-to-female and female-to- 
male transsexuals were recruited (seven of each) in order to facilitate comparison across 
the post-operative genders, as it was expected there would be differences in their 
experiences when moving towards either a male gender or a female gender. 
Participants' interest in the research project was slow to begin with. The first male-to- 
female participant was contacted through a work colleague, and it was hoped that 
`snowballing' would lead to other individuals volunteering to partake. After three months 
it was apparent that other forms of recruitment were required. This time period coincided 
with The 2nd International Transgender Film Festival at the Lux Cinema in Hoxton 
Square, London. The organizers very kindly allowed me to leave 200 leaflets (see 
appendix 1 a), distributed between the front desk at the cinema and a nearby art 
exhibition, advertising the research and requesting the help of transsexual/transgendered 
individuals. The response again was very disappointing. Only one female-to-male 
participant was recruited via this method and they were one of the last to make contact, 
three months after the festival, when they came across my advert whilst tidying up some 
papers. After this, two forms of advertising were conducted simultaneously. 
The FTM Network, with the assistance of Dr Stephen Whittle, agreed to place an 
advertising slip (see appendix lb) in the next edition of their publication, Boys Own. The 
first respondent was crucial as they gave a good recommendation to three other FTM 
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London members who also agreed to partake. Four other female-to-male participants also 
responded to the advert slip. Interviews could only be arranged with two of these as, 
unfortunately, funds were not available for travel expenses to Scotland and, were even 
less likely for the fourth respondent, who resided in the US and got in touch via e-mail. 
A final advert was placed in The Pink Paper (see appendix I c), a free weekly paper 
principally focusing on gay and lesbian issues but including `trans' stories and news. The 
central motivations for choosing the gay press, rather than a national newspaper, were 
cost and coverage. The advert for The Pink Paper cost £66 (funded by Middlesex 
University) and ran for six weeks. Although I was interested in different sexual 
orientation identifications and realized it was unlikely that many heterosexual male-to- 
female respondents would reply, the risk of funding a `one hit' advert in the national 
press - that may well have received a low response rate - was too high. In fact, this advert 
was hugely successful. Thirteen male-to-female individuals made contact and one 
female-to-male. Of the thirteen male-to-female respondents interviews were arranged 
with seven participants (one did not turn up). Of the other five respondents, one had their 
phone cut off so I was unable to continue contact, two lived in regions that were too far 
and costly for me to travel to, and two were only just beginning to discuss their 
transgendered feelings. Although it would have been very interesting for the project to 
hear these individuals' stories, interviews were not conducted as the criterion for 
participation had already been set as `having begun hormone therapy'. However, I felt 
uneasy about simply turning down these individuals, as, for some, I was their first point 
of contact. One, in particular, divulged some highly personal and sensitive information in 
our initial phone conversation. Thus, wherever possible, I gave contact details of 
qualified counsellors who would hopefully help them to make sense of their gender 
confusions. 
4.8 (i) Participants 
All names have been changed to protect the identity of the participants. Please note all 
identifications are made tentatively, the complexity and fluidity of the participants' 
gender and sexual identifications will be explored over the following three chapters. 
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4.8 (ii) Male-to-Female Respondents 
Artemis: age 51, she had just had surgery when she made contact in response to the Pink 
Paper advert. Her sexual orientation was lesbian or S/M dyke and she was Asian, and 
single. She had begun transitioning four years ago and her surgery was privately funded. 
She was employed and lived in London. 
Caroline: age 29, she had had surgery three years ago and she made contact in response 
to the Pink Paper advert. Her sexual orientation was lesbian and she was single and 
white. She began transitioning four years ago, after a referral from a private psychiatrist 
but later received a Health Authority Grant to fund her surgery. She was employed and 
lived in the south-east of England. 
Cheryl: age 41, she identified as transgendered rather than transsexual and although she 
had begun taking hormones four years ago she had not yet decided whether to transition 
permanently. In fact, Cheryl still lived much of her life, particularly at work, in a male 
role. She was sexually attracted to women and would, if the situation arose, identify as 
lesbian. She was white, single, registered with a private psychiatrist and had recently left 
her job. She responded to the advert in the Pink Paper and lived in London. 
Emily: age 33, she had begun transitioning five years ago and was registered at Charing 
Cross Gender Clinic. She was the only male-to-female participant not to be transitioning 
privately and was waiting for a date for NHS funded surgery. She was white, lived with 
her lesbian lover and was employed. She responded to the advert in the Pink Paper and 
lived in London. 
Karen: age 23, she was the only heterosexual male-to-female participant and she had 
begun transitioning five years ago soon after leaving school. Her surgery was privately 
funded. She had been in a relationship for three months and her partner was unaware of 
her transsexual status. She was white and working full-time. She responded to the advert 
in the Pink Paper by e-mail and lived in the south-east of England. 
Sally: age 35, she had surgery two years prior to the interviews and this was privately 
funded. She was lesbian identified, white and lived with her female partner. She was 
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unemployed. She was originally contacted by a colleague of mine -a friend of hers - and 
kindly agreed to be the first participant. She lived in London. 
Sarah: age 36, she began to transition five years ago and was about to have her surgery, 
which was to be privately funded. She identified as lesbian, was white, single and 
employed. She responded to the advert in the Pink Paper by e-mail and lived in the 
Manchester region. 
4.8 (iii) Female-to-Male Respondents 
Albert: age 59, he had surgery 30 years ago and was the only female-to-male participant 
to have had a phalloplasty constructed. His surgery was NHS funded and he identified as 
heterosexual. Older than the other participants, Albert only became aware of the concept 
`transsexual' and the existing support groups seven years prior to the interviews. He was 
single, white, lived in the south-east of England and was due to retire. He responded after 
receiving a request slip in Boys Own. 
Billy: age 46, he transitioned four years ago. This was when he finally made the decision 
to live full-time in a male role, although he had had privately funded chest surgery and a 
hysterectomy ten years previously and had been `flip-flopping' between gender roles 
since his early twenties. He was white, heterosexual, although he saw himself as `queer' 
rather than `straight' and lived in London with his female partner. He was studying at 
university and responded via the recommendation of other FTMLondon group members. 
Neil: age 35, he decided to transition three years ago. At the time of the interview he was 
awaiting chest surgery which was to be privately funded. Neil was heterosexual, white 
and single. He lived in London, was self-employed and responded via the 
recommendation of other FTM London group members. 
Richard: age 24, he had begun hormones 14 months ago. Being unemployed and 
registered with a private psychiatrist, he had no immediate plans for chest surgery. He 
loosely identified as gay, was white and single. He lived in London and also responded 
via the recommendation of other FTM London group members. 
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Ruben: age 19, he was the youngest participant. He had been taking hormones for a year 
and a half and his transition was being supervised by Charing Cross Gender Clinic. At 
this point in time he was still waiting to see when he would be put on a waiting list for 
NHS funded chest surgery. He was white, single and identified as heterosexual. He lived 
in the south of England and was currently studying. He responded to the request slip sent 
out in Boys Own, by mail. 
Jason: age 39, he had begun transitioning two and a half years ago. He had undergone 
privately funded chest surgery, was white, heterosexual, and single. He lived in the 
south-east of England, was employed and was the first female-to-male participant to 
respond to the request slip sent out in Boys Own. 
Sam: age 32, he had begun transitioning two years ago and had subsequently had 
privately funded chest surgery. He was white, heterosexual and had stayed with his long- 
term female partner since transitioning. He was employed and lived in London. He 
responded to the leaflets distributed at the Transgender Film Festival. 
4.8 (iv) Pilot Interview 
The format for the interview questions used in the second interview (focusing on the 
participants' understanding of gender and sexuality terminology) had already been 
successfully employed in an undergraduate research dissertation which explored how 
lesbian and heterosexual women constructed their gender identity in relation to their 
sexual orientation (Johnson, 1997). Thus, for this study, after a detailed research of 
existing clinical literature, socio-cultural accounts and most importantly, transgender 
community based publications, many of these questions were re-worded to focus on 
transsexual identity. Following this, considerable time was spent with supervisors 
reflecting upon the ordering of the interview schedule, the new questions that focused 
upon attitudes to media reports and legal position (interview one) and autobiographical 
questions (interview three; see 4.8(v) for further discussion). The three interviews 
conducted with the first participant were intended to be employed as a pilot study, but the 
interviews ran so smoothly and effectively it was decided to include this participant in 
the main study - this decision was also influenced by the problematic start to recruiting 
participants. Reflecting on the first interviews, only one amendment was made to the 
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interview schedule. In the undergraduate project lesbian participants had been asked: 
Do you or would you use methods to divert attention from your sexuality? 
If so what? How do you feel about this? 
These questions pertained to issues around lesbian identity and `visibility', in that the 
`best' representation of a lesbian is often construed as a butch woman (Calhoun, 1996, 
see Chapter Seven), and many lesbian women will project a different image at work than 
when they are socializing. However, the lesbian male-to-female participant who took 
part in the pilot interview found this question confusing and problematic - possibly 
because they were more concerned with `passing' as female than as `straight'. Hence, 
this question was dropped from subsequent interviews. 
The interview questions were primarily the same for male-to-female and female-to-male 
participants, although the ordering depended upon the direction of their transition. Thus, 
separate schedules were constructed to avoid any confusion or embarrassing errors on 
behalf of the interviewer. 
4.8 (v) Interviews 
Although I focus on `interview' to describe the method of data collection here, I tried to 
avoid such terminology when engaging with participants. `Interview' can invoke the idea 
of correct answers given in a stressful situation, such as a job interview or a police 
interview. I wanted to avoid such connotations so focused on `discussing your 
experience' when asking for participants to `help with a research project'. It was hoped 
that this would be a productive means of empowering participants as it assumes, 
correctly, that they will have more knowledge about their `condition' than the researcher. 
Interview schedules (see appendix 2) were constructed to cover three broad areas that 
formed the basis for discussion on three occasions. The first focused on the participants' 
general attitudes, feelings and beliefs about how transsexuals were represented in the 
media, and their legal position in the United Kingdom. The second interview questioned 
the participants' understanding of various terminological concepts of gender and 
sexuality. This included questions such as `what does it mean to be transsexual? ' and 
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`what does it mean to be a man, a woman, masculine and feminine? ' The rationale 
behind this type of questioning was to try to ascertain what exactly the respondent meant 
when using these terms. Of course, the notion that they would use one term exclusively 
to represent a fixed concept is naive, but this type of questioning permitted the 
documentation of the richness of meanings that can be present in a particular word, 
clause or discourse. Sexual orientation issues were also discussed in this interview. 
Contrary to traditional gender expectations, only one male-to-female transsexual 
identified as heterosexual, where as only one female-to-male transsexual identified as 
gay. This distribution could, perhaps, as indicated above, be explained by the method of 
recruitment, as all the male-to-female participants were found through the advertisement 
in The Pink Paper. The final interview focused on the individuals' own experiences of 
the transition process, incorporating a narrative account from childhood through to the 
present day. The interview schedule was conducted in this manner in order to move from 
the public to the personal. It was expected that the participants' growing familiarity with 
the interviewer would facilitate self-disclosure - particularly in the final interview, which 
dealt with the participants' own experiences. 
The venue for the interview was left to the participant to decide upon, with the emphasis 
on their comfort. Also, with restricted funds there were no means available to reimburse 
participants' travel costs. However, to add some diversity to the geographical location of 
the participants, some limited funds were provided by Middlesex University to enable a 
few interviews to take place with respondents who lived outside of London and the 
south-east of England. Although, no claims could or would be made to having a 
representative sample, as wide a variety of stories as possible were sought in order to 
enrich the data. This was particularly the case with the female-to-male respondents as all 
of them came through the same tight knit organization, The FTM Network. Many of the 
London Group members met up on a monthly basis and spent a great deal of time 
pondering the same types of questions as in the interviews. Such a support group is 
admirable for those individuals engaging with these issues. But, for the sake of the 
research, I was keen to interview some members who were simply affiliated with the 
group rather than only its core members, who, at times, responded in terms of the groups 
pre-discussed conclusions. Thus, some travel outside of London and two over-night stays 
were conducted during the interviewing period. 
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All the interviews took place in the homes of participants with the exception of two 
male-to-female respondents. Karen, who travelled to work in London, requested the first 
meeting in a pub near to her office. This was agreed to but, unfortunately, the recording 
was so poor that the interview was un-transcribable. The following two meetings took 
place, at my request and her agreement, in a quieter room in her company's building. The 
other participant, Sarah lived some way outside of Manchester, and since I only had 
access to public transport, she suggested we also meet at her workplace in central 
Manchester. Fortunately, she had a very private workstation and the interviews went 
ahead uninterrupted. 
In total forty-two interviews were conducted, with the first and second interview taking 
on average just over an hour, and the third interview taking between one hour and a half 
and two hours. Whilst the interview schedule was divided into three separate sections, at 
times, I only met twice with the participant. This was usually dictated by their 
availability times or travel cost to their home. Thus, for those who lived outside of 
London, I only made two trips, conducting the first and second interview on the first visit 
and the third interview on the second visit. Forty-one interviews have since been 
transcribed in a style that emphasizes readability, rather than specific details such as 
intonation. Transcription is extremely laborious and it has taken between six and nine 
hours for each interview (see appendix 3 for transcription notes) 
4.9 Analysis of Interviews 
4.9 (i) Initial confusions 
In total nine months was spent pouring over the forty-one interview scripts attempting to 
extract discourses and discursive positions without losing the context of the participants' 
self-narratives. At this point all sorts of anxieties regarding the method and its suitability 
were encountered. At times, when the text was chunked into categories that related to the 
interview questions, I felt that I had strayed into the realms of grounded theory (e. g. 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Ekins, 1997). At others, when trying to 
analyze the third interview which focused on biographical accounts, I wondered if a 
narrative method which permitted a greater degree of interpretation (e. g. Josselson & 
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Leiblich, 1999; Hollway & Jefferson, 2000) would, perhaps, be more appropriate. And 
very occasionally, after underlining and drawing reference to practically every word on 
the page, I felt like running away to an exotic location: bathing in a warm turquoise sea 
became infinitely more attractive than drowning in the sea of Xerox paper that littered 
the floor of my study. Undoubtedly, these are problems that plague most qualitative 
researchers although we rarely read about them. More importantly, whilst well equipped 
with the rationale behind discourse analysis, we rarely encounter any guides to how 
researchers did their analysis. Perhaps this is because a detailed account of what was 
done may not only seem prescriptive, but also - for those of us concerned with more than 
language - we might discover we are not doing discourse analysis `properly' after all. 
4.9 (ii) Shifting Approaches 
From the moment of transcription some well-known dualistic discourses and positions 
were easily recognized. For example: mind/body, individual/society, or biological V's 
psychological explanations for transsexualism. However, as it has already been pointed 
out, dualism in itself is not always of much interest, as language also remains inherently 
dualistic. Despite this, obvious discourses and positions of interest were noted during the 
transcription period for future reference. The next step was to try to systematically 
analyze the interviews adhering to the principles outlined by Potter & Wetherell (1987), 
as well as attending to issues of subjectivity (Hollway, 1989; Hollway & Jefferson, 
2000), and power and identity implications (Parker, 1992; Burman & Parker, 1993). 
Three months later hampered by the sheer quantity of transcripts and becoming 
increasingly frustrated and confused, little in road had been made. Rather than reducing 
the data, each reading seemed to elicit an escalating number of positions, contradictions 
and themes. Supervisors suggested a change in direction. 
This time, the data was approached from a thematic perspective. This entailed extracting 
anything that pertained to the central aims of the thesis, such as: a greater understanding 
of what transsexual and transgender identifications mean and how they are negotiated; 
notions of self in transition, gender identity and embodied subjectivity; the relationship 
between gender and sexual orientation identifications. Of course, there were many other 
categories - particularly those to do with participants' experiences with the medical and 
clinical establishments, as well as family and employment based relationships, and media 
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and legal representations of transsexualism - that do not feature so predominantly in the 
analysis chapters. 
To facilitate a comparison between MtF and FtM respondents it was decided to tackle 
their scripts separately. For no particular reason the MtF participants' transcripts were 
addressed first. A coding frame was outlined (see appendices 4a) addressing eight 
distinct themes: transsexualism; gender; sexual orientation; self and identity; the body; 
social relations; media portrayal; experience with medical/psychiatric profession. Eight 
computer files pertaining to these themes were constructed and then those files that 
related to the focal themes of the thesis (i. e. gender and sexual orientation identifications; 
self; identity; embodied subjectivity) were broken down into a far more detailed 
framework. This facilitated the teasing out of specific discourses. For example, within 
the `transsexualism' file, a `Cartesian dualist' discourse dominated explanations for 
transsexualism, and within the `gender' file biological discourses dominated explanations 
of gender identity. But, most of the analysis involved tracing through the complex and 
contradictory web of both gender and sexual orientation identifications and their 
relationship to one another. Thus, the second interview became the central focus for 
discourse analysis, with interviews one and three being used to complement and 
contradict those discourses, positions and themes already extracted. The text contained in 
files such as `medical/psychiatric profession' remained fairly un-deconstructed and may 
be subjected to a more detailed analysis in the future, perhaps using a narrative style of 
analysis that may be more compatible with the structure of the text elicited from the third 
interview. 
The FtM participants' interviews were analyzed using a similar detailed framework to 
the one constructed for the MtF respondents' texts (see appendix 4b). However, due care 
and attention was taken not to simply fit the coding frame to the new set of data. It was 
expected that differences would be found between the two sets of data in terms of 
experience and the discourses or positions that were drawn upon to express this. At times 
this was certainly the case. For example, constructing `transsexualism as distinct from 
transvestism' featured strongly within many of the MtF respondents' accounts but not at 
all in the FtM participants' accounts. It has been argued that the female transvestite is an 
anomaly because no erotic value is entailed when a woman dresses in male clothing 
(Stoller, 1968). Although this statement could be questioned in the light of recent Drag 
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King publications (e. g. Halberstam, 1997; LeGrace Volcano & Halberstam, 1999), 
traditionally they appear to be a rarer phenomenon than male transvestism (Fenichel, 
1930). Instead, in the FtM respondents' accounts these types of `border wars' (Hale & 
Halberstam, 1998) tended to focus on distinguishing FtM identity from a butch lesbian 
identity. Thus, although the coding framework for the FtM respondents follows a similar 
format, subtle differences were recorded when deconstructing the principle themes. 
These are discussed in the analysis chapters. 
However, the data still had to be reduced further and the vital decisions about which 
extracts should be included in the thesis needed to be made. At this point, heeding the 
advice of Csordas (1999), a more intuitive method was used. Addressing the data from 
an `embodied standpoint' involved not only focusing on the embodied subjectivities of 
the participants, but also bringing my own `bodiliness to method'. Thus, each extract was 
chosen `viscerally', inevitably guided by my own interest and by how well I felt the 
extract would enhance the `story' that was being told: A story which attempted to 
account for the complex experience of Being Transsexual. Undoubtedly, others would 
have chosen differently. 
4.10 Ethical considerations 
4.10 (i) Recruitment 
Ethical clearance for the study was granted by the internal, departmental ethics 
committee, before any advertisements were publicized (see appendix 5). Advertisements 
informed participants that the research would endeavour to increase understanding of 
transsexual experience and that their participation would greatly aid this process. Contact 
was initiated with the participants via e-mail or telephone when they responded to the 
various forms of adverts. At this stage more information regarding the central themes of 
the interviews was disclosed. Some respondents immediately withdrew, as they did not 
want to partake in a recorded conversation. Those who agreed to participate were assured 
that they could withdraw at any point including mid-interview. 
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4.10 (ii) Interviews and commitment to respondents 
All participants were assured that, wherever possible, anonymity and confidentiality 
would be protected. Thus, particular steps needed to be taken in order not to violate this 
contract and, at the same time, to allow Health and Safety precautions to be met. Hence, 
when an interview was arranged at a participant's home the name, address and telephone 
number were left in an envelope with a designated supervisor or peer. Time guidelines 
were provided whereby the interviewer would ring at a particular hour to confirm all had 
gone well. This procedure worked effectively as I did not have to renege my 
commitments to confidentiality whilst protecting my own safety. 
During the interview I took as much care as possible to facilitate participant self- 
disclosure. The role taken by the interviewer is clearly of great importance in how the 
participants construct their responses, but it also affects the type of experience the 
participant will have. Griffin (1990) describes three stances the interviewer might take 
during their discussion. Researcher as `Kewpie doll' involves keeping one's eyes and 
ears open and one's mouth closed (Polsky, 1969). Alternatively, the researcher as 
`nodding dog' involves giving encouragement through smiles and nods but keeping 
verbal intervention to the minimum. This approach might involve participants reading 
the smiles and nods as positive or negative feedback so cannot be seen as a neutral 
intervention. Finally, Griffin describes the stance of `talking-back'. This can involve the 
interviewer either challenging what the participant says, or encouraging mutual self- 
disclosure in the form of a friendly discussion. As in previous research (e. g. Gilfoyle, 
Wilson & Brown, 1993) a mixture of all three approaches were adopted to achieve a 
participatory rather than voyeuristic approach to the subject matter (Currie & Kazi, 
1987), but the extent to which this took place varied between participants. In fact, whilst 
I wanted to promote the respondent's own self-disclosure by taking care not to interject 
or interrupt the flow of their narration, at times it would have been suspicious and, 
perhaps, insulting not to have responded to some of their questions. Many participants 
were, quite justifiably, curious to know what motivated my interest in researching 
transsexualism, and, on occasion, asked about my own gender and sexual orientation 
identifications. At first I was somewhat uncomfortable, as well as unfamiliar, with 
responding to these types of questions in this context: expressing my own anxieties 
around gender and sexual identities under their spotlight of enquiry. However, I tried to 
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be as honest and open as possible in order to maintain a relaxed and friendly atmosphere 
in the interview and, perhaps more importantly, to try to diminish as much as possible 
some of the power relations that were undoubtedly in play. It was hoped that the setting 
would be very different from that encountered when transsexual individuals present 
themselves for diagnosis and are reliant on producing the correct `story' in order to attain 
their requests for medical interventions. Thus, to avoid implying that I was in anyway an 
`expert', or that I required the participants to `prove' their status, was crucial to the type 
of interview setting I wanted to create. Whilst recognizing that the conversation topics 
might be, at times, distressing, it was hoped that the participants would, overall, have a 
positive interview experience. In fact, several months later, one of the MtF participants 
rang me to ask if I would become her counsellor as she had found the interviews to be 
very beneficial. I explained to her that, unfortunately, I was not qualified for this type of 
psychotherapeutic relationship. Again, this raises ethical implications regarding the 
responsibility of the researcher to participants that not only give so generously of their 
own time, but also, after disclosing so much personal information, may make certain 
attachments to the interviewer. In this case, I passed on as much information as possible 
about alternative sources of counselling that were available to her, in addition to the 
unsatisfactory service she was already receiving. 
Other commitments made to respondents' involved issues around what was to be done 
with the research. Of course, it will be endeavoured to ensure all respondents will receive 
feedback at the end of the research process. However, this commitment will take place in 
a variety of forms. Integral to this decision are the problematics of meeting the specific 
requests that some of the participants made when talking about their own reasons for 
becoming involved with the project. For example, some of the respondents were 
motivated to partake simply to help raise the profile of transsexual research. They had 
what could be called a more `realist' approach where although they may not agree with 
all - or even much - of the research in the area, at least research was beginning to take 
place that actually engaged with their own views and experiences. Conversely, other 
respondents had heavily invested political positions and much of their interviews would 
revolve around their professed political aims. Here, I tried to emphasize that the research 
was looking at the diversity of transsexual experience and whilst being very grateful for 
their time and an insight into their political goals, the final project may not fit entirely 
with their specific political agenda. Whilst social constructionist accounts can so often 
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descend into pure relativism it is impossible, particularly if you wish to avoid this, to be 
all things to all people. Hence, feedback will take the form of academic papers at small 
transgender community orientated conferences along with individual copies of any 
published work for all participants. 
4.10 (iii) Analysis restrictions 
Pledges of confidentiality and anonymity, wherever possible, were made to all the 
participants and must be adhered to. However, the depth and coverage of life history 
during the three interviews could make the participants easily identifiable, particularly 
given the relatively small number of transsexual individuals in the UK. Whilst I believe 
that for the sake of research rigour original data files should be made available for the 
checking of, for example, context, at the same time, commitments made to research 
participants must be upheld. For this reason I have decided not to include the interview 
transcripts as an appendix. Furthermore, permission to use a more detailed personal 
account would be requested before proceeding with a narrative style analysis which may 
be less protective of an individual's identity than discourse analysis. 
The discursive constructions, positionings and themes that emerged from the analysis are 
presented in the following three chapters. The first of these chapters attempts to move 
beyond a Cartesian dualist representation of transsexualism by arguing that it fails to 
account for the complex web of identification the transsexual has to negotiate when 
attempting to explain their life story. 
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5 
Being transsexual: beyond Cartesian dualist constructions 
... in common perception, to name oneself as transsexual 
is to own 
precisely to being gender displaced, to being a subject in transition, 
moving beyond or in between sexual difference. 
Jay Prosser, Second Skins, (1998: 2) 
Dualism (thus) cannot be deconstructed in culture the way it can be 
on paper. To be concretely - that is, culturally - accomplished 
requires that we bring the `margins' to the `center, ' that we 
legitimate and nurture, in those institutions from which they have 
been excluded, marginalized ways of knowing, speaking, being. 
Susan Bordo, Unbearable Weight, (1993: 41) 
Remembering our past, carrying it with us always, may be the 
necessary requirement for maintaining, as they say, the wholeness 
of the self. 
Milan Kundera, Identity, (1999: 43) 
Given the paucity of qualitative studies of transsexualism, one of the central aims for this 
research was to gain a greater understanding of the lived experience of transsexual 
individuals: what does it mean to be transsexual? The methodological approach, with its 
focus on how meaning is constructed through language, necessitated that this question 
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became central during the interview sessions. It could not be assumed that the 
participants were using `transsexual' or `transgendered', or any of the other identification 
terms in the same way as each other or as the researcher. Thus, this chapter begins by 
exploring how these identifications are embraced and resisted whilst explicating the 
variety of ways in which they are deployed. As is the case with most Western 
philosophical notions of personhood, many of these accounts were dominated by the use 
of a Cartesian dualist discourse that promulgates the notion of a rational unified self that 
pre-exists the physical body. However, in an attempt to step beyond simply documenting 
how pervasive Cartesian dualism is, I will illustrate how a Cartesian dualist construction 
of transsexualism becomes problematic for the transsexual individual, particularly when 
recounting their life story. 
5.1 What does it mean to be transsexual? 
5.1 (i) Cartesian dualism versus biological reductionism 
In response to questions about their own beliefs about what it means to be transsexual, 
most of the participants' accounts were littered with the Cartesian dualist construction 
`being born in the wrong body'. For example Artemis suggested that: 
... one of the most 
frustrating things about umm about going through this 
whole process is umm (.. ) is (.. ) the, is hearing the odd comment from 
somebody that is (.. ) is unhappy with umm their sex because they perceive 
themselves as being umm a little bit ugly or not masculine enough or 
whatever... but that is so superficial compared to somebody who has the 
misfortune of being born in the wrong body (Artemis, MtF, 50,2/220-223, 
225-226). 
Yet, by implication, this aphorism has the effect of constructing a problematic image of 
selfhood that perceives the subject as born into a docile body, with a rational unified 
sense of self fully formed. Clearly, `born in the wrong body' as an all-encompassing 
explanation for transsexualism is unsatisfactory (see Chapter One and Chapter Three). 
There was, however, some support for Prosser's (1998) claim that `born in the wrong 
body' provides a pertinent account of the feelings of disembodiment the transsexual 
subject encounters. As Caroline describes: 
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... this is going to sound so cliched you 
know the thing about the woman 
trapped in a man's body, it is the biggest cliche under the sun but it's true. 
It's the only way you can really describe it and it's not until you start going 
through the whole process of changing over that you realize that (Caroline, 
MtF, 29,1/155-158). 
However, given that `born in the wrong body' is a well-known media account of 
transsexualism, it was not that surprising to find this representation readily available 
within the participants' interview scripts. Perhaps more revealing was the apparent 
superseding of this aphorism by the more recent notion that transsexuals `have the brain 
of the other gender'. At some point during the interviews every participant drew on this 
specific explanation. As Albert demonstrates: 
A:... I was never a woman (K: uhum). I was a child, but I didn't grow up into 
a woman. Do you see what I mean? Because my whole person, my whole 
core identity was male so I couldn't grow into a woman. Of course my body 
looked as if it was, but that, but you are not your body, you are your your 
brain. It's your brain that makes you a person, you are not your body 
(Albert, FtM, 59,1/ 185-189). 
Again, Albert is clearly employing a dualistic representation of selfhood, where gendered 
subjectivity is accounted for in terms of the brain, and the body is docile, even redundant, 
in determining a gender identity. However, whether this construction is representative of 
a Cartesian dualist doctrine is debatable. It could be argued that `having the brain of the 
other gender' is a more sophisticated deployment of the same Cartesian dualist discourse 
that distinguishes the mind from the body as a separate substance. Indeed, many of the 
participants used the terms `brain' and `mind' interchangeably, as illustrated in the 
following two extracts taken from the same interview with Ruben: 
K: what do you think it means to be transsexual? 
R:... I think you've got the brain of the opposite sex (. ) that your body is, so, 
you know, it's not yours (Ruben, FtM, 19,2/8-9). 
In this first statement Ruben suggests that being transsexual entails a mismatch between 
the brain and the body - to the extent that the body feels that it does not belong to the 
transsexual subject. However, later in the interview Ruben replaces the term brain with 
the term mind to explain that to be a man implies a match between these two entities: 
K:... what does it mean to you to be a man? 
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R:... I think it's really complicated the question you ask but (.. ) because 
you'd have your body to match your mind for one thing, just so you can live 
your life like as you should do... (Ruben, FtM, 19,2/139-142). 
The appeal of the phrase `having the brain of the other gender', which has been greeted 
with much support from the `trans' community, stems from its dubious biological 
underpinnings. These claims have been precipitated by recent neurological studies 
(Swaab & Hoffman, 1995; Swaab et al, 1997, discussed in Chapter Two) that have 
sought to pinpoint gender identity confusion within the structures of the brain. Thus, it 
could be argued that in a strict philosophical sense, this type of explanation for 
transsexualism is in fact materialist: rather than indicating separate substances, the brain 
and body are both assemblages of physical matter. Hence, this explanation could more 
readily be interpreted as biologically reductionist. As such, it is possible to argue that 
`having the brain of the other gender' is indicative of the recent and flourishing trend that 
seeks to reify the biological at the expense of the psychological. 
5.1 (ii) Biological fate or psychological choice 
Certainly there is a fear of the psychological within most of the participants' accounts - 
as there is undoubtedly with many contemporary explanations for complex phenomena. 
The following exchange between Albert and myself is quoted at length as it illustrates 
clearly the level of anxiety that can be evoked when transsexualism is associated with the 
psychological: 
A:... from my point of view, you know, I was born with this medical 
condition. It was treated in nineteen sixty-nine, seventy. Seventy-one 
surgery done, take hormones, finished. 
K: was it treated as a medical condition at that time? 
A: it's been among the list of medical conditions now for about thirty odd 
years I think. I think it was, I think even before that it was a known medical 
condition, it certainly is now anyway (K: but why? ) it's listed as a as a 
medical condition (K: in DSM? ) yeah (K: but that's a psychiatric listing so) 
well this is what, this is one of the problems. I mean to my mind it's just a 
load of, it's just a way for psychiatrists to get work (K: mm) because to my 
mind it's it's just, that's stupid. (K: right) umm (.. ) The only people who 
need a psychiatrist as far as I can see are psychiatrists umm dreadful umm 
(.. ) I don't think that at any point that I've ever had a sort of mental 
condition (K: mm) umm, you know, I'm I'm pretty sure that I've, I'm very 
sure that I'm quite well balanced umm (. ) and I'm quite sure it's not a 
psychiatric disorder umm it never should have been put down as one (.. ) just 
because when when the thing was first realized the state of knowledge was 
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zilch ... on the state of 
knowledge (then) I can understand why they would 
just out and say it's a mental condition etc. but I think we understand so 
much more today that it's high time that they looked at that again and 
realized that it isn't a mental condition. Many of the people that I've met 
are very very intelligent people and by no means (.. ) psychiatric in the sense 
of having any, they're not schizophrenic they're not, you know, they're 
perfectly well balanced people and very clever people most of them umm 
and I think you know I I'm adamant in fact that it's time that they remove 
that (K; mm) from from the (.. ) from the record and realize that it is just a 
medical condition. You're born with it, you have treatment for it and for all 
intents and purposes you're cured (K; yeah) but that's the thing that gets up 
my nose that you never seem to be cured. Well according to the rest of the 
world, you know, it just is nonsense (Albert, FtM, 59,1/111-126; 131-142). 
Albert is clearly very angry at the idea that transsexualism could be, and is, tainted by 
association with a psychiatric diagnosis as he perceives transsexualism as a treatable 
biological condition. The refusal of a clinical diagnosis exacerbated by problematic 
relations with the psychiatric professions, which were often perceived as `gate-keepers', 
was a common theme to emerge from most of the participants' interviews. In contrast, to 
describe transsexualism as a treatable medical condition appears to legitimize the 
transsexual participants' claims to be the other gender. It would appear that to pinpoint 
the psychological in the development of particular desires, complexities and 
inconsistencies of self signifies a complicity on behalf of the subject with this very 
process: biology is our fate, psychology is of our own volition. The lack of conclusive 
evidence for a biological etiology for transsexualism always leaves transsexuals' claim to 
be the other gender in a fragile state. Caroline illustrates this point when she draws a 
comparison with the medical condition `intersexed': 
C:... It's fine to be intersexed. People feel sorry for people that are born 
intersexed but if you're born transsexual they still think it's a choice umm 
(. ) but it is a type of intersexed condition umm (.. ) brain of one gender, body 
of another (Caroline, MtF, 29,2/60-62). 
For those who are born intersexed with the visible physical features of both sexes there is 
a tangible element to their diagnosis, grounded in biology, that is simply not available to 
those who present themselves as transsexual. This juxtaposing of psychological choice 
with biological pre-destination appears to be a strong motivation for couching 
transsexualism in the discourses of medical science. This was evidenced in some 
responses to questions about the clinical terminology that surrounds transsexualism: 
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KJ:... is gender dysphoria a term that you've used? 
K: umm (.. ) no not really I think I may have used it with my parents to try to 
er break them into it gently because it sounds less threatening, it sounds less 
extreme (KJ: right) and also it sounds, I don't know, if one can have a kind 
of nice medical sounding label one can put on it then it's easier for other 
people I think, who one has to tell, like one's family and one's friends. It's 
easier for them to accept because the thing that most incenses me is the great 
fiction that it's a choice (KJ: right) and II think gender dysphoria by (.. ) 
couching as a more clinical term umm slightly negates the fictional choice 
(Karen, MtF, 23,2/40-48). 
So, for Karen, positioning herself within the medical discourses of transsexualism is an 
effective means of legitimizing her condition by avoiding any connotation with a 
`fictional choice' that is associated with psychological explanations. The anxiety 
provoked by the premise that to be transsexual is a choice is often exacerbated by 
representations of the transsexual as a freak or weirdo. And, this idea was commonly 
cited in the participants' accounts. For example, Karen resisted identifying as transsexual 
for precisely this reason: 
... I've worked so 
hard and been through so much (. ) hassle pain (. ) to get to 
the stage where I'm happy and where I, I feel normal and I just don't want 
to take that away from myself for anything (KJ: mm). I don't want to put 
myself back in a box where I feel like a weirdo (KJ: mm) and I don't want 
anyone else thinking I'm a weirdo either (.... ) umm I don't think I'm, well I 
I mean while I think that my circumstances are unusual, but I'm also aware 
that it's not my fault and (.. ) I just don't want, I just don't want anyone 
looking at me and questioning anything about me (KJ: mm) I just don't 
want to feel that (Karen, MtF, 23,2/127-134). 
Thus, psychological explanations for transsexualism tend to infer that a transsexual 
identity is taken up by choice. But, why would anyone choose to position themselves 
within a category that is frequently exemplified as `freak', `weirdo' or `not normal'? 
Attempts to dissipate these negative representations are found in statements such as "it's 
not my fault" which, in turn, both implies and supports the story that transsexuals are 
born that way: it is a medical condition. As Albert explains: 
A:... you know it there there are so many anomalies of one sort or another (. ) 
but why is it that that (.. ) one small lot of people are sort of picked out as 
being strange and weird it just doesn't make any sense. umm. Mind you, I 
mean I'm I'm absolutely positive that you're born with it and I think it's 
exactly the same with homosexuality. I think it's a condition that you're 
born with (Albert, FtM, 59,1/151-155). 
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Here, drawing reference to another minority group, lesbians and gays, Albert challenges 
the notion that transsexuals are `weird'. If transsexuals are "born with it", as a biological 
explanation implies, it must be a `natural' condition rather than being strange, weird or 
freakish. Thus, parallels can be drawn with the same debates that have dominated the 
theorizing of homosexuality in recent years - particularly in the light of the impact of 
identity politics (e. g. Whisman, 1996; Sullivan, 1995. See Chapters Seven and Nine for 
further discussion of the relationship between transgender and gay and lesbian politics). 
5.1 (iii) Deploying psychoanalytic discourses 
Whilst there appeared to be a strong resistance amongst informants to psychological 
interpretations in favour of a biological explanation for the condition of being 
transsexual, biological discourses were not always so pervasive in their accounts when 
they were attempting to provide a narrative account of the path towards transition. For 
example, a biological explanation for transsexualism is made more feasible by the 
clinical criterion that suggests gender dysphoria is frequently evident from early 
childhood. However, some participants effectively deployed alternative, yet 
complementary, discourses to explain why they had not begun to transition until much 
later in life. For example, Jason drew on psychoanalytic discourses peppered with 
references to `repression', `uncovering the real me' and `making sense of my childhood' 
through dream analysis in a psychotherapeutic setting: 
J:... 1 think it's something you discover within yourself that has always been 
there (K: right) so the umm to be transsexual or transgendered umm you 
don't pick up the label and think oh that's what I am, it wasn't like that for 
me umm because I'd already seen an article or a couple of articles... so there 
were things like that around but that didn't make me think ok oh that's what 
I am, I think it's a thing you you discover in yourself. It could have been a 
trigger point but it wasn't (K: right) so it's something that has always been 
you I think, (K: uhum). It's always been part of you and it's this shall we 
say gender (... ) which has been pushed inwards right from when you're 
young and you start displaying your gender because it doesn't fit into 
society. It it's not allowed (Jason, FtM, 39,1/12-28). 
Rather than identifying his experience with a familiar identity category `transsexual', 
Jason explains how he `discovered' his `true' male gender which had been repressed 
since early childhood because of societal pressures to act and behave in a gender specific 
way: pressures and expectations determined by his female body. In the next extract, 
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Jason describes his route to discovering his `true' male gender that had been `repressed' 
over the years. This path involved dream analysis whilst receiving psychotherapy: 
J:... I dreamt I had, I was male and had all the body parts and that that's part 
of when I first started going to psychotherapy and this, I just was going into 
a pit of depression and I wasn't going to come out of it unless I got some 
serious help, but I didn't know what it was about (K: right) and it became 
very clear during the psychotherapy. That's what started me off to think I've 
got to do something about this. All of a sudden you know stuff fits into 
place and you suddenly think mss, you know, it's been there all these years 
why, you know, it's just been you've repressed it all umm but the language 
of dreams was was very powerful in umm saying what the issues were and 
always had been and had been repressed (K; right) I'll give I'll give you an 
example this is one of the most telling examples umm of a dream I had very 
shortly after I started going to the psychotherapist and all we'd done is talk 
about my childhood that's all umm I'd had literally had two or three 
sessions I think and umm I dreamt I was in the old family house where I was 
brought up. My parents live in a different house now. Er, I could hear all 
these cats crying in the garden there were loads of them moving around and 
meowing and stuff and I was in the house and I thought I was alone umm 
and then all of a sudden there was this big cat came to the house and umm 
(.... ) I was with this cat (K: right) and er we started having a fight and all of 
a sudden this cat lost it's skin and there was a man inside and this man got 
out (. ) with a gun (.. ) (K: ooh) and that prompted I mean you can see the 
analogy and like the psychotherapist said to me because I said what's this 
about? And she said, well what what do you see as a cat? I said, well I 
suppose female. Cats tend to be associated as female. And what was inside? 
A man. And she didn't say, you know, she was very good she didn't say I 
think this is what you are, although she said she knew immediately what 
was going on, particularly from that dream. Because there was a man inside 
me, and it started to fit with my childhood (Jason, FtM, 39,1/361-382). 
Jason began transitioning at the age of 36. Prior to this he had no medical record of 
gender dysphoria, just a sense of unease with himself and his long-term lesbian 
relationship. Thus, although he deployed Cartesian dualist and biological discourses to 
explain the transsexual `condition', when his life history began to disrupt the medical 
discourses that construct transsexualism these specific representations of his experience 
of being transsexual were incomplete, unsatisfactory and over-simplistic. Instead, 
another powerful discourse, psychoanalysis, is drawn upon to facilitate a reconstruction 
of the past that makes sense in the light of his own personal sense of a lack of continuity 
in his gendered subjectivity. Deploying a psychoanalytic discourse suggests he was `born 
in the wrong body', but he had repressed this. Furthermore, implicit in this account is 
Jason's awareness of the correct procedure for self-discovery within psychotherapy. He 
is unequivocal that this interpretation did not come from his therapist, "she was very 
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good", but "didn't say", despite knowing "immediately what was going on". Hence, this 
justification of his therapist's actions supports his interpretation that he discovered his 
`true', but repressed, gender identity in psychotherapy. Moreover, it also avoids any of 
the problems or criticisms that have been associated with psychotherapeutic practices 
and particularly well documented in the debates that circulate around such phenomena as 
false memory syndrome (e. g. Sandler & Fonagy, 1997). 
Ian Parker suggests that, whilst at times psychoanalysis may provide a useful framework 
for understanding social phenomena, we need to be "more sceptical about psychoanalytic 
truth claims". As such, he proposes that "[R]ather than treat psychoanalysis simply as a 
key to unlock the secrets of the subject, we should reflect upon how it has been fashioned 
as part of a particular system of self-talk and self-reference in Western culture" (Parker, 
1997: 483). This opens up numerous contentious issues. Whilst, undoubtedly, a short 
extract from a single interview should not be used as a basis to challenge a deep-level 
psychoanalytic interpretation, it could be argued that the reading Jason makes of his own 
dream is not itself psychoanalytically informed. He dreamt that he was a man, breaking 
out of a feline, female shell, represented by the cat, and thus concluded that he was a man 
trapped in a female body: the classic trope of transsexualism. Did his dream really 
provide a sharp poke from his sub-conscious to awaken him to the fact that he had been 
"born with this bloody condition" (see the next extract)? 
Such an interpretation, as we shall see, is something of a caricature of psychoanalytic 
thinking. Within psychoanalytic theory, the relationship between dreams and the 
subconscious are perceived to be far more complex than the one represented in Jason's 
account. As Stephen Frosh has suggested, "[T]he dream and the subconscious: the two 
things are related, but not the same" (Frosh, 1999: 187). Freud suggested that "dream- 
interpretation, if it is not made too difficult by the patient's resistance, leads to 
knowledge of his hidden and repressed wishes and of the complexes nourished by them" 
(1991: 64-65, my emphasis). Within this context, rather than providing clarification of a 
male identity, the dream provides evidence of Jason's unconscious wish to be a man. 
From here, a range of alternative plausible accounts of why Jason might wish to be a 
man can be constructed: an immediate example might be to overcome conflict between 
wanting to conform with heteronormativity, despite sexually desiring women. As such, 
psychoanalysis may be one means of providing insight into the fragmented, inconsistent 
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and irrational bases of human existence (Wetherell, 1999). But, it also provides, 
somewhat against its own grain, a pervasive discourse that helps Jason to reflect upon his 
past, make sense of his childhood unhappiness in terms of being born with the wrong 
physical manifestation for his `true' gender identity, as well as permitting an ongoing 
resistance to a lesbian identification. Furthermore, deploying the concept `repression' 
enables him to explain his delay in transition until his late thirties, even though he had 
been aware of other transsexuals and the notion of transsexualism for some time. Despite 
this awareness, he had never identified this term with his own feelings prior to 
undertaking a course of psychotherapy. Thus, the notion of `repression' can be seen as a 
powerful discursive tool for explaining the apparent inconsistency inherent is his life 
story, which includes having lived as a female for thirty-six years even though he was 
"born with a medical condition". This is expressed in his anger and disappointment at 
being born with a female body when his gender self-perception is male: 
J:... you know you've been born with this bloody condition anyhow but you 
know you could have been born with cerebral palsy or whatever but you 
know I still would have been male but whatever you have, however you 
were born, you are still born you know as a (.. ) a male with all the right 
parts, you know, it's just so key to your existence, who you are. So, I 
obviously felt quite strongly about it (.. ) and cheated by it. I also felt cheated 
by, you know, all my childhood stuff but er I did make the best of it that I 
could umm but it was, well things could have been different. I could have 
had a happy childhood (K: uhum) I could have, I think I did reasonably 
well, I think, under the circumstances, to get a professional qualification and 
be working and having, having a house and stuff (K; mm) (... ) but umm I 
don't know (Jason, FtM, 39,3/87-97). 
My point is neither to negate Jason's uncomfortable feelings with his gender over the 
years, nor to dismiss the use of psychoanalytic concepts he may have acquired from a 
lengthy period of in-depth therapy (although, in this case, Jason began transitioning 
within seven months of commencing psychotherapy). Rather, my goal is to discern the 
ways in which these participants tell cohesive life narratives, grounded within accessible 
discourses of the self. The requirement for self-cohesion and ordered narratives is 
mediated by symbolic systems and discursive practices which, within Western societies, 
propagate a rational notion of personhood that tend to overlook fluctuations, shifts and 
inconsistencies in selfhood. However, the alternative danger in some recent 
deconstructions of sexual practices is that in attending only to the fragments and 
inconsistencies of self-fashioning in order to combat Enlightenment notions of 
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personhood, we overlook the need for a stable sense of self for psychological well-being. 
As Jason states: gender identity is "key to your existence, who you are". Here lies a 
dilemma for those academics working within postmodern epistemologies - the 
impossibility of either defending or dispensing with identities (Connolly, 1991). As 
Connolly states: 
My identity is what I am and how I am recognized rather than what I 
choose, want or consent to. It is the dense self from which choosing, 
wanting and consenting proceed. Without that density, these acts could not 
occur; with it, they are recognized as mine (Connolly, 1991: 64, cited in 
Hekman, 2000: 295). 
According to Susan Hekman, even Judith Butler in The Psychic Life of Power (1997) 
has, albeit tentatively, conceded that "some version of a core is necessary to psychic 
health" (Hekman, 2000: 293). Hekman argues that the trend in recent postmodern theory 
to reject any notion of core subjectivity and define identity as a fiction is profoundly 
misleading. She draws upon James Glass (1993) who suggests that "unity of self is both 
a difficult achievement and a necessary requirement for leading any version of a good 
and satisfying life". He also criticizes those postmodern accounts that deploy "identity 
disorders as an ideal deconstructed identity", suggesting that they are "irresponsible and 
insensitive to the human cost of these illnesses" (Hekman, 2000: 299). This line of 
thinking, however, risks falling back into the pitfalls of essentializing identity and 
pathologizing transsexualism. But, if the goal of psychology is, as some see it, to assist 
individuals to make sense of complex psychic phenomena, then I would suggest that for 
those who share this view, it is a risk worth taking. The somewhat confused filtering of 
psychoanalytic discourses that permeated Jason's narrative account, epitomized in the 
claim that his dream revealed the `truth' of his male identity is, as a truth claim, 
problematic. But, as an interpretation partially couched within the discourses of 
psychoanalysis, it does enable him to create some semblance of order, cohesion and 
wholeness of self within his narrative -a necessary requirement for psychic health. As 
Adam Phillips suggests: 
All psychoanalysis can produce is the life-stories told and constructed in 
psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis, as theory and therapy, can never be useful - 
despite Freud's commitment to the progressivism of Science - as a way of 
putting us closer to the Truth. But it can be useful in the way it adds to our 
repertoire of ways of thinking about the past (1994: 67). 
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5.1 (iv) Transsexualism as spiritual quest 
There was also evidence of the construction of transsexualism within what can loosely be 
described as `new age' discourses. For example, in a discussion of influential television 
documentaries about transsexualism, Neil described his transition in terms of a spiritual 
quest: 
N... of course the most recent thing which everybody will tell you was the 
`In the Wrong Body' programme that Zac did (K: yeah) which was excellent 
as well (K: mm) and I remember at the time I just thought that it was so 
excellent that these people have risen to the challenge that was within them 
because that's how I've always seen it is that you know you've had this 
challenge since you were really really young and it's like well what are we 
going to do about it and you go through all these different phases and umm 
increasingly I used to have to fight off a lot of depression about that (Neil, 
FtM, 35,1/58-64). 
Thus, for Neil, transitioning was a life-long challenge that had been awaiting him since 
early childhood. His initial confusions and understandable reluctance to face up to his 
`challenge' resulted in depressive episodes. However, rather than seeking solace from the 
counselling professions, as Jason had, he found his own path to transition through the 
deployment of self-help style literature: 
... there's an expression that 
I got out of one of my books because I use to 
like write out all these cards of like amazing sayings that I saw, you know, 
to encourage me and there's things like um Fear is frozen excitement, right, 
and actually that is partly true because when I finally faced the fear and did 
it any way, as the book says, umm,, I mean it took a long while but things 
feel so much more exciting now (K: mm). You know, things are groovy 
again and they weren't for quite a long time but they are now (K: mm) so () 
it's kind of like you know I hope I won't, I don't think I will, but if I die 
tomorrow at least I know that I died living my dream, being true to myself, 
doing what needed to be done and it would have been a drag to have died 
like two years ago and () which always use to bug me. I thought blimey, 
you know, I'd better not die now because it will be so irritating (K: yeah) so 
I'll have to reincarnate all over again and face all this bullshit again to go 
uuh oh no I can't do it, you know, so I thought let's just do it now and whack 
through a load of stuff on this life now. So that's what I did (hh) crazy crazy 
but true (hh) (Neil, FtM, 35,1/248-262). 
In contrast to Jason's construction of transsexualism as something you have to dig out, 
reveal, or uncover, Neil's construction of transsexualism as a spiritual quest allows for a 
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greater degree of fluidity within his conceptualization of gender across the lifetime. The 
preponderance of soul-life within his account lent itself to a greater sense of possibility in 
each of our life paths, where our future gender manifestations are not necessarily static, 
fixed or predetermined, even if our current sense of self may seem reasonably secure. For 
example, in the next extract he suggests that at some point in the future I could face the 
same issues that he has recently had to deal with: 
... To me, to be honest, the 
bottom line is that essentially we're all human 
beings and actually these are only different manifestations of our () soul life 
if you like. Do you know what I mean? I mean I don't see you as really any 
different from me. It's just that in this life, my path at the moment is, you 
know, here and at any time also our paths could cross or you could find 
yourself being maybe faced with the possibilities of my path in five years 
time. Do you know what I mean? It's I just see it as all much more flexible 
and really the love of labels is to do with people trying to hold fear at bay 
you know by by trying to come up with systems that that make people feel 
safe () () whereas II think that the reality er er as I see it is that things are 
much more infinite than that (K: mm) (Neil, FtM, 35,1/197-205). 
Thus, Neil suggests that labels or identities that are taken up by and placed upon people 
can be restrictive as they both contain and restrain the infinite number of possibilities and 
paths we may encounter over the life-span. Whilst this type of conception exemplifies 
the celebratory and emancipatory tone that frequently underpinned the interviews with 
Neil, the suggestion that we are "all human beings", albeit performing "different 
manifestations of our soul-life", appears to down play the impact that 'bodiliness' has 
upon our sense of selfhood. This would appear to be particularly incongruous with the 
case of the transsexual subject given the frequently expressed level of distress and sense 
of urgency to rectify feelings of disembodiment through physical intervention. 
5.2 Negotiating processes of transsexual identification 
In this section I attempt to outline some of the contradictions and complexities inherent 
in discursive practices of gender identification. Principally, I examine two positions: 
firstly, resisting identifying as transsexual and, secondly, insisting upon identifying as 
transsexual. Jay Prosser (discussed in Chapter Three) argues that both transsexual and 
transgendered narratives produce the sobering realization of the ongoing functional 
power that the categories of man and woman still carry for a sense of cultural belonging 
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(Prosser, 1998: 11). And, certainly, within some of these participants' accounts there was 
a marked resistance to being identified as `transsexual'. 
5.2 (i) Resisting transsexual identification 
Some of the informants rejected the identification category `transsexual' because, as 
Prosser has described, "in coming out and staking a claim to representation, the 
transsexual undoes the realness that is the conventional goal of this transition" (Prosser, 
1998: 11, my emphasis). This ambivalence towards deploying transsexual as a self- 
identification is clearly apparent within the following extract taken from an interview 
with Caroline: 
K: is it (transsexual) a term you identify with? 
C: transsexual? umm no actually I don't now and umm I will always be a 
transsexual, umm but I didn't change sex to become a transsexual er, at the 
moment, er, I always was a transsexual er, it's a medical term umm I went 
through to become a woman (Caroline, MtF, 29,2/35-38). 
Caroline evidently has difficulty in identifying as `transsexual'. Acknowledging that she 
`will always be transsexual' signifies the move from one gender to the other, which will 
always be part of her history. Yet, defining transsexualism as a `medical term' 
legitimizes her claim to be a woman, as it signifies what Anne Bolin (1988) has 
described as `transsexual rites of passage'. This entails moving from a male identity 
through a treatable medical condition, `transsexual', to emerge the other side as 
`woman'. However, the sense of `always being a transsexual', of having a differently 
gendered past, problematizes Caroline's ability to identify as a `real' woman: She later 
expands on this point by suggesting she is "never really going to be a woman": 
... I mean I can never quite get there 
because (.. ) I wasn't born a woman and 
as good as science gets I'm never really going to be a woman. I might look 
like a woman and they might be able to do this to me, and that to me but I'll 
never really be a woman and even if nobody can tell, I'll know the 
difference (Caroline, MtF, 29,2/230-233). 
For Caroline, in contrast with the more recent trends in politicized transsexual and 
transgender narratives (e. g. Feinberg, 1993) that have sought to establish trans- 
subjectivities by rewriting transsexual narratives as open-ended (Prosser, 1998), the 
notion that her transition is never fully accomplished is an uncomfortable one. Thus, 
these excerpts illustrate the problems that the binary gender system creates for those who 
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although born `male' feel they are not men yet, can never be `real' women. However, to 
take up the identification of `transsexual' actually suggests they are outside of the gender 
system or, as Prosser would describe, "gender displaced" (1998: 2): this serves as a 
constant reminder of cultural non-conformity which to many is distressingly 
unacceptable. These types of dilemmas were also found in the accounts of some of the 
FtM participants. For example, Albert describes how he only uses the identity category 
`transsexual' for the political campaign work of Press for Change: 
K: so is it (transsexual) a term you identify with? 
A: no, to my mind, as far as I am concerned, II don't really. I mean II 
identify with it, I identify with it on the service because I am concerned with 
other people who have this problem but on a personal level I don't believe 
that I am transsexual. I was transsexual (.. ) but I had treatment and surgery 
so to my mind I'm no longer transsexual (Albert, FtM, 59,2/27-32). 
Again, Albert is drawing reference to particular `rites of passage' where transsexual is 
seen as a transitory category, a medical condition that is treated and cured. Yet, the legal 
position of those who have transitioned from one gender to the other is such in the UK 
that Albert has felt it necessary to take up this identity for the purpose of campaigning for 
political change. The principal aim of Press for Change is to attain the right for 
transsexuals to change their birth certificates, thus achieving legal recognition for their 
claim to be male or female. It is somewhat ironic that the `coming-out' of transsexuals, 
the means by which transsexual subjectivity is established, has been necessitated by the 
desire to gain the legal right to be positioned only within the binary gender system: 
making `transsexual' a subject position in order to facilitate the erasure of that mode of 
subjectivity. In this legal context `transsexual' will, perhaps, emerge as a transitory 
category: a transitional category of our time. If Press For Change do succeed in securing 
the legal right for transsexual individuals in the UK to align the sex category documented 
on their birth certificate with their new gender identities (and it looks increasingly likely 
that they will), their need to explain any incongruity will disappear - at least in the public 
sphere. Undoubtedly, the trauma caused when transsexual individuals are required to 
present their birth certificates in the more mundane activities of acquiring a mortgage or 
on the first day of new employment is an unnecessary mandate. But, the downside for 
those who wish to live more ambiguous modes of gender subjectivity is that this process, 
which seeks to establish `transsexual' as a transitory category, also serves to reinstate and 
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regulate the binary gender system - where there are only two genders/sexes. The 
representation of `transsexual as transitory' category is echoed in Ruben's claim: 
R:... As far as I'm concerned you should be transsexual while you are being 
treated and afterwards you're just male. Well, I think it's best if you are one 
or the other (Ruben, FtM, 19,2/20-22). 
And, perhaps, it is best. Certainly it is for those who are currently trying to forge some 
form of self-cohesion. Why should transsexual individuals be expected to occupy the 
gender borderlands unable to take up the gender positions and associated rights that the 
rest of us take for granted (Rubin, 1998)? In a similar example, Artemis, who also 
resisted identifying as transsexual, suggests that to identify as `transsexual' indicates 
being `in-between', suspended between the two genders: 
... I think it's the word trans which 
is difficult for me (K: right) because umm 
it implies that you're either going through a process of going from one to the 
other where as if you've already gone through that process then trans should 
be no longer operative. So if somebody were to umm (.. ) invent another 
word but drop trans then possibly I would identify with it (K: right) you 
know but umm I don't, I don't regard myself as in-between so I don't 
identify as (. ) with a word that I believe implies that I'm in-between 
(Artemis, MtF, 50,2/18-23 ). 
It is hardly surprising that many of the participants resisted identifying as transsexual, 
preferring to see it as a transitory category on the way to becoming their `true' gender. 
Furthermore, this construction also sits well with both Cartesian dualist and biological 
discourses of transsexualism: where each is underpinned by the assumption that there are 
only two sexes and the mind should match the physical sex unless there has been some 
aberration of the `natural' order. But, however understandable the deployment of these 
discourses are for creating some semblance of order and coherence in self-narrative, 
these types of representations fail to provide a nuanced account of transsexual embodied 
subjectivity because they also require the denial of a differently gendered past. 
5.2 (ii) Insisting upon transsexual identification 
Not all of the participants were so eager to delete their gender history. Some, whilst 
acknowledging that their contemporaries might want to refuse a transsexual 
identification, insisted that to identify as transsexual permitted them to incorporate her or 
his gender story into their self-narratives. As Billy, a female-to-male participant states: 
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K: Is transsexual a term you identify with? 
B: (. )I can't identify any other way because I can't deny my past (. ) (K: ok). 
Some people might feel differently, some people do. Some people take a 
view er that once they've had hormone therapy and operations, they are a 
man, they are a woman. They're not transsexual any more. I feel differently 
(Billy, FtM, 44,2/21-24). 
This is strikingly different from the refusal of a transsexual identity in the accounts of 
Albert and Ruben, discussed in the previous section. In a similar fashion, Emily was also 
concerned to incorporate aspects of her past gender history within her self-narrative. At 
the same time she also points to a complex dilemma when identifying as either `woman' 
or `transsexual': 
K: is it (transsexual) something you would identify as? 
E: yes but I mean (.... ) I think there's a, again there's a categorization 
between pre-operative and post-operative transsexuals as to where they see 
they are and whether they feel themselves to be women or transsexuals, and 
I kind of think well (... ) it's kind of somewhere in the middle. I kind of don't 
(.... ) I can't really draw that line that definitively and because I don't want to 
ignore my past in terms of history then I kind of think it's quite important to 
keep a relatively open mind. Yes, I'd be identified as, first and foremost as a 
woman, but secondly I wouldn't be frightened of the label transsexual 
(Emily, MtF, 33,2/17-25). 
Again, this excerpt illustrates Bolin's (1988) notion of `transsexual rites of passage' 
where, as the individual moves from pre-operative to post-operative, they will drop the 
identification `transsexual' in favour of their new gender identity `woman'. However, 
Emily suggests that maintaining a transsexual identity, although less favourable to her 
than identifying as a woman, allows her to acknowledge her gendered past which was 
spent as a boy and a young man. Thus, it appeared that for some of the participants their 
willingness to embrace the identification `transsexual' was related to their ability to 
incorporate their past experiences of a different gender existence within their 
biographical account. For example, the participant, Billy, recalled that much of his social 
history involved a long-standing commitment to the lesbian community, and he preferred 
to see his self-identity as part of the queer continuum (see Chapter Seven). Of course, 
there are many reasons for the denial of a past sense of self. As Foucault has suggested, 
this may be driven by the desire to become somebody you were not in the beginning 
(1988: 11, see Chapter Six for further discussion). Moreover, the anxiety created by 
previous feelings of disembodiment may impede many of those who might otherwise 
133 
attempt to confer some sense of continuity upon their self-narrative - as would other 
equally traumatic and perhaps discursively untranslatable experiences. Similarly, the age 
at which individuals begin transitioning may also have an impact upon their willingness 
and ability to take up an identity category that allows them a greater degree of 
ambivalence within their continuity of self-narrative. Billy and Elizabeth, who were 
concerned about incorporating their different gender past, were more willing to embrace 
a transsexual identification. But, being significantly older than Ruben and Karen, who 
began transitioning in their late teens, they had a larger chunk of self-narrative at risk of 
erasure. 
5.3 Transgender identifications 
Whilst the rejection of a transsexual identity in favour of identifying as male or female 
was a common theme in many of the participants' accounts, there was a mixed reaction 
in participants' willingness to embrace the more recent identity category `transgendered'. 
In this section I explore the relationship between transsexual and transgender identity 
positions and the different ways in which this new subject position is deployed. 
Inevitably, this is dependent upon the variety of meanings and effects that this identity 
held for the participants. 
5.3 (i) Identifying as transgendered 
Some of both the MtF and FtM participants rejected the identity category `transsexual' in 
favour of the term `transgender'. For example, Neil illustrates this when he explains how 
he went about telling people he met through work about his intention to transition: 
N:... I usually use certain phrases, you know, I usually say well, you know, 
I'm transgendered or () I'm under (. ) I I'm transgendered and I'm now 
having treatment or (. ) that's the kind of phrase that I use. I never use the 
transsexual word (Neil, FtM, 35,3/521-523). 
Of the participants who preferred the identification `transgendered', most cited their 
reason as it gave a more accurate description of the process involved in their transition. 
As Neil describes: 
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N:... When I came across transgender I thought now that is a nice word 
because that sums it up (K: right) you're trans you're in motion yeah and er 
and gender is more accurate to me about what's going on than sexual. It's 
got nothing to do with sex. It's to do with ideas of gender (K: right) so that 
was the word that kind of I leapt on to describe me if you like (Neil, FtM, 
35,2/50-53). 
Similar intimations can be found in the account of Caroline who suggested that the 
gender dysphoria of `trans' individuals was misrepresented and slurred by association 
with the word `sexual': 
K: what other terms would you identify with? 
C: umm (........ ) transgendered (K: yeah) I think it's better than transsexual 
because straight away you've got sexual and it's it means a sexual thing and 
they try to say it's a sexual dysfunction thing it was like this when I came 
out to my doctor and (.. ) which it's not a sexual thing um for a start the 
hormones kill all the sex drive so if it is a sexual thing that's going to you 
know (h) it's going to go (Caroline, MtF, 29,2/45-49). 
Thus, the identity category transgender permits the transsexual subject to disassociate 
themselves with any salacious connotations that maybe drawn from an identity that 
labels their condition as `sexual' (see Chapter Seven for further discussion) 
5.3 (ii) Resisting transgender identity 
Given the potency of many of the informants' argument that the category `transsexual' 
infers a perverse sexual identity, a number of the participants, somewhat surprisingly, 
rejected the `transgendered' identity category that could potentially liberate them from 
this association. The following example is taken from an interview with Sam: 
K: sure ok are there other terms that you prefer to identify as, other than 
transsexual? 
S: the other's I sort of know are like person (hh) or bloke or something umm 
no I mean er presumably the obvious one there would be transgender and no 
I don't necessary. No I don't sort of see myself as transgendered in the way 
that a lot of people would seem to define it (Sam, FtM, 32,2/88-91). 
Here, Sam illustrates that those who deploy the identification term `transsexual' 
frequently overlook the 'personhood' of the trans-subject. As I have already argued (see 
Chapter One and Chapter Three), this oversight is common in much research that 
attempts to theorize transsexualism conceptually, and is exemplified by Tamsin Wilton's 
claim that her "article is not `about' transsexual people, but about medicalized discourses 
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of MTF transsex" (2000: 237, emphasis in original, see Chapter One for further 
discussion). But, as Stephen Whittle insisted in his paper on the current status and goals 
of Press for Change, "we are not transsexuals, we are transsexual people" (2000). Hence, 
in the above excerpt, Sam's joking manner and the deployment of the terms `person' and 
`bloke', are very effective means of enveloping his experience with a sense of 
ordinariness. He then continues by explaining the meaning that transgender holds for 
him and why he feels it is not an accurate description of his own experience: 
K: ok so how would you define transgender then? 
S: I think transgender is more about er either () aiming towards a gender 
which is neither male or female or also a component of people 
experimenting with with gender () which can include more sort of er () 
drag kings and drag queens people that may wish to be perceived some of 
the time as a stereotype of (. ) something other (.. ) So, I think that that is 
more more fluid, and () also to me it seems to contain an element of of 
continuing change and development, whereas transsexual tends to mean 
more sort of moving from one thing to something else and when you get 
there that's it, whereas transgender is sort of well today I'll be sort of this 
and tomorrow I'll be that, and the following day I won't necessarily define 
myself as anything at all because I just want to be a person that's sort of 
genderless. I'm not quite sure how well that works. I think it's very difficult. 
It's possible for it to work on the individual level but it's just it it it's a set of 
gears that don't mesh with society's gears unfortunately so I think I don't 
quite know how people actually manage it in practice (Sam, FtM, 32,2/92- 
103). 
So again, within this extract, we see `transsexual' represented as a transitory category, a 
moving from one gender to the other, where the journey ends. For Sam, in contrast to the 
category `transsexual', `transgender' implies a less `real' gender performance - 
exemplified by drag or stereotypical representations; gender fluctuation; or aspirations to 
a genderless position. Sam also draws attention to the impossibility of being genderless, 
again illustrating (to paraphrase Prosser) the ongoing functional power that the categories 
of man and woman still carry for a sense of cultural belonging (Prosser, 1998: 11). 
However, whilst Sam might reject the degree of gender fluidity entailed in his 
interpretation of transgender, this interpretation has proved to be more liberating for 
others. Particularly for those who are unhappy with their current gender specification, yet 
unsure about how far they would like to take the major steps towards transitioning. As 
Cheryl describes: 
C:... for me, I prefer the label transgendered because (. ) the important thing 
for me is about gender not sex (K: uhum) or sexuality, and I see a big 
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difference between umm transsexual and transgendered, although the word 
transgendered in recent times has come to mean anyone who changes their 
gender in any way. It's got expanded or widened, whereas II see it in a pure 
terms of some someone that's changing their gender, you know, if it's a 
male then they live as a woman, looks like a woman, talk and act like a 
woman but don't necessarily have genital surgery (K: uhum). I mean I have 
no problem with the concept of a woman with a penis (K: uhum right) 
(Cheryl, MtF, 41,1/16-24). 
Thus, Cheryl's interpretation of the identification `transgendered' implies anyone who 
takes up the opposite gender role, but does not necessarily engage with medical practices 
of reassignment surgery. Cheryl's circumstances are substantially different from most of 
the other participants as she has been taking hormones for four years, but remains 
undecided about whether to transition full-time. She was the only participant who 
actively moved between the two gender positions; working in a male role and socializing 
in a female role. She also spoke warmly about recent shifts in the conceptualization of 
gender dysphoria within the medical profession that allowed her to do this. In her 
experience the clinical requirements to take up a singular gender position were no longer 
strictly adhered to - whether this entailed living in your birth sex, or undergoing 
reassignment surgery and living in your new gender role: 
C:... I learnt and heard of, that there were different options, you know, you 
didn't you could be transgendered and not, not transsexual. You didn't have 
to be in one camp or the other (K: right) and I think the whole attitude of the 
medical profession, psychiatrists, psychologists has changed over the last 
decade (K: right) they largely dictated you were either one thing or the other 
where as I think nowadays they're more willing to accept inbetweenies if 
you like, you know, different shades of gender dysphoria and I certainly 
know for a fact that if ten years ago I'd gone into Charing Cross Hospital 
they'd have kicked me out the back door because unless you go there, and 
it's still largely the same today, unless you go in there and say I'm a woman 
and I've always been a woman and I've worn dresses since I was five and I 
want the operation, if you don't say that script you don't get anything (K: 
right) (.. ) whereas I saw a private psychiatrist, explained what my situation 
was, said I don't know what I want to do ultimately but I do know I want to 
do things different but not continue as a man whereas that was ok and also 
through having a lot of counselling with some one which has been helpful 
made me accept that I can be something not exactly one thing or the other 
(Cheryl, MtF, 41,3/102-126). 
Several significant themes emerge from this extract. Firstly, the identity category 
`transgendered', enables Cheryl to live as an `in-betweenie', in an undecided state, 
precisely the type of existence that most of the other participants were so averse to. 
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Secondly, Cheryl suggests that there have been significant shifts in the clinical practices 
of professionals engaged in the treatment of gender dysphoria - although she suggests 
this has only taken place within the private sector. Cheryl see the NHS service as more 
dogmatic in its approach to gender reassignment, where candidates still have to fit their 
subjective experience with the transsexual script that so problematized practices of 
diagnoses in the 1970's. Yet the guidelines for clinical practice, as stated by the Harry 
Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association (1998), have been substantially 
revised in recent years suggesting, as I have already argued, that transsexual subjectivity 
is not simply constituted through the discourses and practices of medical science 
(Billings & Urban, 1995; Hausman, 1995). Rather, I suggested that transgender politics 
have pushed clinical professionals into new directions for dealing with the trauma and 
suffering of individuals who experience a deep conflict between body and sense of self 
(see Chapter Two). Thus, it seems somewhat surprising that these changes should only 
take place within the private sector - unless, of course, these changes are more to do with 
the ongoing march of capitalism and consumerism. Perhaps, for those that can afford to 
pay for treatment the options are much wider and varied, whilst for those who are reliant 
on a cash-strapped National Health Service the options are to prove how worthy you are 
of this money and then wait. Finally, given Cheryl's investment in the term `transgender' 
that permits her to live as an `in-betweenie', it is interesting that the fundamental 
assumption that underpinned Cheryl's dislike of the terms `transsexual' and `sex-change' 
was her belief in the immutability of sex: 
K:... you said before that there were other terms you preferred to identify as 
and you mentioned transgendered (C: transgendered yeah). What is it 
particularly 
C: it's getting away from the emphasis on sex (K: yeah) people are always 
labelled sex change or transsexual and it's it's a fallacy because you can not 
change your sex. You can (.. ) if you're going male to female or female to 
male you can have constructed a physical resemblance of the sex of your 
choice but you're a male to female you will never have a womb and be able 
to conceive in a biological or sexual sense of the word or vice versa (Cheryl, 
MtF, 41,2/32-37). 
Like many of the other participants, exemplified in the accounts of Neil and Caroline, 
Cheryl also objects to the `sexual' aspect in the term `transsexual'. But, there are 
significant contradictions in the discourses deployed within Cheryl's account and 
between her account and the other participants. For Cheryl, her gender presentation is 
constructed as a representation of "the sex of your choice" - not a birth defect, or medical 
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condition, but a choice. Moreover, underpinning her assumption of gender transition is 
the notion that sex is a fixed biological certainty. Therefore, the male-to-female or 
female-to-male transsexual is a constructed version of a `true' male or female, so she or 
he can never be a `real' woman or man. However, the politicization of the transgender 
movement and the impact of its campaign on the professional conduct of many clinical 
practitioners working in the area of gender dysphoria, has been of consequential benefit 
for Cheryl's own experience. Taking up the identity transgender has enabled her to 
circumvent the singular path to gender reassignment so often found in the medical model 
of transsexualism. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, Cheryl lives as a `gender warrior', in 
the `gender borderlands' where her very existence challenges the monolithic status of the 
binary gender system - despite her personal belief in the biological realness of the two 
sex model. Perhaps, this is one aspect of the allure of a transgender identity. Whilst many 
of the participants' accounts fit well with the medical discourses of transsexualism, the 
replacement of this self-identity category with the more recent term `transgender' affords 
some of them the benefits of a politicized identity. It can also enable them to resist any 
negative or perverse connotations that are often associated with the term `sexual' (see 
Chapter Seven for further discussion). 
As a final note, it is interesting to compare the diverse positions of those who construct 
transitioning in terms of either gender-reassignment or sex-reassignment. For example, 
as we have already seen, Cheryl resists a transsexual identification in favour of the 
identity category `transgendered' because she believes in the impossibility of changing 
sex. This contrasts sharply with the account of Albert: 
K: ok I was just thinking because there's some other terms which are being 
used more these days such as transgendered whether that's a term you'd 
ever use? 
A: No. I don't think, I don't think as far as people in my condition, my 
situation, it is er relevant because I haven't changed my gender because my 
gender is my core identity and that has not changed. What has changed is 
my sex if anything has changed at all (K: uhum) because that was denoted 
by looking to see what I had physically (K; yeah) and that has been altered 
you know that's fair enough um umm. It is a shame to me that it had to be 
altered I wish it would have been as it is now in the first place (h) but it 
wasn't but I mean there is nothing I can do about that umm but now it's it 
it's as I believe it should be umm to all intents and purposes and to the best 
of the ability of the surgeons and the surgeons have done umm, you know, 
I'm I'm perfectly happy with what's been done (Albert, FtM, 59,2/63.74). 
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Albert constructs his `condition' as a biological anomaly, yet this is underpinned by a 
fixed sense of a core male gender identity. Thus, although he has had to overcome some 
physical problems his investment in transsexualism as a medical/biological condition 
enables him to maintain a far more stable sense of a male identity. Albert is male, has 
always been a man but, unfortunately, he had to undergo some surgical reconstruction to 
alter his physical appearance. In contrast, Cheryl wants to be a woman: 
C:... I suppose for the last couple of years I've thought continually about 
whether I want to change over full-time. Whether that is a viable option for 
me umm (.. ) I have a sort of psychological barrier in that although I've 
always wanted to be a woman, ever since I can remember, I've never 
particularly wanted to be a transsexual which is the kind of label and status 
that people seem to end up with (Cheryl, MtF, 41,1/8-12). 
C:... I have this thing about not wanting that label (transsexual) (K: right). 
You know, I want to be a woman but I know I can't. It's impossible (Cheryl, 
MtF, 41,2/7-9). 
Perhaps this contradiction tells us something about why Cheryl remains in a transient 
position, suspended between the two gender positions. Cheryl believes in the 
immutability of sex, the impossibility of being who she wants to be, of being a woman. 
Thus, whilst other participants manage to successfully transition and lead fairly cohesive 
lives, Cheryl is hindered by the notion that she will never be a `real' woman - that she 
will always be a transsexual, marginalized and, ultimately, still `gender displaced' (see 
Prosser, 1998: 2). Consequently, her motivations for taking up a transgendered 
identification are not political. She has no desire to disrupt the binary gender system, just 
an entrenched sense of self-fragmentation and gender dislocation - "the personal cost of 
not simply being a man or a woman" (Prosser, 1998: 12). 
5.3 (iii) Alternative conceptions of transgender 
As Ekins and King (1999, see Chapter One) described, the term `transgender' is imbued 
with very different meanings and interpretations by these participants. To illustrate just 
how varied these can be a few more examples will be given in this next section. In the 
first extract Caroline describes transgender using the discourses of gender presentation: 
C:... it's like the whole transgender thing, it's a very grey area and I mean 
you could be described as transgendered because you've got boots on and 
combats you know (K: mm) (Caroline, MtF, 29,1/200-202). 
140 
Here, she is referring to the fact that during the interview I was not dressed in an 
archetypal feminine way: I could also be transgendered because I was wearing boots and 
combats. Whilst this may be so, my clothing style could also have been interpreted as 
`lesbian', `queer' or simply the fashion of the day. In the second extract, Albert 
constructs `transgendered' in terms of gendered positions within same-sex relationships: 
A:... but transgendered (.. ) as far as I see it would tend to as it as it as as far 
as I know the definition would tend to denote anybody that's got (.. ) a 
gender problem in in the sense of (... ) say bisexual people (.. ) Like, so they 
they live their lives as a particular gender but act or interact in a way at least 
sexually that encompasses acts of either gender (K: right). So that's what I 
would consider as transgender in their, in their social interaction with with 
partners they they might take on the role of one gender or the other at any 
time and alternate between the two or, you know, this is II don't know 
whatever else, people who wish to dress as one gender or the other (K: 
right) er without actually wishing to to change their their sexual identity (K: 
right) you know like lesbians for instance er like like to interact with other 
women but there is no way in which they wish to be men or need to be men 
they are quite happy with whatever it is they are. It's just the interaction 
with women it seems which is different from well what society would 
expect (Albert, FtM, 59,2/74-86). 
Albert's stumbling and searching for words at the beginning of this quotation might 
imply that he is unsure about what `transgender' means. However, he goes on to suggest 
that bisexuality is one brand of transgenderism. Rather than constructing bisexuality in 
terms of sexual desire, he describes this identity category as a "gender problem", where 
bisexuals may want to act out different gender positions within same, and opposite sex 
relations. Like Caroline, he also links transgenderism to gender appearance, referring to 
those who like "to dress as one gender or the other", but this is again related to sexual 
identity - particularly lesbianism. The final example, taken from an interview with 
Richard, illustrates the labyrinthine nature of these identification categories: 
K: what about umm transgender? 
R: transgender? When, if, if you say to someone you are transgendered, they 
want to know what the difference between transgender and transsexual is, 
and to be honest I'm not entirely sure. I think in strict terms of labelling I 
would be transsexual as opposed to transgendered because umm oh although 
I don't see myself as being a man, I'm I'm not a male woman if you see 
what I mean. I am a male entity but I'm not a male woman. I, I mean it's 
like I think it's umm transgenderism is where umm you can have aa man 
who is happy to be a man but identifies as woman as female as opposed to 
as a woman, but, but he's happy to be a man (K: ok). I mean it's quite 
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confusing to put, but I don't see where the line gets drawn you see (K; mm). 
I don't think anyone really knows what the true definition is, but if people 
ask I'll say I'm transsexual because it's it's easier, but I don't necessarily 
feel that I am (Richard, FtM, 24,2/51-63). 
This illustrates just how perplexing the identification categories that are generated by and 
circulate between the discourses of transsexualism have become - even for those who are 
positioned within them. 
5.4 Multiple identities 
Whilst the purpose of this research necessitated that gender identity became the focal 
point of discussion, at times it was not unusual for gender identity to be subsumed by 
other more pressing identifications and needs. For example, Ruben describes how his 
cerebral palsy also leaves him classified as disabled: 
K: do you think that the media coverage you've seen gives an accurate 
portrayal of things that occur in your own life? 
R: Not in mine because I'm I'm quite unusual in that I've got, I'm classed as 
disabled anyway (. ) things like that so I get stigma from a lot of categories 
so I don't (. ) fit into a normal transsexual as such but no not really (Ruben, 
FtM, 19,1/112-114). 
In the question I was assuming a singular identity of being transsexual. A better question 
would have been, "in what ways does the media portrayal of transsexualism provide a 
good representation of your own experience? " His response indicates that his transsexual 
status is not always the most pressing issue when he reflects on his self-experience. In a 
similar fashion, Sam describes hows she wants: 
... to be seen as a person 
first and a transsexual is sort of something also that 
I happen to be umm and that includes you know a motorcyclist and a and a 
record collector and this that and the other. There's a lot of things that I am 
and and being transsexual is just one of them umm (. ) it's part of what 
makes me up as a person. Certainly, if I hadn't been born transsexual I'd 
have been very different (Sam, FtM, 32,2/56-60). 
Here, Sam illustrates how we all have different and multiple identities. When one of 
these is a marginalized identity, for example being transsexual, transgendered, lesbian, 
gay or bisexual, it can have a profound effect upon day-to-day interactions within the 
social and cultural order. However, as he quite rightly points out, it is not all that you are 
- and it can be frustrating to be categorized so singularly. Billy provides a more 
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discerning example of how gender identity can be subsumed by more pressing needs. 
Billy spent much of his childhood in care and first presented at a gender identity clinic 
when he was eighteen years old. However, it was not until his forties that he managed to 
successfully transition full-time, despite undergoing a double mastectomy and 
hysterectomy during the interim period. As he describes: 
B:... I mean one of the (. ) strange things that happened to me and II 
remember mentioning it last week on er when we spoke on the tape (. ) 
Trying to sort of get my sort of self on my feet get some type of 
qualification so I could just get a job any job something decent umm. I went 
on a training course and II said to you then, they wouldn't allow me to to go 
as as a man (K: yeah). They wouldn't accept it. So I I've had this sort of er 
bit of a conflict or a bit of a strange situation where I've sort offlip flopped 
a bit you know, although I don't suppose I looked any different. People still 
had a problem unless they knew, you know, I didn't have obviously as much 
hair on my face yeah (. ). But, so, I've had to work as a woman for quite aa 
number of years and it got it it got to the point that I was being successful in 
my work and even I somehow didn't want to change it and didn't want to 
like rock the boat. Look hey! I'm earning money here you know I'm doing 
all right I've finally got a bit of stability and security do I really want to 
change (. ) all this yeah? 
K: so how old was that then when you were? 
B: well it must have been about twenty-five yeah, twenty-four twenty-five 
(. ) and er for about two or three (. ) years, no, maybe a bit longer, I was 
working as a woman and then I basically couldn't hack it. I just went my 
own way and I set up a shop, and (. ) did other things (K; right) for about 
eight years (. ). I needed to get work again and and did it as a woman. I think 
with having such a bad experience with all the psychiatrists all the problems 
that I faced er and and all, and a sense of isolation because whilst I was 
ostensibly gay II couldn't speak to (. ) lesbians about it. Do you understand 
you know? Oh me (inaudible), it's kind of the way I am, you know, almost 
like a denial you know (. ) So (. ) ended up in my early thirties that my life 
was like such a mess you know been sort of like in danger of losing my 
home everything (K: mm), and not having like family to fall back on and 
literally like nowhere to go the the options weren't there (K: mm) for me to 
say ok I'm going to sort myself out emotionally. It wasn't, because it's the 
practicalities of surviving you know they have to take priority (Ben, FtM, 
46,3/151-166). 
Earlier in this chapter we saw how Jason accounted for the delay in his transition by 
employing psychoanalytic discourses that drew on notions such as repression. Here, 
Billy accounts for his decision not to transition full-time, despite his profound gender 
dysphoria, because of his socio-economic position. His need for both financial and 
emotional security created immense conflict as he was aware that transitioning also 
requires sacrifices - losing his lesbian partner and his job: 
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... I wanted it all you 
know. I wanted to transition. I wanted to keep the job 
that I'd worked hard for, you know, I wanted to keep those sorts of things 
yeah and I wanted to transition and I wanted to keep the woman I was with 
and I was trying to (hh) you know what I mean yeah? But it didn't work out. 
(h) Yeah I wasn't prepared to give up any of it. (K: right) Yeah, I wasn't 
prepared to make that, at that time, that sacrifice because I didn't want, you 
know I don't have a family I didn't want to be alone. But I think it got to the 
stage that I had to be strong enough whoever I was, me, myself, even if I 
was going to be isolated for the rest of my life. When you die you die alone. 
Just you there, you sort of, you do er and I just had to go along with that in 
the end. So really that's basically what happened to me like four years ago 
(K: right) you know I just said to hell with it, this is this is what it boils 
down to (Billy, FtM, 46,3/192-203). 
5.5 Beyond Cartesian dualism 
In this chapter I have traced the complex and at times contradictory processes of 
identification these transsexual participants have had to negotiate. The exploration of 
these processes supports the suggestion made in Chapter One that simply to document 
the use of a singular and omnipresent discourse, such as Cartesian dualism, gives an 
insufficient account of transsexual subjectivity. At the same time I have begun the task of 
suggesting why a sense of "wholeness of self" (Kundera, 1999: 43) is important for 
psychic health. However, for these participants there was no single route to either 
transitioning or a cohesive sense of self. Some believed that they had always known, and 
transitioned in their late teens. Others discovered a transsexual identification later in life, 
and drew on particular discourses to account for the delay in transition - given that they 
were "born with this condition". Still others lived in a transient position for many years 
because of their socio-economic status and personal fears. Within these various journeys 
the new gender was constructed as their core sense of self. Continuity of self within 
narrative accounts was to a varying degree achieved through divergent means. These 
included: incorporating a differently gendered past; accounting for the delay in transition 
through psychoanalytic concepts such as repression or socio-economic factors; whilst for 
others, a sense of self-fragmentation remained very real. 
Thus, within this chapter I have moved beyond a Cartesian dualist account of 
transsexualism by providing examples of the respondents' deployment of alternative 
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discursive constructions in their accounts - drawn from equally persuasive biological, 
psychoanalytic and new-age discourses. Yet, undoubtedly, the power of a Cartesian 
dualist discourse to explain the participants' transsexual status is that it has the effect of 
validating the transsexual subject's claim to be man or woman. This is not a chosen 
gender, but the unfortunate result of a `medical condition', such as a `brain defect' and, 
ultimately, transsexualism is not transgressive but, instead, supports the binary gender 
system. Moreover, as Elliot & Roen have already argued, given the sheer complexity in 
the identification practices the transsexual subject has to negotiate, it is not surprising 
that "the Cartesian view of oneself as `trapped in the wrong body' is of greatest comfort 
and therefore of immediate use" (1998: 273). In the next chapter, by focusing upon shifts 
in self-perception and embodied subjectivity I continue the task of illustrating how these 
participants attempt to account for continuity in self after a radical change in body 
morphology. This entails a focus on shifts in self-perception and embodied subjectivity. 
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Changing sex, changing self: transitions in embodied subjectivity 
... you don't quite make 
it into full manhood, ever. Because you're also 
incredibly aware that you have none of that background. 
Stephen Whittle, Perfidious Man, (Self & Gamble, 2000: 47-48) 
In the aftermath.. . my old 
life was waiting to reclaim me. I should have 
known: no escape from past acquaintance. What you were is forever 
who you are. 
Salman Rushdie, Midnight Children, (1982: 368) 
This chapter explores themes pertaining to shifts in perceptions of self-identity made by 
the participants in this study. It was suggested in Chapter Four that one of the problems 
with accounts informed by poststructuralism is that, with their emphasis upon multiple 
subjectivity, they often fail to answer for continuity in the subject. In Chapter Five I 
began the task of attempting to theorize constructions of self-continuity in the light of 
radical changes in gender presentation. Here, under the rubric "changing sex, changing 
self', I develop these ideas by contrasting two strategies that impact upon the notion of 
continuity in self-narrative: `being the same person' and `being a new person'. In the next 
section I explore social practices through which the transsexual subject's new gender 
identity is both affirmed and disavowed. Here, continuity in social relations, particularly 
the way in which family and friends relate to the participants, is highlighted as imperative 
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for the transsexual's new sense of gendered self. Unfortunately, past relations also create 
seepages and fractures within any newly achieved sense of gender confirmation. 
The notion of the past, past selves, past relations and previous gender history is central to 
the arguments presented in this chapter. Consequently, in the section `Becoming a 
different kind of a guy', I explore the way in which the experience of living as a female 
impacts upon the type of man the female-to-male participants wish to be, a better man. 
Less surprisingly, the notion that to be a man was not necessarily a valiant thing also 
appeared in the sentiments of the male-to-female participants. These are discussed in the 
section `Who would want to be a man anyway? ' 
Following this, I explore the problems many of these male-to-female participants had in 
responding to questions about being a woman and being feminine. Drawing upon the 
work of Wendy Hollway and Tony Jefferson (2000), the complex positions outlined in 
this chapter are interpreted in terms of the notion of a defended subject. However, in this 
case, the defended subject is not formulated from a psychoanalytic reading of free 
association narrative interviews. Rather, I return to Hollway's (1989) original premise 
that the defended subject is a discursive position constructed through intersubjective 
relations within the interview setting. Accordingly, in this section I also explore the 
participants' rhetoric that relies upon the notion of the unique nature of `being me'. It is 
argued that `being me' is a powerful linguistic tool for avoiding questions which are, 
inevitably, anxiety provoking and challenging for those who have negotiated substantial 
shifts in gender identifications, particularly when potential responses appear to require 
some form of justification for changes in selfhood. 
In the final part of this chapter, I engage with the task of trying to illuminate the complex 
and contradictory ways in which a dramatic change in morphology affects embodied 
subjectivity. Here, cultural practices of embodiment are documented, illustrating, for 
example, how some of the transsexual participants described learning the correct 
deportment for their newly acquired gender identity. The impact of the physical body, 
particularly as trace and marker of a previous embodied being, is also explored, as these 
subjects attempt to not only `pass' and eventually `become' the new gender, but also as 
they attempt to shake off those already well known and ingrained practices of gendered 
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embodiment. Thus, in the concluding comments I continue the task of theorizing 
transsexual embodied subjectivity as an ongoing process of becoming male or female. 
6.1 Accounting for shifts in self-identity 
Before his premature death in 1986 Michel Foucault began to engage with theorizing the 
problematic notions of subjectivity and practices of the self. Prior to this his central 
concern had been to envisage a historical analysis that identified forms of domination that 
operated through mechanisms of subjectification, objectification and normalization. His 
seemingly radical return to an aesthetics of self after declaring `the death of man' has not 
always been greeted with enthusiasm (Sawicki, 1994). Yet, the shift from a genealogical 
approach that documented the anonymous processes by which individuals are constituted 
by one another, to a genealogy of self that engaged with the actual historical processes 
through which individuals establish a particular relationship to themselves, has been 
instrumental in new ways of theorizing subjectivity. Rejecting a Cartesian notion of 
subjectivity in favour of the historically located theses of Nietzsche and Heidegger, 
Foucault suggested that subjectivity is formulated through multiple `practices of self' and 
is always undergoing significant change. Thus, as Jane Sawicki suggests: 
Foucault brings to our attention historical transformations in practices of 
self formation in order to reveal their contingency and to free us for new 
possibilities of self-understanding, new modes of experience, new forms of 
subjectivity, authority, and political identity (Sawicki, 1994: 286). 
Foucault's method of self-interrogation was not to facilitate self-discovery, as the 
pseudo-psychoanalytic discourses deployed by the participant Jason in Chapter Five 
imply, but rather to facilitate self-refusal. As Foucault states: "The main interest in life is 
to become someone else that you were not at the beginning" (1988: 11, cited in Sawicki, 
1994: 286). It is this type of sweeping separation from a previous self-conception that is 
represented in the discursive construct `being a new person'. But, whilst radical self- 
transformation is often possible and even desirable, the question remains of whether we 
are ever fully able to break free from our old selves. As the old adage goes, we may be 
through with our past but our past is not always through with us. 
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Two contradicting constructions of selfhood, in terms of `being the same person' or 
`being a new person', were elicited from interview accounts and were interpreted, in turn, 
as indicative of either stasis or flux in self-perception. Thus, in this section, these 
discursive positions are introduced as ways by which these transsexual participants 
attempted to either account for, or refuse, the notion of change in embodied subjectivity. 
6.1 (i) Being the same person 
In a discussion about perceived changes in sexual orientation, Billy draws on the 
discursive construction `being the same person'. However, inherent in this discursive 
position is an explicit denial of any change in personhood. For example, Billy states: 
... I mean 
like I had girlfriends, you know, II live with my partner now (h) 
still the same (hh) it's just society now classifies me differently (K: right). 
You know, I was queer, I was lesbian, you know, now I'm transsexual and 
I'm straight, you know, but I am the same person doing the same things 
(Billy, FtM, 46,2/78-81). 
But, by accounting for continuity in self under the aegis of claiming to be "the same 
person doing the same things", Billy denies the significance that a shift in embodiment 
has for his lived experience. Whilst Billy is open about his transsexual identity, he can 
also pass as male. The affects of testosterone have significantly marked his body to the 
extent that it is unlikely that he would ever be read as anything but male. Undoubtedly, 
this will impact upon all his social interactions, on a day-to-day basis. Equally, he may 
also be in the same sexual relationship as the one prior to transitioning, but that 
relationship will now be read as heterosexual. Inevitably, this allows for certain 
privileges that were unobtainable when he was in a lesbian relationship. Furthermore, 
identifying as transsexual and being quite open about this identification (as we saw in 
Chapter Five) will also have a profound effect on the inter-subjective relations that Billy 
forms. 
In a similar fashion, Jason also suggests that contrary to other people's expectations he 
has not changed at all: 
K: in what ways do you feel you have changed? 
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J:... the thing you change is the fact in some ways you're not changing. I 
have always been male. Umm. It it wasn't recognized because people go 
on external, how you look externally (K: right) ok so they say oh you're 
changing, but you're not, you're not. And this is what I tried to make clear 
on Thursday for the documentary and I just hope it comes out is the fact 
that I haven't changed. All that's been recognized is is the maleness that 
was always there, but people couldn't recognize the signs for it (K: right). 
This society stuffs you in a box umm so therefore what happens is you 
repress to some extent who you are (Jason, FtM, 39,1/136-144). 
Within this extract we see Jason constructing his selfhood as unchanged - "you're not 
changing". Thus, for Jason, his self-perception remains static. Instead, what have 
changed are the perceptions of those around him - finally his `true' male self has been 
recognized. This enables him to claim continuity in his gender identity. He was always 
male, but because he was born with a female body this went unrecognized. Certainly, in 
his social interactions he has, since birth, been perceived as female. His maleness went 
unnoticed by those around him, and himself, until he reached his late thirties. And again, 
as we saw in Chapter Five, he draws on the psychoanalytic concept `repression' to 
account for the delay in transitioning to his `true' gender. But, the discursive position 
`being the same person' problematically assumes that his self-concept is immune to 
social and cultural factors, not to mention the effects of his day-to-day interactions and 
relations with others. Yet, shifts in subjectivity cannot simply be unidirectional. The 
individual cannot be assumed to be some pre-conceived given, immune to fluctuations in 
the external world as this problematically sets up the dualist construct of 
individual/society that poststructuralist theorist have attempted to dismantle. Rather, as 
Nikolas Rose suggests "the self is produced in the practicing of it" (Rose, 1998: 192). 
Undoubtedly, these practices of self can never be disengaged from changes in embodied 
experience. 
6.1 (ii) Being a new person 
Whilst `being the same person' was a readily available discursive position within many 
of the participants' accounts, some participants, particularly the MtF respondents, drew 
upon an alternative and contrasting position - `being a new person'. Inherent within this 
construction is an underlying notion that depicts a radical shift in personhood. As 
Caroline describes: 
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... I can't remember the week 
before I changed over but I can remember the 
first week, every day of the first week, after I changed over and I just 
remember the fact that all of a sudden I'm a new person... (Caroline, MtF, 
29,1/158-160). 
In a later interview, when discussing her relationship with her family, Caroline again 
draws on the notion of being a new person: 
... I'd rather 
just tell people I'm an orphan or, you know, my parents are 
dead because they are as good as (). They never come and see me, they 
never, they're not there for me, they don't do the parent thing any more and 
they never were very good at that anyway so (.. ) and they don't accept the 
fact that I've got a life and I'm a new person now. They just ignore the fact 
that I just, the person I was is the person they remember and that person is 
dead and they won't even grieve which is part of the process of coming to 
terms with having somebody who is transsexual in the family. So you've 
got to grieve a little bit because the person you knew, right, never really 
existed like that, it was all an act and the person they knew is gone, is dead, 
will never be seen again, umm and they can't, they just can't be bothered to 
get to know me as I am now and that does hurt, it winds me up a bit umm 
(...... ) (Caroline, MtF, 29,3/917-927). 
Within this extract we can see how Caroline's construction of herself as a new person is 
undermined by her problematic relationship with her parents. Her parents' apparent 
resistance to her new female identity is self-threatening and hurtful, and thus, she avoids 
contact with them. As we shall see later, continuity in social relations is an important 
factor in both affirming and disavowing a successful transition. In this case, Caroline 
avoids familial relations, preferring to "tell people I'm an orphan", as her parents, quite 
understandably, have had difficulties in coming to terms with their son's gender 
reassignment. Whilst her parents' feelings are not unusual, their inability to relate to 
Caroline as a woman, as their daughter, erodes her own certainty in her new gender role. 
Her inescapable male past, as a son and as a brother, is re-invoked in the course of family 
relations. 
As I have already suggested, the notion of being a new person was more commonly 
found in the interview scripts of the MtF participants. However, two FtM participants 
also draw upon a similar idea of a perceived shift in personhood. For example, when 
discussing the current legal status of his birth certificate, Albert infers a split between two 
distinct states of being - who he originally was and who he is today: 
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... the Corbett case right 
brought about a situation where I had a birth 
certificate - still have a birth certificate - which is an absolutely worthless 
scrap scrap of paper as far as identification is concerned. It does not reflect 
who I am, it never has and it never blood will. It may have appeared to 
apply to who I am originally but it was only in appearance, it was not in 
fact, it has absolutely nothing, nothing remotely to do with who I am today 
(Albert, FtM, 59,3/833-838). 
This account is slightly more tricky than the one provided by Caroline as the distinction 
made by Albert between an old self and a new self is not as clear cut. Albert's old self is 
conceived in terms of an `appearance' rather than a `fact'. However, whilst Caroline also 
described her old self as an `act', there was a greater acknowledgement within her 
account of having been this person. In contrast, Albert's partial refusal of an old self 
enables him to construct a sense of continuity in his gender identity. The female birth 
certificate may have "appeared to apply to who I am", but it "does not reflect who I am, it 
never has". Thus, Albert, in contrast to Caroline's subsequent attempt to eradicate her old 
self, who is "gone, is dead, will never be seen again", implicitly claims that he was 
always male. 
In a second example from the FtM participants, Ruben, when describing how he came to 
choose his name, also attempts to distinguish his current self-perception from a notion of 
him in the past: 
K: and how did you come to choose Ruben? 
R:... I wanted something that was totally different from my name before. It's 
like some people, like Nicola, they would have shortened it to Nick (K: 
yeah) you know, what I mean? But, I wanted something that was totally 
different so people wouldn't be able to sort of connect it to me from the past 
(K: right) so that's why I chose that (Ruben, FtM, 19,3/357,361-365). 
Here, Ruben is seeking a radical shift in his sense of selfhood. As he quite rightly states, 
many transsexuals employ either the female or male version of their birth name after 
transitioning. However, Ruben would prefer to have no continuity in selfhood, no 
reference to his previous embodied being, incorporated in his name. Thus, whilst `being 
the same person' negates shifts in embodied subjectivity, claiming to be a `new person', 
with no recollection of self prior to transition, negates any continuity in self. The notion 
of `becoming a new person' initially appears to be very liberating but, contentiously, it 
feeds into many of the medical discourses that used to require transsexuals to deny 
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having a differently gendered past. And, as we have already seen in Chapter Five, this is 
problematic for making the transsexual a subject as it erases transsexual subjectivity. 
6.2 Seeing me differently: Affirmation and disavowal of gender identity through 
social relationships 
Within many of the participants' accounts there was a profound need for affirmation of 
their new gender identity and, at the same time, examples of its frequent undermining by 
the reactions of past acquaintances. In the playful novel Identity, Milan Kundera suggests 
that the sole meaning of friendships is its indispensable role for the proper function of 
memory. He offers a somewhat cynical, and not entirely valid, interpretation of 
friendship as singularly facilitating the pampering of our narcissistic tendencies. Friends, 
he states, "are our mirror; our memory; we ask nothing of them but that they polish the 
mirror from time to time so we can look at ourselves in it" (1999: 43). While friendships, 
in my view, also serve many other purposes, the recounting of past stories with long term 
confidants does allow us to reflect on both where we've been and where we are going; it 
permits a certain degree of self-reflection and self-knowledge. What happens then to this 
process of self-reflection after a radical shift in self-identity? How does it feel when the 
mirror that is held up by friends or family members reflects a distorted, threatening image 
of a gendered self that the subject has been trying to shake off? Perhaps, the effect 
explains much of the discontinuity expressed in some of the transsexual participants' 
rhetoric around social relations. As we saw earlier, Caroline prefers to present herself as 
an orphan rather than to risk invoking an identity crisis through on-going problematic 
familial relations. Yet, there is also an expressed need for continuity in social 
relationships in order to provide affirmation for their decision to undergo gender 
reassignment: if family, friends, or colleagues assimilate the participant's gender shift 
this confirms that it was their `true' gender all along. As Jason describes: 
K: mm did you er confide in anybody when you first started thinking about 
transitioning? 
J: well obviously my psychotherapist and I discussed it (h) (K: yeah) umm 
(.. ) the first person I told was aa close friend in Scotland who I've known 
for a number of years and er it's interesting, she's training to be a 
psychotherapist and a rare sort of being and she wasn't at all surprised and 
er she had recognized that in me, as other people were, subsequently said 
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they recognized that that in me, but had not formalized it into anything 
(Jason, FtM, 39,3/98-104). 
Thus, whilst Jason claims to have discovered his `true' male identity in psychotherapy 
(see Chapter Five), the truth of this identification is apparently confirmed by the reactions 
of his friends. Moreover, for him, drawing attention to his friend's occupational status as 
a training psychotherapist enhances the validity of her acknowledgement. But, at the 
same time, attempting to maintain relationships with those people known prior to 
transition can raise anxieties about how they perceive you. As Karen so painfully 
describes: 
KJ: How is your relationship with your parents now? 
K:... my Dad, I can't help but get the feeling that he still regards me as male 
and that so umm so that's the problem really why I don't see them very 
often. It makes me uncomfortable and and and my parents occasionally both 
of them occasionally kind of use wrong pronouns or wrong name and that 
really upsets me and I just don't like it at all. II don't say anything to them 
because II just don't think its a nice thing to do. I mean they miss, you 
know, it would be very selfish and arrogant of me to not not to recognize 
that it's very difficult. It was very very difficult and traumatic for them and 
if I were to be (.. ) I don't know, kind of fascist about it I don't know that it's 
kind of my place to do that umm, but they, but umm and I would never 
correct them because it would make them uncomfortable and it would upset 
them and I can't see the point in doing it. II don't want to hurt them umm 
and I don't want to be difficult umm and so, but but if they do do it as they, 
and it occurs less and less but it happens occasionally and just the way my 
Dad talks to me, relates to me, I feel uncomfortable with, so I don't go and 
see them very often because particularly when they say the wrong things 
about (. ) I don't know, it makes me feel awful though. It just kind of takes 
away that of myself and it strips my confidence and it, I don't know, I kind 
of feel winded how they just (... ) It really upsets me and so I don't go and 
see them for that reason, that I, you know, it's traumatic for me (Karen, 
MtF, 23,2/601-618). 
Hence, in a similar but more fully explicated fashion than Caroline, Karen narrates her 
fragile relationship with her parents, and her father in particular. Karen is more than 
aware of the difficulties her parents have had in coming to terms with her transition and 
is sympathetic to their confusion. But, her parents inability to embrace her as a daughter, 
as a woman, exemplified through their sometimes failure to use the correct pronoun is 
very painful for Karen. Consequently, the differently gendered past that she so 
desperately tries to escape by refusing to identify as transsexual or by disclosing her 
gender history comes crashing in. Their failure to recognize her as a woman does not just 
take away a part or a bit of herself, "it takes away that of myself'. It eradicates her sense 
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of her self. Thus, not only, as Prosser (1998) has claimed (see Chapter Five), does 
identifying as transsexual undo the realness of the desired gender identity, the unravelling 
of the realness of a new gender identity also occurs when friends and loved ones fail to 
recognize the desired changes that have been made by the transsexual subject. 
Perhaps the most distinctive example of how a new gender identity may be affirmed 
through social relations can be found in a recent publication by Will Self and David 
Gamble (2000). In Perfidious Man, Will Self deliberates upon one of gender theory's 
most pressing concerns of the moment: "this vexed question of masculinity, of what it is 
to be a man" (2000: 6). Embroiled in his own existential crisis, Self sets out in search of 
the elusive answers. He begins with a brutal, and often amusing, account of his maligned 
father, who seemingly offered "an inadequate specimen of manhood" (2000: 5). Finding 
no answers there, Self turns to one of the most perceptive points in this short essay - the 
insight that gender only becomes a conundrum when it is questioned. As Self states, he 
may feel ambivalent about what being a man means, but his own gender identity has 
neither been endorsed, nor disputed. Rather, it has always been accepted by those around 
him as a given (2000: 8). Thus, Self suggests that "[I]f I could talk to a person who, 
against all odds, had won through to proclaim themselves a man, then perhaps I'd find 
myself a little closer to knowing what it was to be one? " (2000: 8) 
The rest of the book narrates the story of Stephen Whittle, a female-to-male transsexual, 
academic, leading political campaigner for Press for Change, founding member of the 
FTM Network, loving partner of Sarah and father of four. Stephen Whittle is often 
endorsed as an inspiration, by those who meet him and now, via this book, he will also be 
to those who have not had the pleasure. His story charts a determined, brave journey 
through gender confusion, and is not dissimilar from that of any of the other FtM 
participants' who took part in this research project. As such, there are also aspects of 
Whittle's account that I find problematic. His reliance upon biology as an explanation for 
transsexualism is, at once, understandable and disappointing. Despite his erudition in 
queer theory and feminist politics, Stephen Whittle is still a transsexual man, seeking the 
same legal rights as other men - particularly to be recognized in a legal sense as the father 
of his four children. And, in the current climate, the power of biological explanations for 
complex phenomena is not in their accuracy, but in their ability to appeal to the 
sympathies of the majority. Thus, Stephen Whittle's story often exemplified the same 
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type of discourses, discursive constructions and positions that were found throughout the 
interview scripts of the FtM participants who partook in this research. But, of most 
interest in Self's deliberations on the nature of masculinity is his conclusion that what 
makes Stephen a man is his relationship to his family: 
Wherein does his masculinity consist? In all of him: in his appearance, his 
demeanour, his manner of expressing himself -- in his very quiddity; his 
quality of this-is-Stepheness. But still more importantly -- and this is why 
I've written about the family at all -- his manhood resides in his 
relationships with it, as a partner, as a father, as a patriarch. These aspects of 
Stephen's masculinity are far more important to me than whether he's big or 
small, bearded or clean shaven, let alone what kind of genitals he has (Self 
& Gamble, 2000: 14). 
So, for Will Self, in the style of Judith Butler, his own existential anxieties seem to be 
answered by deciding that gender is a performance after all. Again, we see the 
disappearance of the body (despite its vivid significance in Self's memories of his father) 
and of the importance of physical markers that distinguish between the two sexes. In his 
conclusion, the penis is seen as the least important aspect of being a man. This is 
somewhat ironic, given his recollection of his father: who "pissed like a horse"; who's 
"penis was stubby and circumcised"; who's competitive drive made him feel "tiny- 
dicked, [how] unmanned" (2000: 3). Moreover, if Stephen Whittle, or any of the other 
FtM participants, had been born with a penis their maleness would never have been 
questioned. Instead, Self sees the crux of Stephen's maleness in the fact that Stephen's 
partner Sarah relates to him as a man. Thus, Stephen's maleness is evidenced by the fact 
that Self can assimilate Stephen and Sarah's relationship into an idealized configuration 
of a heterosexual relationship. Stephen provides a desirable model of masculinity -a 
caring, sharing, and present partner, provider and father. Stephen offers a model of 
masculinity that was absent in Self's own life, a model of fatherhood that Self might want 
to aspire to, rather than the disappointing and frustrating one provided by his own father. 
But, is this a compelling answer to Self s question of what it means to be a man? 
Certainly not. Stephen Whittle does not, after all, even claim to be a man. All it tells us is 
that to be a better man, a different kind of a guy, men's formative years should perhaps 
have been spent struggling with an uncomfortable female gender identity. As Stephen 
Whittle states: 
And I think one of the things I've learnt through being a transsexual man, is 
that transsexual men, we've worked very hard to provide an alternative 
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model of masculinity, because we've inculcated those sorts of values, an 
awful lot of us have come out of the lesbian/feminist community; if nothing 
else, we sat and we discussed this ad infinitum: what were better values 
(Self & Gamble, 2000: 93). 
6.3 Becoming a different kind of a guy 
In a similar fashion, it was not uncommon for many of the FtM participants to construct 
their past gender history as giving them an insight into being a different, or better kind of 
a guy. As Sam describes: 
... I (. ) for me I will I will never 
be a stereotypical man. You can't go through 
that process and see things from the other side and all that kind of stuff and 
it not make you different somehow, but I consider a lot of that and given 
that it's now finished, and I'm very glad it's finished, it eh, what is left to 
me is actually aa positive difference umm it might have been a negative 
experience at the time, but what it's given me now is something which I 
consider to be positive and useful (.. ) umm (....... ) (Sam, FtM, 32,2/444- 
449). 
So, although when Sam was living and being perceived as a woman his experiences felt 
`negative', now that he has transitioned he is able to reflect upon his experiences of being 
female and reconstruct them as positive. Neil expresses similar sentiments when also 
rejecting stereotypical notions of manhood and macho behaviour: 
... It can be quite uncomfortable 
if you get someone come along (to FTM 
London) who's (. ) very macho (. ) you know, macho in their posture and 
stuff or, you know, very straight, you know, in the sort of pure sense of the 
word and that's really, I don't like that in the same way that I don't really 
like coming across it in my everyday life actually, you know, I don't like it 
in sort of (.. ) you know (. ) bio-boys as they call it any more than I like it in 
TS guys. Really it's more annoying in TS guys because you kind of think 
well, you know, you had a different experience. It's very boring to have 
gone through all that and turned out like some jerk that you'd find on any 
street corner. It seems a waste (Neil, FtM, 35,3/597-604). 
As Neil suggests, "it seems a waste" to have experienced one side of the gender divide 
and not use these experiences or insights to construct a better form of masculinity. 
Parallels can be drawn here to Judith Halberstam's argument that alternative forms of 
masculinity, female masculinity in particular, can subvert aspects of `dominant 
masculinity' and thus de-naturalize the relationship between maleness and power 
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(Halberstam, 1998: 2). In stark contradiction to the belief that manhood is an inherent 
given, as the biological discourses employed by many of the participants (see Chapter 
Five) imply, the quest for an appropriate model of masculinity, coupled with the 
possibility of undermining dominant oppressive forms of masculinity via the creation of 
new variants, indicates the socially constructed nature of gender. Many of these FtM 
participants, in light of their female experiences, were embroiled in this process of gender 
construction as they sought out ways of being male that did not offend women. As Jason 
describes: 
... one thing that umm 
(..... ) which I suppose yes is is advantageous is that 
having seen what it's like to be in treated in a female role does give you an 
insight... but on the flip side, is wanting to to be able to display your 
masculinity but without making it sound if it's derogatory against women. 
No I wouldn't want to be taken as female but it's not (..... ) (K: yeah? ) to say 
female is a bad thing (K: right) and umm you do draw yourself up short 
about how, how you do you put it more carefully? About how you do 
display your masculinity so that it isn't seen to offend, but also that you 
don't go OTT that you don't try and put on a sort of masculinity cloak that 
um isn't yours (K: mm) in order just so that you make sure people take you 
as male (K: yeah) and I hope I don't. It would be interesting to to hear your 
opinion on how I'm coming over in terms of what you perceive masculinity 
to be umm (..... ) and also in terms of, you know, getting a balanced attitude 
about people (K: mm) I say not not hooking up to an attitude that that will 
somehow make me feel better which is which is an attitude that really fits 
with me (.... ) 
K: sorry can you say that last bit again? 
J: (hh) well it's it's really you know say this cloak of masculine behaviour 
which some umm I have seen in a couple of transgender chaps put on I think 
cloaks of masculinity which aren't theirs purely you know (sighs) There is 
one chap who turned round and said umm I said I can't believe you said 
that, to his partner he said something oh it's it, you know, women nag nag 
nag sort of thing (hhh) you know guy's joke. How can he say that? I 
wouldn't ever want to be like that, just to try and fit into this male, you 
know, stereotypical behaviour. So I'd be interested to know if you think I'm 
going down that path but also saying how would you see my masculinity? 
(Jason, FtM, 39,2/540-556). 
Given his previous gender experience of living as a female, in this extract we see Jason 
stumbling between wanting to be masculine enough to be perceived as male and a desire 
not to offend women. Thus, his past experience that undoubtedly involved an awareness 
of sexist behaviour, gender inequality, and the power differentials between men and 
women, causes him concern - particularly for how he is now manifesting as a man. There 
appears to be an implicit belief within many of the FtM participants' accounts that to be 
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male is not necessarily a valiant thing. Constructing an alternative form of masculinity 
may have the potential to prise apart the profound relationship between masculinity and 
maleness (Halberstam, 1998). Yet, those aspects of dominant masculinity that the FtM 
transsexual might want to resist are precisely those cultural and material signifiers of 
maleness. This leaves the FtM transsexual in somewhat of a quandary. Thus, Jason is 
seeking confirmation from me, the interviewer, on two levels. Firstly, affirmation that he 
is successfully materializing and passing as male. And, more interestingly, that he is 
manifesting as an acceptable kind of guy - one who does not offend any feminist 
principles that I, and he, may value. 
6.4 Who would want to be a man anyway? 
The theme that to be a man or masculine was not necessarily a desirable thing was also, if 
less surprisingly, clearly apparent in the accounts of the MtF participants. As Karen 
describes: 
... I 
find kind of masculine traits very alienating umm and I just think they're 
bad I mean I find them bad to deal with in myself. I find them bad to deal 
with kind of and I find they are hard to relate to, but also on a wider social 
level I just think they are bad things. They make nasty aggressive people and 
selfish people and I was going to say all men are selfish umm but they're 
not generally but those traits I find bad things they are negative qualities 
(Karen, MtF, 23,2/315-320). 
Given that masculinity is a trait traditionally ascribed to men, it would appear that it is 
men who make "nasty aggressive people and selfish people". However, Karen who 
would emphatically deny a male identity, also finds these traits difficult "to deal with in 
myself'. Thus, this would suggests that Karen has either been marked in some fashion by 
her experience of being born male, or that masculine traits are free floating and not 
necessarily bound to a male identity. In contrast, Sarah describes how to be a man 
specifically entails manifesting as these masculine traits - to be competitive and 
aggressive, aspects that she felt she could never achieve: 
K: what do you think it means to be a man? 
S: (............ ) ooh er competitiveness urm aggression (.. ) all the horrible 
qualities that that (.... ) seem to seemed to be placed on being being male. To 
appear, you have to appear successful and II just don't care anymore. I'm 
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just like happy to be me. I know, I know it sounds really sort of like boring 
to keep saying I'm happy to be me but (.. ) when I was male I hated the 
competitive nature of of the way you had to behave. I hated that you had to 
appear strong and competitive aggressive and it was like it just use to tire 
me out and I just couldn't do it (K: mm) umm probably one of the reasons I 
changed because II don't have to be aggressive or competitive if I don't 
want to be. I can be quite quite chilled and passive but (... ) I just don't like 
this macho nature that (.. ) that you have that you have to carry around with 
you to be to be man to be male so I don't (K: mmm) I don't think I ever did 
that in originally any way (Sarah, MtF, 37,2/339-348). 
In this extract, we see again how competitiveness and aggression are constructed as 
inherent traits of manhood. Yet, these are not singularly fixed to a male identity. Sarah 
notes that she can still be competitive or aggressive if she wants to. But, there is now 
more flexibility because she can also be "chilled and passive": a way of being that felt 
impossible and undesirable when she lived as a man. In another context, this extract 
might give some insight into the unconscious processes that eventually led Sarah to 
gender reassignment. Perhaps, a life-long sense of failure to live up to the image she held 
of what it meant to be a man - to be strong, to be aggressive, to be successful - are all 
represented as reasons for her transition. However, for others, there was a point blank 
refusal to even engage with questions about manhood. As Caroline illustrates: 
K: ok all right what do you think it means to be a man? 
C: a sad existence umm I don't know I've never been one (K: ok) umm no 
let's think about it (.... ) I don't know it's like me asking you that question 
umm I've only grown up amongst them (Caroline, MtF, 29,2/483-485). 
Here, Caroline reinforces a female identity by identifying herself with me. It appears that 
to acknowledge even stereotypical conceptions of what she, and all of us, may think it 
means to be a man might imply that she had actually been one. Thus, she completely 
refused to engage with the question. In a similar, but slightly more self-reflexive tone, 
Emily also resisted answering questions about being a man or being masculine: 
K: what do you think it means to be a man? 
E: No. I think that's probably a bit too close really. I can't (.. ) I mean I umm 
I'm not sure whether it's, whether it's something I don't particularly want to 
think about, because it it touches too many nerves in me, or whether it's 
something that I'm not actually sure of (.... ) umm (......... )(Emily, MtF, 33, 
2/500-505). 
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For Emily, to even consider the notion of manhood was too identity threatening: "It 
touches too many nerves". Thus, it appeared that many of the questions that focused upon 
the meanings of particular gender manifestations were raising complex anxieties in these 
transsexual participants. 
6.5 The defended subject and the impact of intersubjective gender relations within 
the interview setting 
As we saw in Chapter Four, Wendy Hollway (1989) suggested the psychoanalytic 
concepts such as `splitting' and `projection' can be used to explain why subjects position 
themselves within certain discourses. Her subsequent book, co-authored with Tony 
Jefferson (2000), reiterates the notion that the self is, partly, forged from unconscious 
defenses against anxiety. Furthermore, they suggest that illuminating the way conflict and 
suffering impact upon the psyche will enable us to ascertain why individuals invest in 
particular discourses, rather than others. This premise forms the crux of their theory of 
the defended subject (see Chapter Four for further discussion). In this section I draw upon 
Hollway and Jefferson's notion of the defended subject to account for the pervasive use 
of both the discursive construct `being me' found in some of the participants' responses 
to questions about gender identity, and the pattern of discursive positionings already 
presented. 
6.5 (i) Being me 
`Being me' emerged as a powerful linguistic tool for avoiding questions pertaining to 
gender identity that appeared to require some form of justification for changes in 
selfhood. This was generally employed far more in the accounts of the MtF participants 
and the accounts of those FtM participants who strongly resisted identifying as 
transsexual and rejected any notion of having a differently gendered past. Predominantly, 
this phrase was elicited in response to questions such as `what do you think it means to be 
a woman or man? Or what does it mean to be feminine or masculine? For example, Sarah 
responded: 
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... I'm just me. I'm not I'm not anything I'm trying to 
be or anything I'm not 
trying to be. I'm just me (Sarah, MtF, pre-op, 37,2/284). 
These questions are in all likelihood anxiety provoking, particularly for the MtF' 
participants, when asked by me, someone who they may see as a `real' woman and who 
may (but of course does not) know the answers to questions about womanhood. For 
example, in the following extract, I was surprised when Caroline turned the question 
"what does it mean to be a woman? " back on me: 
K: right er (.. ) ok now the gender questions, these may seem quite difficult 
so if you can't answer them don't worry about it. Er, what do you think it 
means to be a woman? 
C: OK. What do you think it means to be a woman? 
K: what do I think? (C: yeah). It's a bit umm (C: that's it) This is what I'm 
saying because people go (.. ) I mean I've asked this question of lots of 
women and everybody goes umm (C: nobody knows. I don't know). But 
this is it. It's like, but what does it mean to you then to be a woman? 
(Caroline, MtF, 29,2/357-362) 
Here, Caroline immediately turns the question around. I had hoped that by suggesting 
that these types of questions were often difficult to answer that I would allay some of the 
participants' concerns. However, this was clearly not the case here. In retrospect, after re- 
reading this extract, it is possible that Caroline was misled by my initial comment "these 
may seem quite difficult so if you can't answer them don't worry about it" -a failed 
attempt to put her at ease. Rather, it is possible she felt that I was challenging her female 
identity: that she might not be able to answer the question because she was not a `real' 
woman. Somewhat stunned by becoming the focus of the interview I rather ineffectively 
stumble my way through the next few lines. I must have at some level been conscious 
that I had caused offence, however unintentional. Thus, in the next few sentences I 
attempt to include Caroline again within the impossibility of knowing what it means to be 
a woman. Once I have suggested that many women find this question difficult, she 
happily continues and provides an answer to a variation of the same question: 
K:... what does it mean to you then to be a woman? 
C: (..... ) that is such a difficult question umm () to be quite honest I don't 
know. I just don't know what it is, what I could use to define you you know 
what it is to be a woman. It's probably something stupid like, you know, pee 
properly or something er or (.. ) I don't know. I think it's probably a lot of, 
because mentally I always was anyway so, but physically I think it's, to me 
being a woman it's the ultimate freedom. Because if I go into women's 
changing rooms and get changed and there is no one who bats an eyelid 
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right and (... ) this might sound crazy but it's one of those things people take 
for granted but all of a sudden I can do it. So yeah, I suppose it's something 
like that using women's changing rooms and trying on clothes when you are 
out shopping ... (... ) what 
is it to be a woman? I don't know. I don't know 
(K: ok) It would be easier to (inaudible) (K: sorry? ) It would be easier to 
bottle happiness I think than to find out (Caroline, MtF, 29,2/362-374). 
So, in this extract, we can see that Caroline's defensive anxieties are somewhat 
relinquished. It is now acceptable for her to not know what it means to be a woman. At 
the same time, she also reinstates her claim to a female identity by suggesting that 
"mentally I always was". And, she continues by suggesting that 'to be woman' is to pass, 
or be accepted unquestionably as female in the public physical display of women's 
changing rooms. In a similar vein, for those FtM participants who clung on ferociously to 
a male identity, yet positioned themselves within biological discourses such as having 
been born with a medical condition or birth defect, perhaps the idea of not knowing what 
`being a man' meant was equally threatening. In the following extract, Richard attempts 
to resist all forms of gender identification: 
... I don't think that 
I am transsexual umm (K: uhum) because I'm just now 
the way that I was if you know what I mean? But, it's like I don't see myself 
as being a man but I'm not a woman and the important thing was not to be 
perceived the whole time as female and as a woman. I am male but I 
wouldn't say that I was necessarily a man umm I don't really know why I 
say that because when people say that I'm a man I don't really give a shit. It 
it's that's fine. It's like a compliment but I don't actually set out to be a 
man. I'm just myself (Richard, 24, FtM, 2/16-21). 
In this extract, Richard doesn't see himself as transsexual, because he feels he hasn't 
changed, "I'm just now the way I was". But, in an attempt to avoid claiming to be either a 
man or a woman, the only position left for Richard is the assertion that "I'm just myself'. 
However, like those MtF participants who situated themselves within the discursive 
position of `being me', `being myself implies that Richard is beyond the gender system - 
which, of course, he is not because he also claims to be male. Thus, a complicated 
linguistic game ensues that implies to be male is somehow different to being a man. 
Thus, like Hollway & Jefferson (2000), I propose that `being me', and phrases of its ilk, 
are used defensively to parry away questions that are anxiety provoking and challenging 
for those who have negotiated substantial shifts in gender identifications. This 
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interpretation led me to reflect upon how other discursive positions discussed so far in 
this chapter could have emerged from inter-subjective gender relations within the 
interview setting. Suddenly, the idea that the FtM participants should attempt to construct 
their past female gender experiences as insightful and enlightening in terms of `being a 
different kind of a guy', made sense in light of my own female gender identity. Perhaps, 
they did not want to offend me, given that many of them shared a similar history to me 
having been informed by feminist politics, and having close affiliations with the lesbian 
community. Perhaps, if the MtF participants had spoken with a male interviewer their 
constructions of what it meant to be female may have been less defensive. The impact of 
gender relations within the interview setting are a well-known influencing factor (see 
Oakley, 1981; Hollway & Jefferson, 2000), and undoubtedly, the responses elicited here 
would not be immune to my own gender manifestation. 
6.6 Accounting for shifts in gendered embodiment 
Hollway and Jefferson's (2000) methodological approach provides a valuable way for 
theorizing subjectivity by attempting to account for why certain individuals position 
themselves within particular discourses and why they may be reluctant to give up these 
positions. It does not, however, make any specific methodological contribution to 
theorizing embodied subjectivity. Here, in order to begin the task of theorizing 
transsexual embodied subjectivity, I return to the recommendation made by Thomas J. 
Csordas (1998, see Chapter Four for a more detailed discussion). Csordas proposed 
researching from an embodiment standpoint which entails bringing an attention to 
`bodiliness to method' in order to research the notion of being-in-the-world. Thus, 
embodiment is not simply about `the body'. As Alan Radley suggests "embodiment is 
also about social worlds, not just those which are material and extant, but also those that 
are ephemeral and possible" (1998: 14). Accordingly, in this section, I introduce four 
means for accounting for the way in which a dramatic change in corporeality affects 
embodied subjectivity. 
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6.6 (i) Bodies in transition 
Emily, exemplifies the notion of bodies in transition by describing the often fraught early 
stages of transitioning, where: 
E:... despite the fact you think you know where you're going umm you're 
just a fish out of water. You know, it's men in skirts, it really is men in 
skirts. It's bad drag, men in skirts umm (.... ) yeah it's grim (.... ) (h) it's 
really grim. Yeah, it's nasty, you know, sort of like big caked on make-up to 
try to hide a beard (Emily, MtF, 33,1/182-186). 
But, aided by the ingestion of hormones and the learning of cultural practices of 
embodiment for the new gender identity, the transsexual individual is able to move closer 
to embodying their female or male ideal. As Caroline describes, often there are 
remarkable changes in the transsexual people's fleshy physicality, which do not simply 
impact upon how the body is perceived, but also affect how the transsexual participant 
experiences her or himself as an embodied subject: 
... my body 
feels right now and I don't have any concept of what it was like 
when it felt wrong. umm. It's sort of like this is me. I can't remember what I 
was before. I know I was something but I can't remember what it was like 
umm I mean the physically the changes have been immense umm (.. ) and 
they're still going on. I mean I'm still changing as a person umm I'm still 
coming to terms with my body the way it is umm (. ) I like my body I'm 
quite happy with it (. ) mark two (hh), (Caroline, MtF, 29,3/608-614). 
In the first line of this extract Caroline draws upon a Cartesian dualist discourse to 
construct the body as separate from the self, from the I. As she states: "my body feels 
right now and I don't have any concept of what it was like when it felt wrong". However, 
this must be due, at least in part, to the inherently dualistic nature of language. To speak 
of `the body' immediately invokes a Cartesian dualist discourse that sets the body up as 
an observable entity in opposition to the self. Despite this, when she states "[I]t's sort of 
like this is me. I can't remember what I was like before", Caroline is able to construct a 
degree of embodied self, of satisfaction with her embodied being. Moreover, Caroline 
also refers to the ongoing process of transition - surgery results in a prominent change in 
body morphology but the daily intake of oestrogen has an ongoing effect of feminizing 
the male body over the life span. Yet, this transition, or ongoing process of change, is not 
only related to the body. As Caroline suggests, "I'm still changing as a person". Thus, we 
get a real sense of transsexual embodied subjectivity as an interactive and mutable 
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process, bound up with shifts in corporeality. It is as if with the passing of the years the 
male-to-female transsexual becomes more and more female. 
6.6 (ii) Cultural practices of gendered embodiment 
But, in order to become male or female, the transsexual subject also has to re-learn 
gender specific cultural practices of embodiment. Richard, a gay FtM participant, 
describes this process of needing to learn to enact the bodily practices of the new gender 
as one of the reasons why he goes cruising: 
... one reason I go cruising 
it's a really really good way to to learn about men 
and about men's body language and how to understand sort of the subtleties 
of male body language (K: uhum) and I've learnt a lot through doing that. I 
mean you could say yes so now I've learnt everything I should stop but you 
know hey (h) (Richard, FtM, 24,1/312-324). 
Thus, observing and attempting to mimic the `body language', the actions, gestures and 
postures of the men he meets whilst cruising provides Richard with a model of male 
embodiment to aspire to. Echoing these sentiments, Caroline also draws attention to the 
notion of gendered embodiment as a learnt cultural practice: 
... Genetic 
females get taught from the moment they're born, you know, you 
dress boys in blue and girls in pink (. ) They get trained for this this job 
which is being a woman and (... ) all right, there's all the stereotypes and all 
that crap which I don't hold, but umm it does make you into a different 
person to boys and it's like (. ) I had a female brain but a male upbringing 
and a male body and that hurts. That hurts. It's like the upbringing you take 
for granted, I don't know if you can sew or knit or anything, but where I 
grew up in Wales everyone either sewed or knitted. I got taught none of that 
and it's only after I changed over that all of a sudden I had to start learning 
it (Caroline, MtF, 29,1/167-174). 
Whilst Caroline claims to not hold stereotypical notions of what it means to be a woman, 
inevitably, like all of us, she does. This is demonstrated by her referral to an upbringing 
that did not provide her with what are traditionally seen as female skills. And, I might 
add, abilities that are certainly not within my repertoire. But, what this extract 
successfully illustrates is that despite Caroline's claim to have a female brain, the 
manifestation of a gender identity is formulated through an ability to imbue cultural 
practices of gendered embodiment. Whether these practices reinforce particular social 
roles or modes of physical deportment, girls "get trained for this job which is being a 
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woman ... 
I got taught none of that and it's only after I changed over that all of a sudden I 
had to start learning it". Thus, comparing these extracts to those we saw in Chapter Five, 
we see evidence of a distinction between conceptions of gender identity and gendered 
being. Whilst these participants might claim that their gender identity is innate, or 
biologically determined, their ability to be this gender certainly is not. 
6.6 (iii) Body as trace 
Physical intervention via hormones and radical surgery coupled with the learning of 
cultural practices of gender embodiment promise to lead the transsexual into a newly 
found sense of embodied gendered subjectivity. Yet, the body is not completely 
malleable and there is always the risk for some transsexuals of never attaining their ideal. 
In the following extract Neil describes how he has not yet reached the privileged position 
of being able to pass as male: 
K: right when did you start the hormones? 
N: I started the hormones on, I think it was April the tenth last year, umm 
which was pretty initiatory as well. That was quite umm an amazing 
experience actually (. ) umm (. ) so I see myself as er being on hormones for 
a year and that's given me some good changes, but II know that I'm still 
perceived as very in-between (. ) That's something that a lot of people don't 
really like to admit very freely and II feel don't always like to either, you 
know, like in the context of the (support) group (K: mm) umm (. ) You know 
people aren't always that, people don't really like to mention too much 
when they don't pass. They don't seem to really talk about weird situations 
that happen because people can't quite tell what's going on (. ) partly 
because it's upsetting (K: mm) you know it's sort of dislocating (Neil, FtM, 
35,3/109-117). 
Only a year into transition, there is every chance that as the hormones begin to mark 
Neil's body, he will, one day, be able to pass as male. Currently his physicality is 
perceived as "very in-between", a body in transition, indicative of the transsexual's 
ongoing process of attempting to successfully appear as male or female. However, this 
point raises the important issue that 'passing' is a privilege and not all transsexuals 
achieve this status. As Stephen Whittle recounts: 
... I became incredibly aware that passing was a great privilege. It was a 
privilege afforded to a few of us ... and most of my community, most of the 
people I loved, enjoyed the company of, could have the same crack with -- 
just didn't have that privilege (Self & Gamble, 2000: 64). 
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This is particularly the case for MtF transsexuals as the effects of testosterone on the 
male body are not always easy to erase. As Cheryl, a pre-operative MtF transsexual 
describes: 
... I've always hated my 
body (K: right) I've always been uncomfortable 
with it because it's it's by and large a male body and there's bits of it that I 
can't change and no hormones or surgery can change and I hate those bits 
umm and I I'm more comfortable with it now because it's changed ever so 
slightly (Cheryl, MtF, 41,3/521-524). 
There is a profound distinction between the MtF and the FtM transsexual's ability to 
pass. For the MtF transsexual, the most pressing need is to undo the dramatic and, to 
them, ravaging effects that testosterone has upon their body over the years. Whilst 
changes imbued by oestrogen are more easily reversible, the effects of testosterone upon 
hair growth and voice are not. Thus, for the MtF a broken voice at puberty, the 
development of an Adam's apple and the thickening and coarsening of body hair present 
huge obstacles to overcome in order to pass as female. In contrast, for the FtM 
transsexual, the effects of testosterone in masculinizing their body can be dramatic. 
Within weeks their voice drops, muscles begin to thicken, even facial structure becomes 
squarer. Within a few years, most will have noticeable body and facial hair and even 
receding hairline patterns. Hence, for FtM transsexuals, passing is frequently more 
obtainable - at worse, they will be perceived as short men, or very much younger than 
their years. However, whilst passing in day-to-day interactions is often achievable, there 
is by no means the same degree of success in genital reconstruction surgery for the FtM 
transsexual. Vaginoplasty, the creation of a neo-vagina, is now a well-established 
technique for MtF transsexuals. Moreover, all the post-operative MtF transsexuals in this 
study reported both a high degree of satisfaction with their surgical results and the ability 
to orgasm. As Kate Bornstein quipped on the Geraldo Rivera show in response an 
audience member's question: 
"Can you orgasm with that vagina? " 
"Yah, the plumbing works and so does the electricity" 
(Bornstein, 1994: 31) 
In contrast, for FtM transsexuals, phalloplasty offers very poor results. The most recent 
surgical development, known as the radial forearm technique, involves grafting a large 
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chunk of skin from the inner forearm and splicing it to the pelvic region. This is a very 
complicated procedure as the skin needs to remain constantly attached to a blood supply 
and it leaves horrific scarring on the arm. This scarring is exchanged for a penis like 
construction that enables the FtM transsexual to pee standing up and can be stiffened for 
sexual intercourse with the use of an implant that resembles a pipe cleaner. The surgical 
procedure is hugely expensive, rarely obtainable on the NHS, and fraught with side 
effects, which include urinary problems and damage to sexual sensation. Hence, not 
surprisingly, few FtM transsexuals opt for phalloplasty. However, this leaves the trans- 
man in the incongruous position of attempting to be a man with a vagina. As Jason states: 
... so you've got this anger which umm you 
have to deal with umm (.. ) you 
you're left with this sort of body that still isn't quite as it should have been 
(Jason, FtM, 39,2/54-56). 
This is particularly difficult for negotiating sexual relationships. Even if the transsexual 
man is able to pass as male in every other situation, when embarking upon a new sexual 
relationship his transsexual status, exemplified through the lack of a functioning penis, 
will become a contentious issue. As Jason describes: 
... sometimes you can be a bit a 
bit ultra sensitive about things really, 
sometimes you get a bit mixed up when you think of the past and you feel 
excluded (K: mm) a bit extra sensitive around some things (K: mm) (.... ) 
K: so it doesn't go away 
J: no you can't you can't make it go away you can never free yourself 
completely from it... the issues of if you do go into any relationship at some 
point you're going to have to say something. You can't not, it's the one time 
when it it has to be relevant and er you know sort of when is the right time 
and all the issues around that and that can get you get you feeling low and as 
if going into a relationship isn't fraught enough (Jason, FtM, 39,3/427-433, 
440-444). 
This extract supports the proposal that transsexuals can never be simply men or women. 
They are never free from being transsexual. When Jason thinks of his past, those aspects 
of gender history that he does not have, and when he wants to embark upon a sexual 
relationship, any sense that he has of himself as a man is unravelled. Thus, it is not 
simply biology, or being `born in the wrong body', that undermines the transsexual 
subject's gender identity. It is also their history, a history spent as a differently embodied 
being. As Sally describes: 
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... Somebody who who 
is transsexual will have had gender dysphoria and 
then will start presenting at some point in their life as female. The earlier 
you do it the better (... ) the the less history you have as, you know, as a 
genetic man with a sort of male history and male work patterns and and the 
acceptance of male privilege, you know the better it is to (. ) umm to live as a 
woman (Sally, MtF, 35,2/102-106). 
The earlier a MtF transsexual begins transitioning the better. The better able they are to 
pass as female. This is not only to escape the masculinizing effects of testosterone that 
become more difficult to reverse the older the man is. But also to rid oneself of the 
cultural practices that inscribe an increasing indelible sense of gendered being. 
6.6 (iv) Cultural practices of embodiment as trace 
In the following extract, Emily explicitly refers to attempts made to shake off cultural 
practices of male embodiment that have become entrenched over many years of living as 
a man: 
K: is it (a man) something you ever tried to be? 
E: a man? (K: mm) umm (.. ) yes but I suppose I was a hopeless failure umm 
(.......... ) yeah II mean in in terms of in terms of umm society yes you have 
to. You have to fall into one role or another and you know when you see a 
penis you and your mother calls you a boy and you have a boy's name umm 
then you have to try and adopt that role umm (. ) Yes, undoubtedly, and 
that's why you know transsexuals spend years and years and years with 
speech therapy and with umm I don't know just er umm trying to find 
appropriate ways to, to walk and move and listen and loll their heads and 
you know all sorts of bizarre things because we've all, whether we've liked 
it or not, tried to be men (Emily, MtF, 33,2/506-515). 
Gender is more than positioning the self within particular discourses. Here, Emily gives 
credence to Bourdieu's comment that male-female differences are based upon "a durable 
way of standing, speaking, walking and thereby of feeling and thinking. .. in posture, in the 
gestures and movements of the body" (Bourdieu, 1980: 70, cited in Sampson, 1998: 25). 
And, it is these culturally located bodily practices that define sexual difference in 
adulthood. Moreover, there are many shared cultural practices for displaying sexual 
difference. Consequently, the problem faced by many transsexuals, particularly in the 
aftermath of transitioning, is how to successfully enact these practices. Or, more 
explicitly, how to embody an alternative gendered being. As Alan Radley argues: 
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... socio-psychological life would not be what it is if it were not embodied 
through and through. This means, for example, that we are individuals who 
do not just happen to find ourselves in male or female bodies. Instead, our 
existence as sexual beings is involved in all aspects of our lives. This does 
not mean that sexuality is a blind factor in all life's equations, but that the 
ground from which an individual acts is a gendered ground, and that its 
features can be sought in the largest or in the smallest actions. Again, this is 
not meant to imply that sexuality is a natural characteristic: the marking and 
cultivation of physical difference is cultural and symbolic (Laqueur, 1990). 
The remaking or undoing of that difference in action is, however, an 
endorsement of the fact that we are differentiated in our being, not just in 
our social identities (1998: 14-15). 
These transsexual individuals are not simply attempting to construct new social identities. 
Rather, they are engaged in the problematic task of becoming a differently gendered 
being. Moreover, this state of being will never be achieved through only realigning the 
physical body. Whilst certainly important gender is more than anatomical difference. 
Instead, gender is displayed and read through actions, postures, and embodied practices. 
As Laqueur (1990) and Judith Butler (1990; 1993) argue, these practices are, 
undoubtedly, culturally and symbolically mediated. Yet, it is through these readable 
actions that sexual difference is played out. And, for many transsexuals, their actions, 
postures, and gendered embodiment do not always sit well with the shared cultural 
meanings of sexual difference. Transsexuals do not always pass as male or female - some 
never pass. As, Radley has suggested the categories male and female are different in 
being, not just as social identities. Whilst transsexuals can never achieve the status of 
being male or female this is not to suggest that the rest of us do. Some (who knows how 
many? ) biological males and females also have problems being read as male or female. 
But, for the transsexual subject, their past gender history seeps into their current gendered 
embodiment and many remain heavily marked by the biology and cultural practices of a 
previous embodied being. Hence, whilst non-transsexuals will at times feel ambivalent 
about their gender identities, transsexuals are faced with the more fraught existence of 
being more aware, more conscious and more at risk of the unshackling of gender 
certainty. 
Thus, this chapter highlights the ways in which we are never free from our past, despite 
the exhilarating temptations of trying to construct a new sense of selfhood. Our 
conception of the past, like our biology, is not untransformable, but it is always waiting 
to cast a shadow, or less charitably, to stick a foot out, trip us up, unfasten any sense of 
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self assurance we have foolishly believed to have been accomplished. Our past is both of 
our making and our undoing. Consequently, for psychic health, it must be important both 
to accept and play with the inconsistencies in our self-narratives, rather than attempting 
to merely iron out the creases. Perhaps this is one reason why Stephen Whittle's story, 
documented in Perfidious fan, reads as such a successful one (Self & Gamble, 2000). In 
embracing his new transsexual embodied subjectivity, he exemplifies these principles as 
he articulates himself through a history of rampant bisexuality, radical lesbian separatism 
to a diligent, loyal and dedicated family trans-man. In the next chapter I turn to the 
relationship between sexual orientation and gender identity. I suggest that whilst the 
participants may attempt to distinguish between sexuality and identity identifications, 
their sexual relationships provide another site for creating anxieties about their new 
gender identities. 
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7 
Transsexualism and Sexual Orientation: Exploring the relationship 
between gender and sexuality. 
.. the psychiatrists generally seemed to 
be interested very much more in 
(.. ) the hereditary factors. It was always questions about was there 
anybody in the family who was gay. I mean it was always sort of 
related to gay. 
(Albert, FtM, 59,3/198-202) 
Sex, gender, sexuality: three terms whose usage relations and 
analytical relations are almost irremediably slippery. 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemologies of the Closet, (1990: 27) 
As we have already seen, the concept `transsexualism' emerged from theoretical 
accounts of homosexuality and transvestism produced by early sexologists such as 
Magnus Hirschfeld (1910) and Havelock Ellis (1936). In fact, gender identity 
construction has continuously been theorized in the light of sexuality. Although 
providing little sustainable evidence for the genesis of homosexuality, the fashion for 
hormonal studies during the 1930's (e. g. Wright, 1935; 1938) and the slightly more 
sophisticated studies that assessed the effects of sex hormones on the pre- and neo-natal 
brain (e. g. Meyer-Bahlburg, 1977), have also proved favourable with those attempting to 
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account for gender non-conformity (e. g. Money and Ehrhardt, 1972; Money and Tucker, 
1975). Similar parallels can be drawn between the highly controversial work of Simon 
Le Vay (1991) whose research into a tiny area of the hypothalamus was misleadingly 
reported as the `gay gene', and recent neurological studies of transsexualism. In a series 
of equally contentious findings published by Dick Swaab and colleagues (e. g. Swaab & 
Hoffman, 1995; Swaab et al, 1997; see Chapter Two), they also suggest a biological 
basis for transsexualism. This is supported by reports of brain differences between MtF 
transsexual's and `normal' males in, again, a small area of the hypothalamus. Other 
correlational methods, which often have a closer resemblance to phrenology than 
biological science, have also received widespread media coverage in recent months. One 
such study, originating in the periodical Nature (Williams et al, 2000), reported that a 
lesbian sexual identity could be ascertained from the ratio between a woman's index 
finger and ring finger. If the index finger is shorter in length than the ring finger, as it is 
for most males, then the woman is likely to be a lesbian. The researchers found no 
correlation between finger length and male homosexuality, but they did find a 
relationship between homosexuality and birth order. 
Inevitably, these types of `spot the weirdo' studies, fraught with methodological and 
conceptual problems, are also being used to construct an index for transsexualism. For 
example, Richard Green (1999) is currently conducting a study at Charing Cross Gender 
Clinic to investigate the finger ridge markings and birth order of those who present as 
transsexual. What happens when someone who identifies as transsexual does not meet 
the finger ridge criteria is just one of the problems with this type of approach. What is 
interesting for the purpose of this chapter is that, first of all, we are still seeing attempts 
to root lesbian sexual identity in male gender, as in the mannish-woman. Secondly, 
whilst the same tools and approaches that are applied to the etiological study of 
homosexuality are consistently refuted, they are expected to yield an etiological 
grounding for transsexualism. In much clinical research, homosexuality and gender 
identity non-conformity are still viewed as inherently related and biological in nature. 
Yet, even in socio-cultural accounts the relationship between gender and sexuality seems 
unavoidable. 
Chapter Three provided a detailed account of Judith Butler's theoretical critique of 
heteronormitivity (1991; 1993) and the major influence it has had on subsequent 
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accounts of transsexualism, transgenderism and other queer debates in the last decade. In 
this chapter I examine some of the troubling themes which surface when the participants 
talked about their own gender identities and sexual orientations. I begin by illustrating 
how so many of the participants dismissed the notion of an interconnection between 
gender and sexuality, primarily to avoid `perverse' and sensationalist connotations that 
the term `sexual' appears to imply. However, in discussions about their sexual 
encounters and relationships, they revealed how sexuality often instigated profound 
frustrations, anxieties and fears about their gender identities. In the final section, I argue 
that whilst a distinction between gay/lesbian identities and transsexual identity may 
prove productive on a personal level, as it reinforces and protects a fragile gender 
identity, the ongoing fragmentation of the queer community through the perpetuation of 
separate categories of identity is problematic for political aims. 
7.1 Gender as separate from sexuality 
Within both the MtF and FtM participants' accounts there were attempts to draw a 
distinction between gender and sexuality identifications. For example, Emily states: 
... obviously the sexuality of an individual is completely separate 
from the 
gender (Emily, MtF, 33,2/60). 
And Richard agrees: 
K: uhum ok umm how important is your sexuality to your identity? 
R: it's not (K: right) it's independent of it totally... I don't know I mean 
sexuality and identity that's er for me two different things (K: right) it's not 
it's not important (Richard, FtM, 24,2/290-291,302-303). 
Having already outlined the inter-conceptual nature of theoretical accounts of gender and 
sexual identity construction, we might ask what is the purpose of these participants' 
attempts to dislodge this relationship. Albert, whilst describing his objection to the term 
`transsexual', provides one explanation which focuses on the way transsexualism is 
regularly subjected to sensationalism: 
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... I don't think it's (transsexual's) a very good term. 
I actually hate the term 
simply because it's like so many of these terms it's got the word sex 
incorporated in it and of course the general public the moment that, well 
umm most people including me I suppose, the moment that word comes up 
sort of the the brain goes into overdrive doesn't it? You know, sex, oh what 
do they do? You know, er, which is absolutely nothing to do with the actual 
condition because it's not to do with what you do or even who you do but to 
do with your own core identity... I think any label attached to any person that 
includes an emotive word like sex immediately gives the wrong signal about 
that particular condition. That it's to do with sex, you know, what you do 
rather than who you are umm so so II really do dislike the the term all 
together (Albert, FtM, 59,2/14-19,23-26). 
As well as stressing his dislike for the way the term `sex' has the effect of 
sensationalizing the transsexual condition, Albert also draws an important distinction 
between `identity' and `practice'. The ways and implications of some of the other 
participants' attempts to distinguish between sexual identity and sexual practice will be 
explored in more detail later in this chapter. In Albert's case, he sees gender identity as 
central to an individual's subjectivity, whilst he tends to represent `sex' as an act that 
takes place but has little bearing on how the person constructs their sense of self. Not 
surprisingly, Albert strongly identifies as heterosexual. Arguably, sexual identities are 
primarily formed in either moral or political opposition to the `norm'. Hence, it is less 
likely that `straight' or `heterosexual' will ever be mobilized as a sexual identity (Lance 
& Tanesini, 2000). Thus, it appears reasonable that for those who are heterosexual in 
practice, gender identity should be valorized as a crucial component of subjectivity over 
and above sexuality. 
Caroline, describing the outcome of a visit to her local GP, builds on Albert's account by 
taking her objections to the understanding of transsexualism in sexualized terms one step 
further: 
... my doctor... er he was going to send me to a sexual dysfunction clinic 
which is completely wrong because it's not a sexual thing being transsexual 
that's why I don't like the term transsexual (K; yeah) it's nothing to do with 
sexuality or anything it's a gender thing (Caroline, MtF, 29,3/273,275- 
278). 
Here, distinguishing between sexuality and gender facilitates the refusal of attempts to 
conceptualize transsexualism as a `sexual perversion'. Both Albert and Caroline 
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acknowledge their dislike for and alienation from the label transsexual on precisely these 
grounds. Resistance to a transsexual identity in favour of the more recent transgender 
identity has already been discussed as a means to reclaim and de-pathologize the 
participants' gender experience (see Chapter Five). One can now add another layer to 
this process of reclamation: resistance to `sexual perversion' connotations that are 
linguistically represented in the label `transsexual'. 
A second reason for attempting to separate the relationship between gender and sexual 
orientation is to challenge the earlier psychiatric policy of refusing treatment to those 
who would, post-transition, engage in same-sex relations (see Chapter Two). Albert, who 
transitioned over thirty years ago, recalls: 
K:... did your sexual orientation have any influence on your reassignment 
process? 
A: ( ... ) yes I 
believe it did. Not from my point of view necessarily but from 
the point of view of the medical practitioners because that was, at that, it 
may not be now but certainly at that time, you know, it was asked about 
partners you know what partners you had and whether you had a 
relationship and you know they were most interested to know about that. 
But then you know in those days umm homosexuality was still illegal had 
only had only just been made legal I think umm so you still had this ethos of 
homosexuality is wrong umm so therefore I think what they were looking 
for was to was to (. ) er fulfill their own wishes in bringing about somebody 
who was heterosexual as it were umm but it may have changed now 
(Albert, FtM, 59,2/182-192). 
Certainly, there have been moves in recent years by clinicians to acknowledge that many 
post-operative transsexuals will engage in same-sex relations (see Chapter Two). 
However, the relationship is far more complex. Whilst the psychiatric definition of 
transsexualism (Roberto, 1983, see Chapter One) that included being heterosexual may 
have changed, it leaves a particular legacy of heterosexuality that needs to be negotiated 
when some transsexuals question their gender and sexual orientation identifications. 
Caroline illustrates this process here: 
K: right have you, do you ever question your sexual orientation? 
C: mm no no umm (.. ) and I don't think I ever have actually. The only time 
I ever questioned it was was that I had these feelings that I wanted to be a 
woman and (... ) I'm still attracted to women and sort of I analyzed myself. I 
analyzed my sexual orientation because it thought I was gay and I thought 
well I can't be gay because I fancy women, but I can't be straight either. 
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What's happening, what's happening? And it actually stopped me changing 
sex for about three years because 1 didn't realize you could be a transsexual 
and still find women attractive (K; right) which umm which did my head in 
for a while and everyone was going you can't be a transsexual, you know, 
you've always got a girlfriend in tow, you know, you've got the choice of 
the girls and so I thought sort of yeah I know but it (. ) it's not the 
relationship I want with a girl it wasn't that type of relationship (Caroline, 
MtF, 29,2/184-193). 
Interestingly, Caroline positions her `self as distinct from her sexual orientation by 
creating a sexual orientation with its own agency: `it' thought she was gay rather than `I' 
thought. This has the effect of carefully keeping any identity threatening references to 
`gay man' away from her 'self. So, in this case, the pre- and post-transition object of 
Caroline's sexual desire, `woman', has remained the same. However, her sexual 
orientation/gender identity has shifted from heterosexual man to lesbian woman. She 
goes on to define her confusion in the early part of the reassignment process in terms of 
the possibility of being gay, despite the fact that she was attracted to women. The 
questioning of sexual orientation prior to gender identity is not uncommon and many of 
the respondents, both MtF and FtM, expressed that for a time they thought they might be 
gay or lesbian, rather than transsexual, simply because they felt `different': 
... I sort of said I was gay 
because I knew I was different but I didn't know 
how I was different (K; right) and I thought that would just shut people up 
temporarily just to say (h) say gay that's fine just gay but I never said I was 
a lesbian. I was always gay because lesbian for some reason it just sounded 
completely wrong but gay was acceptable because it you can be a gay man, 
you can be a gay woman, gay just means different (Richard, FtM, 24,2/36- 
42). 
In this excerpt Richard describes his feelings of `being different' and how identifying as 
gay, rather than lesbian (which would denote a female gender identity as well as 
`difference'), temporarily labelled these feelings. Similarly, Sarah describes the process 
she went through to discover her gender and sexual orientation identifications. Again, for 
a time she thought she was gay because she felt `different': 
... I just thought I was gay `cos I, I knew I was 
different. I just thought I was 
gay so I just had to go and find this out and (.. ) my first experience with a 
man was err god that's disgusting it was like no I didn't want to go there 
umm (... ) so I just it just sort of like put me off men sexually () quite easily 
really umm (.. ) I think I'm I think I'm more at home with women so I 
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suppose I would identify as being lesbian but (.. ) yeah quite strongly lesbian 
yeah (Sarah, MtF, 37,2/50-57). 
Despite attempts to refute the relationship between gender and sexual orientation 
identifications because of `sexual perversion' connotations, sexuality has played an 
important role in these respondents' identity constructions. They have all, to varying 
degrees, had to negotiate either a homosexual self-identification or sexual encounters 
where their partner, at least, has read the experience as homosexual. These experiences 
play a significant role in constructing the participants' subjectivities. Hence, over the 
next four sections, further consideration will be given to the relationship between sexual 
orientation and transsexual identity and its potential effect upon transsexual subjectivity. 
7.2 Heterosexuality and Male-to-Female Transsexuality 
Of the MtF transsexual participants, six identified as lesbian and one, Karen, identified as 
heterosexual. Given that heterosexuality is taken as the norm, Karen is, unsurprisingly, 
far more categorical in her sexual orientation identification, providing just a simple one 
word response to the question: 
KJ: how would you describe your sexual orientation? 
K: heterosexual (Karen, MtF, 23,2/60). 
When asked if she had ever had cause to question her sexual orientation she responded: 
... I was aware of my gender 
dysphoria before I was aware of any kind of 
sexual feelings (K: right) and so when they came I was able to understand 
them as they were, not as sexual not not not not as gay sexuality, it was a 
straight sexuality (Karen, MtF, 23,2/64-67). 
Karen is able to define her sexual orientation as `heterosexual' because of her self- 
awareness of being gender dysphoric prior to the onset of sexual desire, which also 
allowed her to side-step any issues or questions of homosexuality. However, in a later 
interview she discusses her explorations and experiences of sexual encounters on the gay 
male scene: 
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KJ: mmm (.... ) ok um were you sexually active before you began the 
process of reassignment? 
K: er not hugely umm (.... ) I had a couple of snogs and (.... ) faltering sex 
umm never at school in the holidays in kind of er in the gay scene in 
London but it (.. ) it always upset me and I never felt comfortable with it and 
in the end I, it was doing me, it was upsetting me more than anything good 
it was doing for me or anything. I was getting dysphoric because I was (. ) 
people were relating to me in a way I couldn't er it was dreadful and I felt 
deeply ashamed and self conscious in my body and it just wasn't anything I 
wanted. I didn't feel it was what I wanted umm I didn't feel happy (.. ) umm 
and I didn't feel it was the right environment and I felt in a way also I was I 
was deceiving people with whom I was kind of having sex and it was just 
none of it was right. It just felt as alien to me as having a relationship with a 
women would have done so no not really (Karen, MtF, 23,3/619-631). 
So, although Karen was looking to have sexual encounters with men, these partners, on 
the basis of Karen's male embodiment, read the situation as constituting gay male sex. In 
effect, her male embodiment resulted in her being positioned as a gay man whilst she 
identified as a heterosexual female. This caused Karen a great deal of distress because 
she was uncomfortable with the identity her male partners inferred upon her. Thus, she 
attempts to erase her prior sexual experience from her self-narrative through the response 
`no, not really', whilst at the same time expressing that she had had some very negative 
sexual experiences prior to transition. However, post-transition, after completing gender 
reassignment surgery, Karen is now able to successfully `pass' as female and her identity 
as `heterosexual female' is recognized and reinforced in her day-to-day interactions. 
Interestingly, whilst being the only heterosexual MtF participant, Karen was also the 
only participant to maintain a complete silence about her transsexual status. Whilst 
happy to discuss her experiences for the research interviews (perhaps because she had no 
place else to discuss them), she vehemently rejected the notion of being identified as 
transsexual in the public sphere. During most interactions, where personal histories are of 
low-key importance, this was not problematic. However, resisting a differently gendered 
past did cause her profound concern and consternation with regards to forming emotional 
relations: 
... I am (.... ) slow to get 
into relationships and nervous when I'm in them 
(KJ: right) (.. ) umm and again I don't tell my mother about any of my 
relationships because I know she just wouldn't want to know umm (.. ) and 
so that's maybe that sounds mutinous but that (.. ) is a big deal I mean it's 
not it's not a huge deal but it's just again it's another little pain and also 
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again I can't I can't (. ) I have to be very careful when I'm in a relationship 
with somebody who I introduce them to and I have to kind of prepare the 
ground for because you know I can't take the risk of anyone saying 
anything inappropriate so in that sense it's a problem in that II can't be (.. ) 
unthinking about it and I can't be relaxed about it (KJ: mm) I have to think 
very hard about it and I do (. ) which is a bummer in every sense (Karen, 
MtF, 23,2/91-100). 
In this and the following extract Karen professes a profound fear of discovery. Since 
transitioning, Karen has successfully managed to maintain some continuity in her 
friendships, by staying in touch with a few friends from school and with her family, 
albeit an often strained relationship (see Chapter Six). However, these relationships 
create weak links in her story, as their memories of her are tainted by her childhood 
manifestation where they all related to her as a boy. The possibility that someone may, 
even accidentally, reveal her `secret' horrifies her as she doesn't want anybody, let alone 
a romantic partner, perceiving her as a `weirdo', or making her feel `weird' in the way 
transsexuals are so often represented in media accounts (see Chapter One). Yet, Karen 
was also aware that it is unlikely that anyone could maintain a successful relationship 
without at some point broaching the subject of their childhood or introducing their 
partner to their parents and friends: 
KJ:... but I suppose if you meet someone who you want to be with long term 
then you're going to eventually have to broach the subject? 
K: (.... ) I suppose so umm it's just a horrible thought for me I just, it's very 
cowardly I don't really want to face it umm (.. ) I've worked so hard and 
been through so much (. ) hassle pain (. ) to get to the stage where I'm happy 
and where I and where I feel normal and I just don't want to take that away 
from myself for anything (KJ: mm) I don't want to put myself back in a box 
where I feel like a weirdo (KJ: mm) and I don't want anyone else thinking 
I'm a weirdo either (.... ) umm I don't think I'm, well II mean while I think 
that my circumstances are unusual but I'm also aware that it's not my fault 
and (.. ) I just don't want I just don't want anyone looking at me and 
questioning anything about me (KJ: mm) I just don't want to feel that 
(Karen, MtF, 23,2/124-134). 
Karen desperately wants to position herself and be perceived by others as a heterosexual 
female. Sadly, her differently gendered past challenges the security of this positioning. 
Whilst she has faith in herself to maintain a successful veil of secrecy, she is haunted by 
the possibility that others will give her away. The alternative, revealing her past, is also 
too painful. Even constructing her transsexual status as `not her fault' (the result of a 
birth defect/disorder in the brain, see Chapter Five for further discussion) fails to disperse 
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the feeling that people may try to look through her, in search of some male essence. 
Thus, again we see how the past impacts upon intersubjective relations and how they 
have a profound effect upon transsexual subjectivity in their potential ability to undo a 
secure sense of gendered self. 
Karen's identificationary processes - in both her early onset transsexuality and 
heterosexuality - position her firmly within the clinical definition of `primary 
transsexual'. Primary transsexualism has been used within the clinical literature to 
distinguish those MtF transsexuals who report an early onset of gender dysphoria and 
transition in their late teens from those who come to see themselves as transsexual much 
later in life. Emily, who identifies as lesbian, draws upon this distinction between 
`primary' and `secondary' transsexuals (Person & Ovesey, 1974a; Person & Ovesey, 
1974b) to explain the sexual orientation identification of some MtF transsexuals: 
... there seems to be the the thought that there aren't many transsexual lesbians or lesbian transsexuals umm but the reality is there's loads and 
loads and loads and it seems that the vast majority of male to female 
transsexuals are lesbian as long as they're over a certain age and I think this 
is where you get into the sort of um streaming of `a' grade transsexuals, `b' 
grade transsexuals and er I think all the `a' grade streamists have a much 
greater propensity to be heterosexual once they've changed (Emily, MtF, 
33,2/169-175). 
By distinguishing between `A' grade and `B' grade transsexuals rather than `primary' 
and `secondary' transsexuals; Emily is far more damning in her construction of the 
`older' transsexual as 
, 
the young heterosexual transsexual's less favourable sister. 
Certainly, those who transition later in life are to a greater degree physically marked by 
their years of male embodiment. For those, like Karen, who transitioned at the age of 
eighteen, there is little or no indication of the testosterone that previously provided their 
hormone base, whilst the skin of many of those who began later in life shows signs of the 
effects of the male hormone. Yet, whilst the effects of hormones on physical appearance 
may determine how well an individual `fits' with the discourses of appearance for their 
gender identity (i. e. do they meet the subscribed appearance in order to be read as 
female? ), they do not account for why specific sexual orientation identifications are 
made. Here, Emily points to how a female gender identity can be confirmed by 
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positioning oneself within the structures of heterosexuality to explain why many MtF 
transsexuals identify as heterosexual: 
... societal expectations 
for people to be heterosexual, regardless umm of 
transsexuality, are really quite you know quite strong with the media 
imagery and everything else it all leads in that direction and for a lot of 
transsexuals of course it means umm (.... ) an added strength of having a 
man on your arm and therefore umm definitely being the feminine female 
partner within a relationship umm (... ) you know that's great if that's what 
people want II just feel that a lot of transsexuals are suckered into what is 
essentially a lie and I think generally whatever your sexual orientation was 
before you change over is likely to be the truth of what it should be after 
you change (.... ) (Emily, MtF, 33,2/99-107). 
Emily is clearly tapping into what Judith Butler (1991) has described as the `heterosexual 
matrix'. Being positioned as a woman in a heterosexual relationship emphasizes the MtF 
transsexual's femininity, which, in turn, provides confirmation for her female identity. 
This is constructed as positive for the MtF transsexual because she cannot be perceived 
as anything but `woman' when in a heterosexual relationship with a biological man. Yet, 
we have already seen the flip-side to this story where Karen lives in fear that her male 
sexual partner, knowing her gender history, will question her femaleness. Perhaps even 
worse, her fear of him doing so leads her to feel anxious and alienated from her own 
sense of being female. Despite differing outcomes, which can be interpreted as positive 
or negative for the MtF transsexual's security in her female identity, both of these 
scenarios have the effect of re-affirming a relationship between gender identity and 
sexual orientation. But, there is more to sexual orientation identification and practice 
than slotting in to the normative discourses of heterosexuality in order to confirm a 
female gender identity. As Emily has already implied many post-operative MtF 
transsexuals identify as lesbian. In fact, estimates have put the number in the region of 
50% (Nataf, 1996). 
7.3 Lesbianism and Male-to-Female Transsexuality 
Within the accounts of the six participants who identified as lesbian there are two distinct 
forms of identity construction: Lesbianism as a `lifestyle identity' and lesbianism as a 
result of `sexual practice'. For example, Caroline states: 
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... I might identify or 
label myself as a lesbian all right because that's the 
lifestyle I chose to live. (Caroline, MtF, 29,2/163). 
Whilst Sally and Emily construct their lesbianism as a default sexual orientation based 
on sexual desire: 
... I'm a lesbian I don't fancy you 
know 99.99% of men (. ) there's probably 
about you know 25% of women that you know are physically attractive to 
me therefore I must be a lesbian (.. ) (Sally, MtF, 35,2/138-139). 
... when I was living as a man I only slept with women 
I only had umm 
desire for women and (... ) now I still have desire for women so that makes 
me lesbian (Emily, MtF, 33,2/94-96). 
In the last two accounts the participants assume gender as their primary identification, in 
this case `woman', whilst their sexual orientation identification `lesbian' becomes almost 
incidental. Certainly, in this instance at least, their sexual orientation is not constructed 
upon the basis of any affiliation with lesbianism as a `lifestyle' or `political' identity. In 
contrast, Caroline's engagement with a `lifestyle' sexual identity has led her to construct 
her gender identity in terms of being a particular kind of woman: 
K: does it (being lesbian) also have an influence where you go, who you, 
where you socialize things like that? 
C: mm (.. ) very much so umm (.. ) because I go out on the gay scene umm 
(.. ) and the sort of pubs you go to, the food you end up eating. I don't know 
it's it's it's strange it's (... ) I mean you could have a look through my 
wardrobe and I've got virtually nothing, nothing which is really really butch 
I mean you can go in there and find sort of dungarees or anything er a lot of 
combats a lot of hiking boots a lot of trainers a lot of very androgynous sort 
of stuff umm very few skirts or rubbish like that umm yeah it does very 
much influence you know where I go or what I am (.. ) umm but I actually 
went on the straight scene for eighteen months (.. ) umm (... ) because I 
changed over I changed over virtually on the gay scene umm I hung out 
with the only women I hung around with were gay women right and at the 
end of the day no matter how they were dressing then they had been through 
a time where they'd worn skirts they'd worn make up you know they'd 
gone through all that umm and as a result I decided to go on the straight 
scene for a couple of months because I wanted to learn how to act and be 
accepted as a straight woman and as a result it makes me a better gay 
woman if you know what I mean? (h) It helps me understand what they 
went through as well, you know, you go down a straight pub and there's 
guys leching after you ... you 
know it's been good for me to go through that 
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because now I can understand what (h) what gay women have had to put up 
with for years (Caroline, MtF, 29,2/267-285). 
Caroline draws reference to how her identity as lesbian is constructed via what Michel 
Foucault (1985) describes as `techniques of self. For example, she talks about how her 
appearance as lesbian is constituted through various gendered styles of clothing, such as 
`butch' and `androgynous', her diet, which will inevitably effect her embodiment and 
sense of being-in-the-world, and the social spaces she interacts in. Even more 
interestingly, she also describes her attempt to construct a similar history to lesbian 
women. Caroline describes how she needed to learn how to perform within the 
discourses of heterosexuality, particularly in terms of `appearing as heterosexual', before 
she felt she would make an authentic lesbian. 
Another distinguishing factor between these two approaches to defining as lesbian is the 
participants' acknowledgement of sexual desire. In the accounts of Sally and Emily their 
orientation as lesbian is based purely on the fact that they found women sexually 
attractive. In many respects their responses are reminiscent of an older concept of 
homosexuality, pre-identity politics, where homosexuality is simply regarded as a sexual 
act that takes place in a same-sex liaison. Moreover, Sally and Emily employ a style of 
rhetoric similar to that used by Karen and Albert, who identify as heterosexual. This style 
stands in stark contrast to Caroline's account where she draws no recourse to sexual 
desire at all. Instead, Caroline explains how she learnt to `be' lesbian by re-enacting 
specific experiences that she believed would have fed into the construction of a 
biological lesbian woman's subjectivity. 
7.3 (i) Is a lesbian a woman? 
Having demarcated some of the effects sexual orientation can have upon a MtF 
transsexual's gender identity, and given that six of the seven MtF participants identified 
as lesbian, I now turn in more detail to the relationship between `woman' and `lesbian'. 
In the following section I address how this relationship can affect the lesbian MtF 
participants' sense of being female. 
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Lesbianism has a far more ambiguous history than the history of women per se, as, like 
the `transsexual', the `lesbian' is a culturally constructed subject who did not exist in 
identity terms prior to the medical and psychiatric discourse of the late 1800's. More 
recently, as `lesbian' has emerged as a political identity, as well as indicative of sexual 
desire, there has been some consternation regarding whether a de-essentialized feminist 
theorizing of `woman' results in the disappearance of the lesbian under the sign 
`different woman'. Hence, one of the most frequently cited objections to the feminist 
concept of `woman-identified-woman' is that this image desexualizes the lesbian. In 
Celia Kitzinger's (1987) analysis of lesbian identity some lesbians argued that they were 
just a `person' who happened to be attracted to someone of the same-sex. This identity- 
resistant discourse illustrates that same-sex desire can exist alongside a denial of lesbian 
difference purely because same-sex desire does not necessarily provide a representation 
of lesbian identity. However, Cheshire Calhoun suggests it is also problematic to ask the 
question "who is a lesbian? " This invokes assumptions that to be a lesbian is fixed; that 
one definitely is a lesbian and always will be; that to be a `real' lesbian is to be distinct 
from any traces of heterosexuality; all of which confound the constructed status of the 
lesbian subject. Instead, Calhoun suggests that lesbian difference can be best shown in 
response to the question "who represents the lesbian". 
Lesbian difference was originally made conceivable by sexologists (e. g. Kraft-Ebbing, 
1886) who conceptualized the `lesbian' in various forms as not-man, not-woman. Thus, 
again we return to the relationship between gender and sexuality as the `lesbian' was 
born out of a reconfiguration of gender presentation to one that falls outside of the binary 
gender constructions that follow directly from anatomical sex. In a development of 
Judith Butler's notion of "the logic inversion" (1991) where what first appears as 
feminine in the femme inverts into masculine, and Joan Nestle's (1987), description of 
femme sexual power, Biddy Martin (1992), reads femme (and butch) sexuality as 
resisting categorization into the unambiguously feminine (and masculine). Historically, 
women who have best represented the lesbian have been those involved in the act of 
cross-dressing, such as Marlene Dietrich (Garber, 1992), and undoubtedly, it is the 
`butch' lesbian that has been successful in representing `lesbian', through the calling into 
question of the sex/gender distinction. From Butler's assertion of a heterosexual matrix, 
`femininity' is the gender expression of the 'female', thus the feminine lesbian 
disappears beneath a veil of heterosexuality whilst the 'butch' lesbian, by subverting her 
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gender appearance, is successful in representing `lesbian' by generating the question "To 
which sex does she belong". Thus: 
[T]he more vigorously one attempts to read the cross-dressed or mannish 
female for signs that she is unambiguously a woman, the less powerful 
becomes cross-dressing and mannishness as symbols for the lesbian. 
Similarly the more vigorously one attempts to read femme lesbian sexuality 
for sex/gender ambiguity, the more powerful femme sexuality figures the 
lesbian (Calhoun, 1996: 222). 
So, within Calhoun's argument, to appropriate the lesbian as `woman' is to look through 
her lesbian difference to a gender that only serves to underestimate her. Therefore, when 
some feminists welcomed lesbians under the sign `woman', the specificity of lesbian 
portrayal can be said to have disappeared under the representation of `women with a 
different sexuality'. Hence, Monique Wittig's (1992) proposal that `a lesbian is not a 
woman' and Judith Butler's (1991) redeployment of this in the assertion that the category 
`woman' is only stable within the structures of heterosexuality, have received widespread 
acclaim. 
This is all very well, but what happens when the subject who is positioning herself as 
lesbian used to be, however personally distressing, identified as a heterosexual man? 
How do those MtF transsexuals who have struggled for so long to be identified as female 
negotiate a sexual orientation identity that could lead them back to a position that is 
outside of the binary gender system they so desperately want to belong to? 
Caroline, rather than interpreting her lesbianism as positioning herself outside of the 
heterosexual matrix, interprets her lesbianism as a vital representation of womanhood: 
... I think being lesbian actually expresses yourself as a woman 
because men 
can't be lesbians only women can be lesbians and be accepted as a lesbian 
yeah that's one of the defining things it's sort of yeah I've sort of arrived 
now. Does that freak you when I say things like that? (hh) (K: no) good 
(Caroline, MtF, 29,2/379-382). 
Constructing lesbianism as an exclusively female experience is employed as a means to 
reinstate Caroline's gender identity as female. Being accepted as a lesbian means that 
Caroline has completed her journey to where she is recognized as a lesbian and therefore 
187 
as a woman. But, at the same time, when she and some of the other MtF participants 
have positioned themselves as `lesbian' rather than confirming their identities as 
`woman', it has resulted in a threat to their female identification: 
... I met one or two 
lesbians that don't like transgendered women umm their 
argument being that as you've not been brought up a woman so you don't 
understand umm it's quite hurtful er I can see where they're coming from I 
can understand understand their point of view but even so (.. ) it's still a bit 
hard to accept. It's probably happened a couple of times really but as I say 
most people are quite accepting of of me as a woman and they don't they 
don't actually I don't think they actually question whether I am or I aren't 
umm I think they just assume I must be a woman I think they just assume 
that (Sarah, MtF, 36,2/189-195). 
Sarah's identity as `woman' has, in this case, been questioned by some lesbians she has 
met, under the frequently cited, radical feminist, mantra 'MtF transsexuals cannot be 
women because they do not have the historical suffering of women' (see Janice 
Raymond, 1980). However, this response does not necessarily pertain to just lesbian 
women - all biological women have the potential to reject Sarah's status as `woman' on a 
similar basis, if they so choose. But, the lesbian MtF respondent's female identity is 
called into question more acutely if their female sexual partner begins to question their 
own sexual orientation. As Caroline describes: 
(... ) I think I would like a relationship but it's just all the shit telling people 
the way they perceive you afterwards the way they talk to you (... ) and you 
spend about three hours on the does this make me gay or straight 
conversation with a girl and it's that really fucks me off (.. ) you know what 
do I look like? Do I look like a bloke or do I look like a woman? You look 
like a woman. Right, ok. You're attracted to me. Right, ok. So you're 
attracted me and I look like a woman so what does that make you? Lesbian. 
right good one (h) but it's just their own insecurities coming out you know 
because they have to forge an identity for themselves as being a gay woman 
the fact that they meet someone who they're attracted to who for legal 
reasons is still a guy and any way and physically used to be a guy and 
physically will never really be a woman, you sort of look like a woman a 
scientifically created artificial woman (h) (Caroline, MtF, 29,3/960-971). 
In this case her sexual partner is looking through her more recent gender presentation to 
see the `real' gender, `man', that supposedly lurks behind the female facade (Garber, 
1992). Here, Caroline's response is to construct her identity as woman in terms of 
appearance: I look like a woman therefore I am a woman, you are attracted to me so you 
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are a lesbian. In this process she shifts from deploying the `lesbian as lifestyle' identity 
we saw her use earlier. Now that her gender identity is under threat her identity as 
`woman', determined by her appearance, becomes her primary identification. But, at the 
same time, she in effect colludes with her girlfriend's doubts by calling into question the 
`realness' of her own claim to be `woman' by describing herself as "a scientifically 
created artificial woman". 
7.4 Gay Identity and Female-to-Male Sexual Orientation 
Of the seven FtM participants none identified as exclusively `gay'. However, Richard 
frequently engaged in transient sexual relations with men and cruising in the local 
churchyard constituted a central theme in his interview scripts. For Richard, cruising has 
a two-fold effect; not only for enjoyable sexual encounters but also as a means to learn 
how to be a man (see Chapter Six for further discussion). 
... 
do you say I'm a man but because I don't have a penis I'm going to use 
the ladies because I find the gents a threat (K: mm). Or, do you go cruising 
and learn how to how to read the body language and learn how to keep your 
eyes down and go, you know, which is one reason I go cruising it's a really 
really good way to to learn about men and about men's body language and 
how to understand sort of the subtleties of male body language (Richard, 
FtM, 24,1/315-321). 
In this extract we see Richard raise the issue of whether his identity as male, and 
therefore his ability to use the `gents' toilets, could be negated on the basis of `not having 
a penis'. The penis is a central signifier of `man' in the binary gender system but, as we 
saw in Chapter Six, there are other cultural practices of male embodiment that need to be 
mastered in order to pass as `male'. Through the sexual practice of `cruising' Richard 
conducts a specific gay male apprenticeship, mimicking the behaviours, postures and 
stances of the men he meets for sex in his quest to cement his own male gender identity. 
Returning to sexual identity, what is unusual here is that Richard's previous, albeit 
limited, sexual history was with women. He was the only participant whose object of 
sexual desire changed as he moved from desiring women to desiring men, after 
transition. However, other FtM participants expressed that they now felt more open to 
the possibility of having sexual relations with men: 
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K: yeah right sexuality, how would you describe your sexual orientation? 
N: umm basically er it's women that do it for me really umm (. ) I mean I 
can definitely appreciate and find guys sexy er () and oh I don't know that I 
would really have a sexual sort of thing with a guy particularly umm you 
know. At one time I would have said oh definitely not but to just allowing 
myself the possibility to think about these things which I do feel more free 
in a way to think about these things at one time I wouldn't even, you know, 
I'd police myself. Oh no you can't think about that. Click. You know 
shutters down. Now I have been asking myself the question what it or, you 
know, what does it mean, you know? (Neil, FtM, 35,2/58-65) 
Here, Neil acknowledges that there may be a little more fluidity around his sexual desire 
since transitioning. Whilst it remains unlikely that he would ever act upon this, it does 
raise the question of why he should now feel more able to engage in the possibility of a 
sexual relation with a man. Richard goes further and makes explicit that his re- 
orientation towards engaging in sexual relations with men is facilitated by a shift in the 
gender/power dynamics: sex is possible with men when he is not being "fucked as a 
woman": 
... 
its kind of umm the more male I become or the more I pass as male the 
the easier it is to be with a man because II realize that I'm not umm I'm not 
being fucked as a woman so to speak, to be polite about it, umm I don't 
know (.. ) if I was umm I think before with with a man umm there was 
something which I wasn't confident in myself which stopped me from ever 
doing it and II had a serious umm I didn't hate men but I didn't like the 
way that they always drew attention to their penises and had to er lycra 
cycling shorts and stuff like that (Richard, 24, FtM, 2/224-235). 
It seems that post-transition the change in gender dynamics is such that Richard feels 
confident enough in himself to engage in sexual relations with men and is no longer 
`threatened' by their penises. Yet, despite wishing to avoid detracting from his own 
processes of empowerment, it would be a misrepresentation not to draw reference to the 
time when Richard was `fucked as a woman'. On several occasions during the interviews 
Richard graphically described a brutal rape that he was subjected to whilst a female 
student. Undoubtedly, there are some very complex gender and sexual orientation 
identification issues at play in Richard's narrative. Yet, by deploying a `gay' or `queer' 
identification, Richard manages to avoid some of the gender identity anxieties that can be 
triggered when embarking in heterosexual relations. 
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7.5 Heterosexuality and Female-to-Male Transsexualism 
The other six FtM participants were all sexually orientated towards women, although 
some of them resisted the identification `straight'. The variation in their willingness to 
position themselves as `heterosexual' seemed to depend upon their previous attachment 
to a lesbian identity before transitioning (this will be discussed in more detail in the next 
section). Albert, the eldest of the participants, was the most categorical in his 
identification as heterosexual: 
K: umm are there any other terms you would prefer to identify as? 
A: male heterosexual (.. ) end of story (hh) (Albert, FtM, 59,2/61-62). 
Here, Albert's identification as `heterosexual male' subsumes any transsexual 
identification. I draw attention to his age as an important factor because Albert positions 
himself within traditional discourses of heterosexuality where relations between men and 
women are only fully recognized in wed-lock, and he often cited `my generation' as a 
discursive construction to account for his conservative stance on particular issues: 
... I can't marry a woman 
because they (legally) say I'm not a man umm now 
how does that impact on my life? Well I've lost more relationships because 
of this anomaly than anything because the one thing people want is to 
belong to society to be part of it and to belong to the system which society 
has. Now, if you're outside that system then you feel like a foreigner and it 
doesn't just affect me but it affects those partners that I might have because 
they also cannot be in the system... going back to my experience, so I've lost 
quite a few relationships because of this this one thing umm and I feel very 
strongly that that's that it's (.... ) how can I put it (.... ) II find it very very 
difficult to make relationships because I feel that it's not fair of me to to get 
somebody into a relationship which is outside of society (.. ) umm I'm not 
saying that I haven't you know I I've had quite a few but I (.. ) I feel that it's 
very difficult umm and at the first sign of there being difficulties because 
people want to be be part of society not outside of it umm and I think it's 
better for them that they are (Albert, FtM, 59,1/343-349,375-382). 
His legal position causes him significant distress as well as a feeling of alienation 
because, as the law stands in the UK with regard to birth certificates, he will always be 
`female'. Thus, he can never commit to a woman in the way that he wants or the way that 
many of his generation deem necessary for their relationship to be regarded as 
`respectable'. Hence, any relationship that Albert has with a woman will call into 
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question his identity as male. Even though he feels, very strongly, that he has done 
everything within his power to justify being accepted as male - including many 
operations to construct a phallus - the legal position of `transsexual' refuses him the 
rights that every other heterosexual male takes for granted. And whilst at many times in 
his life legal discourses have had little real effect, for example on his employment 
experience, when he meets a prospective romantic partner, they bring his claim to the 
identity `man' into question. 
The legal discourses that fail to recognize Albert's shift in gender identity is a less 
pressing concern for the other FtM participants. Unlike Albert, none of the other 
respondents have undergone surgery to construct a phalloplasty. Hence, for them it is 
their physical gender presentation, encapsulated in their lack of male genitalia, that calls 
into question their identity as male when engaging in heterosexual relations. Jason 
describes how he experienced this when answering relationship questions in a local 
television documentary: 
J:... the relationship one was sort of like about how you know if you can't 
have a relationship as a man, something like that it was sort of negative 
umm and probably what I might have been tempted to do if I'd really 
listened to the question was to to head into well you know of course I'm a 
man and you know just because and I could have got a bit heated so I found 
it quite a difficult balance to umm not get too hung up by trying to prove 
I'm a man because I've got nothing to prove (K: right) so it was a sort of a 
balancing act of getting the points across but not getting it to the point 
where people, if they think I'm trying to prove something, it shows I'm, it 
might be that I'm not sure about it because I've got to prove to other people 
(K; right) and that was really hard so (.... ) What, what I said I think was well 
everybody has unique relationships where people have different styles (K; 
mm) anyhow. You can't, basically you can't judge because what I said was 
a relevant statement umm (.... ) and it was something you could have said 
umm. Certainly what I would say say now about that is the the emphasis on 
you know as a man I would chose well I said I would chose to have a 
relationship with a woman umm and that would be unique to me and that 
person. I think I would just throw that in but very casually (K: mm) (Jason, 
FtM, 39,1/187-202). 
Attention is drawn to how Jason could or would function sexually in a `normal' 
heterosexual relationship given that he has no penis. Jason feels pushed into defending 
his identity as male but, at the same time, is worried about appearing insecure in his male 
identity if he emphasizes the point too strongly. Instead, he tries to counter the perceived 
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attack on his male identity by constructing his lack of a penis as a sexual anomaly that he 
and any potential girlfriend would have to negotiate. Given the dominant view that penis- 
penetrating-vagina constitutes `normal sex', being heterosexual and having no penis has 
been given a great deal of consideration by Jason, particularly in terms of the 
implications for his male identity. Yet, when questioned, he feels that he is required to be 
fairly `casual' in his response so as not to provoke further querying of his claim to be 
male. 
Meanwhile, Ruben positions himself firmly within the belief that a man needs to have a 
fully functioning penis in order to engage in `normal' sexual relations with a woman. In 
fact, lacking a penis whilst in a heterosexual relationship provides such a threat to his 
male identity that he refuses to have a sexual relationship until he has had phalloplasty 
surgery: 
K: were you sexually active before you began the process of reassignment? 
R: no that's one thing I've always decided I don't want to do 
K: right until you're? 
R: it's not fair on the person I was having a relationship with because if I'm 
in a relationship with a woman they obviously want a man and I can't be 
quite what they want to be, or if they if they did even if they did say yes I 
want to see you still I wouldn't believe that they were doing it for the right 
reasons (K: right) so I prefer to not do it (Ruben, FtM, 19,3/653-660). 
As Ruben constructs `man' in terms of having a penis, or at the very least a phalloplasty, 
even the possibility of having a heterosexual relationship emphasizes his lack, and 
therefore his sense of not being male. This feeling of `not being male' is mediated 
through two concerns. Firstly, his disquiet that he cannot be the erect, penetrating man 
his sexual partner would want him to be and secondly, fear that his partner, on the basis 
of having sex with a man with a vagina, will begin to question her own sexual identity: 
K: so would you, would you consider having a relationship in the future 
even if you can't have phalloplasty for a long time? 
R: at some point then obviously I if I knew that would happen then I'd have 
to but I would be very very careful in my choice of partners (... ) because 
like some people could go out with someone not knowing they have this 
condition, they might be a bit funny about it, or they might think they're like 
think they are lesbian or something because it's like, it must be a bit weird 
for them if you know what I mean (K: right) but I yes I would have to find 
someone who I would be (. ) on very sort of funny terms or very sort of 
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arranged terms as I (.. ) if you know what I mean (Ruben, FtM, 19,3/679- 
687). 
Here we can see parallels with the gender anxieties that are brought into play in some of 
the MtF transsexuals' accounts. Ruben, like Karen, is worried that his transsexual status 
will result in his sexual partner seeing through his maleness to a `true' female essence 
and, like Caroline, is concerned that this will result in them questioning their own sexual 
orientation. However, in contrast to these MtF transsexuals, this disquiet is likely to be 
emphasized if the FtM transsexual's sexual partner still has physical signs of femaleness. 
Whilst still having female genitalia, Ruben can never be sure how his female sexual 
partners are relating to him. Although it is unlikely, the possibility that his heterosexual 
female partner could be relating to him as a lesbian threatens his identity as male. 
Despite the earlier well-founded claims by the participants that sexuality and gender 
should be seen as distinct, inter-personal sexual relations, whether these are heterosexual, 
lesbian, or gay, are incendiary in the creation of fears, anxieties and frustrations 
pertaining to the participants' gender identification and sense of gendered embodiment. 
As it was argued in Chapter Six, we again see how intersubjective relations have the 
potential to both confirm and disavow transsexual subject's claim to a new gender 
identity. Some theorizing of sexuality has usefully highlighted the way in which sexual 
relations can provide the opportunity for unconsciously desired gender transgressions 
(e. g. Segal, 1994). However, for those who have struggled to be recognized in a gender 
that is not backed up by their physical appearance or given any legal accountability, 
acknowledging fluidity in their gender identifications is highly improbable (see Chapter 
Five). Yet, there is a surprising amount of fluidity in many of the participants' sexual 
orientation identifications, if not, practices. 
7.6 Sexual orientation identifications and practice - fixed or fluid 
Within both the MtF and FtM participants' accounts rhetoric was used to construct their 
sexual orientation as mutable. For example, Ruben, who was incredibly rigid about 
constructing a male identity in terms of having a penis, responded to the question: 
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K: (.. ) how would you describe your sexual orientation? 
R: straight at the minute, obvious things can't can change you can never be 
totally sure things like that but (. ) straight now (Ruben, FtM, 19,2/86-88). 
As did Sally: 
K: have you ever questioned that (being a lesbian)? 
S: yes I have. I question it every day (. ) because I don't think anybody umm 
can say with any degree of certainty whilst they're you know sexually 
active I'm one thing or I'm another thing ... as a as a generalization and just 
because something is a generalization doesn't mean to say that it's not true 
you know women have personalities that I can get on with a lot better umm 
(.. ) you know an emotional openness which is absent in in most men and an 
aesthetic standard which is completely absent in as I said 99.99% of men (. ) 
you know there's one or two II could name but (.. ) you know it's very very 
rare (. ) but to say that the you know somebody is one thing or another 
completely and utterly and and I will not it's (.. ) it just isn't accurate (Sally, 
MtF, 35,2/140-142,149-155). 
This illustrates a difference in the identification practices for gender and sexual 
orientation. Gender is seen as central - the core identity - and therefore immutable, whilst 
sexual orientation tallies with what you do, and is therefore more open to potential 
change. However, this fluidity around sexual orientation is principally constructed in 
terms of `possibilities' rather than `practice'. As we have already seen the participants' 
object of sexual desire tends to stay the same after transition, although this is not true in 
all cases. We have seen Richard shift from desiring women (lesbian) to desiring men 
(gay) after transition but, as he fully acknowledges, his prior sexual experience and 
degree of identification was limited and he is still very much engaged in the process of 
exploring both his sexual and gender identities. Cheryl offers another example of this 
type of shift in sexuality. She describes how some transsexuals become orientated 
towards a particular sexual orientation, rather than a specifically gendered partner: 
... I guess it's if you are 
brought up as a man and to see women as the 
opposite sex even when you change sex or gender yourself your mind set 
still sees women as the (.. ) attractive partner or opposite in some way (K; 
right) I don't know and yet I've met some transsexuals who before as men 
they went out as women and never fancied men and yet after the operation 
started going out with men and enjoying sex with men but that felt right for 
them because that was still heterosexual if you like (Cheryl, MtF, 41,3/584- 
590). 
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Certainly, in the aftermath of `identity politics', sexual orientation has a greater effect on 
many of the participants' lifestyles than simply who they have sex with. Heterosexuality 
brings with it a degree of privilege and all bar one of the MtF participants now found 
their sexual experiences were no longer located within the discourses of heterosexuality. 
For some this was surprising and even disappointing, as Sarah describes: 
... I'm now a gay 
female (K: mm) so my sexuality's [object of desire's] not 
changed (K: it's not changed no) yeah I thought it would (K; right) I 
expected it to and it didn't (hh) so I think, a lot of it, I think I was quite 
disappointed really that I wouldn't end up straight female because I think 
straight females probably get an easier time than gay females (K; right) 
umm (... ) but looking back on the last eighteen months I'm quite happy to 
identify as a gay female (hh) most of my friends are gay females (K; right) 
so umm I suppose I'm quite happy along with, quite happy along with them 
really yeah (Sarah, MtF, 37,2/59-65). 
It seems obvious why these transsexual women may initially be wary of being identified 
as lesbian but, surprisingly, within most of the FtM participants' accounts there is an 
even stronger resistance to being positioned as `straight': 
... a lot of umm transsexuals 
don't feel that they're queer. Quite often they 
were er straight before and then and if they're they're still of the same 
sexual persuasion afterwards they actually become queer (K: right) umm 
I'm in the position where I was lesbian before and now I've become straight 
(K: right) you would think so but no I haven't because I have a queer 
mentality so I strongly identify with that yeah (Billy, FtM, 46,2/43-47). 
Billy draws attention to the fact that previous life trajectories will continue to impact 
upon lifestyle after transition. Having spent 25 years living on the margins of society, in 
and around the lesbian community, it is unlikely that the many facets of self that have 
been constructed through this existence will change simply because his new gender 
presentation repatriates him with the mainstream structures of heterosexuality. Thus, in 
the accounts of those who have passed through a lesbian identity 'to be straight' means 
much more than engaging in heterosexual relations. 
In the following extract, Neil acutely distinguishes between a sexual orientation based on 
`lifestyle' and `sexual practice' identifications: 
K: so would you so you'd identify as straight then? 
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N: well (.. ) no because that's aa silly word, do you know what I mean? 
Because straight it's like () anything with the word straight in it is not the 
word for me, it's () umm but I suppose you, you know, I can't handily think 
of some better word for it. I'm sure there is a better word for it because you 
said, as soon as you talk, you know, say the word straight it's got er a sort of 
negative quality about it, do you see what I mean? (K: uhum) Straight. The 
word straight doesn't allow for options. It doesn't allow for flexibility. It 
doesn't allow for interest and you see they're the qualities that are primarily 
seen as being aa lesbian and gay or queer experience which is 
bollocks... one isn't better than the other it's just a different way of being (K: 
mm) and you can be a complete bullshit, very straight gay person the same 
way as you can be a cosmic and groovy () psychedelic straight person. Do 
you know what I mean? (K: yeah) It's in the way that you do something not 
who you do it with (Neil, FtM, 35,2/85-92,98-101). 
For Billy, `queer' is a `way-of-thinking', whilst for Neil `straight' is a `way-of-being'. 
For both of them these identities are something above and beyond sexual practice. So, for 
Neil `straight' is an identity, although it is more likely to be placed on others as a form of 
insult, rather than taken up by oneself. Furthermore, instead of interpreting `straight' as 
an identity based on sexuality, `to be straight' constitutes a particular way of life that is 
usually seen as dull and conservative. Whilst Neil's new identity as male, coupled with 
his sexual desire for women, might determine his sexual orientation as heterosexual, he 
strongly resists the notion that he will come to live his life in a way that he could easily 
reject when he used to identify as lesbian. Although he doesn't actually define himself as 
`queer', Neil's account could be interpreted as essentially `queer' in nature. Richard, like 
Billy, uses the term `queer' to define himself, as he finds it useful for resisting the way 
others make identity judgments about him on the basis of either his gendered appearance 
or sexual practice: 
K: what about the term queer is that one that you've ever used? 
R: sometimes, I don't see it as being derogatory I mean it can be it depends 
how it's said (K: mm) umm but I do see myself as sort of queer. It's far 
easier to say oh I'm just queer umm because it cuts out the gay side as well 
because umm people say are you gay or straight er well I'm just queer you 
know, I can be with a man and it will seem like gay sex and actually might 
have heterosexual sex so to speak, or I could be with a woman and look like 
a heterosexual couple and we'd be having lesbian sex more or less you 
know kind of thing but, so I mean, what the hell does a label mean? You 
know, there's a there's a problem with the labels with because it it depends 
whether you go by what you look like to everybody else or what you are in 
bed (Richard, FtM, 24,2/105-114). 
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Interestingly, Richard makes no attempt to resist the signification of his female genitals. 
Many FtM transsexuals live in long-term relations with women without having genital 
reconstruction to create a phalloplasty yet, as Jason's account early implied, they would 
never construct their sexual relations with their partner as `lesbian'. In contrast, Richard 
states that his vagina may be used to determine the type of sex he is having - over and 
above his own gender identification. If he has penetrative vaginal sex with a man, he 
describes how this could be either determined as heterosexual sex - as penis in vagina 
equals `normal' heterosexual sex - or, on the basis of how Richard looks, it could be 
interpreted as two men having sex - gay sex. Hence, he uses the identity `queer' to 
counteract the incongruity between his genital and gender appearance when engaging in 
sexual encounters. 
There is certainly a greater degree of questioning around sexual orientation 
identifications in the accounts of the FtM participants than the MtF participants. I 
propose that this may be because all the FtM participants have had to negotiate, to 
varying degrees, a level of lesbian identification on their way to a FtM identity. In 
contrast, all but one of the MtF participants moved from a heterosexual orientation into a 
lesbian identification after transitioning. Again, we can see that the individual trajectories 
through earlier sexual orientation identities colour the way participants later negotiate 
their positionings in terms of both gender and sexual orientation identities. 
7.7 Fragmented identities -- Frustrated Politics 
In this chapter I have documented the ways in which the sexual orientation and gender 
identifications of these participants intersect, and the fears and anxieties they can 
provoke for a gendered sense of self. As we have seen in Chapter Three, the advent of 
queer theory promised the deconstruction of identity via the bringing to account of sex 
and sexuality (Sedgwick, 1991). Like those queer theorists in the early 1990's, many of 
the participants attempted to distinguish between `sexuality' and `gender'. However, 
whilst early proponents of queer, such as Gayle Rubin (1984), were motivated by the 
claim that the power relations of `sexuality' cannot be reduced to that of `gender' (Segal, 
1999), these participants were more concerned with counteracting any sexual 
`perversion' connotations that are associated with the term transsexual. In this final 
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section I examine the difficult position transsexual has in relation to queer, discuss the, at 
times, uneasy connections between transsexuals, transvestites and the lesbian and gay 
community, and argue that it is impossible as well as politically undesirable to sever ties 
between these gender and sexual identities. 
Historically, members of the `trans' community are intrinsically linked to members of 
the lesbian and gay community - both identities, at least, being born out of the work of 
early sexologists. More recently, `trans' identities have been incorporated into the 
celebratory realms of different sexualities under the rubric `queer'. At its most exciting, 
queer promised to "transcend[s] any gender, any sexual persuasion and philosophy" 
(Jasper Laybutt, "male lesbian" cited in Grosz, 1995: 207), whilst at its most mundane it 
offered a new but trendy synonym for gay and lesbian studies. As a political movement, 
particularly in the US, queer offered a radical challenge to identity politics and came to 
represent anybody who was `anti-straight'. As Alexander Doty suggests queer sets out: 
... to question the cultural 
demarcation between the queer and the 
straight.. . 
by pointing out the queerness of and in straights and straight 
cultures, as well as that of individuals and groups who have been told they 
inhabit the boundaries between the binaries of gender and sexuality: 
transsexuals, bisexuals, transvestites, and other binary outlaws" (1993, xv- 
xvi, cited in Walters, 1996). 
Yet, it is as a political movement that `queer' has been most seriously criticized. Suzanna 
Danuta Walter asks the question: 
If queer becomes the new reigning subjectivity for hip activists and 
intellects alike, what kinds of politics and theories then become 
"transcended, " moved through and over in the construction of the queer 
hegemony? (1996: 837) 
Her particular concern is that feminism and lesbian-feminism are becoming marginalized 
and demonized by this `transcendence'. Likewise, Tim Edwards (1998) is concerned that 
queer politics have resulted in a lifestyle politics that lacks substance and whilst focusing 
on difference is unable to serve as a productive means of fighting minority oppression. 
He argues for: 
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... a gay and lesbian studies that 
is far more materially grounded and aware 
of sexual, racial and gendered differentials, to mention only some, than is 
catered for in a post-structural discourse of so-called `radical' pluralism of 
`beyond' this or that (1998: 481). 
So, the flip side to queer's potential for radical and subversive sexual and gender play is 
that it makes it very difficult to maintain a political campaign for a certain group when 
that group does not have a cohesive identity (Hekman, 2000). Of course, the whole point 
of queer was to celebrate difference thus, it is counter-intuitive to suggest that those who 
fall within the remits of `queer' would mobilize under a singular banner or sustain a 
monadic identity. Yet, some serious issues have been raised about queer's suitability for 
fighting oppression. The debate that circles around which sexual subjectivities constitute 
`queer' and the suitability of queer as a political movement, often emphasizes what could 
be seen as an undesirable split between the transsexual community and the lesbian and 
gay community. 
As `queer' has come to be seen as primarily representing a gay and lesbian agenda, 
transsexual activists have begun to mobilize under their own banners: Press For Change 
in the UK and Transsexual Menace in the US. Their prime motivations have been to 
achieve improved health care and legal rights for `trans'-people (Halberstam, 1998; Press 
for Change Newsletter, Aug. 1999). It would be an oversight to fail to acknowledge the 
profound differences between the experience of same-sex desire and the experience of 
being transsexual, and the occasional need to mobilize on specific issues that may only 
pertain to one aspect of a broad community. However, I believe that it would be 
detrimental to all to negate the sibling type relationship these sexual identities have with 
one another. The gay and lesbian community has frequently provided a respite for those 
exploring their gender questions, and it also provides a home for many of those who have 
reached the end of their individual trans-gender journeys. For example, all of the FtM 
participants in this study passed through, with varying degrees of attachment to, a lesbian 
identity. And, like six of the seven MtF participants in this study, many MtF transsexuals 
end up socializing within the lesbian and gay community. It could be argued that those 
MtF transsexual's who identify as heterosexual would have no connection with this 
community, but even Karen - who resisted any kind of association with homosexuality - 
responded to an advert for this research that had been placed in the gay community press: 
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The Pink Paper. For others, trying on different but associated identities was a necessary 
procedure on their way to becoming transsexual. As Sarah describes: 
K:... you were saying that you didn't know whether you were a gay man or a 
lesbian so did that did that have any effect on when and how you went about 
starting reassignment? 
S: no (... ) no (... ) I don't know I suppose it all went hand in hand really with 
discovering who I am (K; right) umm the sexuality side came later. I'd 
already decided that I wasn't a gay man and then I next decided I wasn't a 
transvestite umm (... ) umm and that's when I seriously had counselling with 
people and that's when I had counselling about for about six to twelve 
months before I actually started hormone therapy so it was (.... ) that was a 
separate process, and actually discovering I was a gay female has come 
since I changed over. Since I've I've I've lived in the full time role and been 
accepted basically by by women that I know (Sarah, MtF, 37,2/110-119). 
Sarah spoke of a process of exploring various gender and sexual orientation positions in 
order to `discover who she was'. This involved moving through the identities gay man, 
transvestite, transsexual woman and finally lesbian. In the light of these experiences one 
might expect to find a tight knit community based on understanding for and reciprocity 
between related but distinct minority groups. Unfortunately, this often is not the case. 
Identity conflict can be a regular occurrence on the lesbian and gay scene as Sarah 
reported: 
K: in what ways have you found members of the lesbian and gay scene to be 
supportive of transsexuals? 
S: mm (.. ) pretty good really (.. ) on on the surface I suppose. Yeah. But I 
mean I think um, I don't know. I think we all have our own little flags and 
own, own little pigeon holes to go and sit in occasionally and (.. ) I think 
that's quite divisive (... ) because I think, I mean one of my one of my 
theories about this is gay, lesbian, transgendered people have all come sort 
of through a process of finding out about their sexuality or their gender, and 
my argument is they should all stand shoulder to shoulder but they don't (. ) 
and lesbians shout at the guys, the guys shout at the lesbians, the lesbians 
and and the guys shout at the trannies and the trannies shout back and it's 
all, it's all the same. Everybody slags each other off (Sarah, MtF, 37,2/168- 
175). 
Inevitably, the queer community (and I mean that in its broadest sense) does not always 
provide for a `community' spirit and can sometimes end up with disaffected factions 
arguing for rights over community space and the protection of their hard fought for 
identities. This is exacerbated by the onset of a post-modern fragmentation of identities 
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in an attempt to counteract essentialism (e. g. Butler, 1990; Grosz, 1995). Resistance to 
essentialist thinking has been of particular importance in the conception of `queer' 
sexuality that celebrates difference and the subsequent influx of new and ever-shifting 
ways for individuals to present themselves. Cheryl provides a good example of this when 
she describes her sexual identity: 
... I've slept with women I've slept with pre-op transsexuals umm which I 
quite enjoyed to be honest umm but I've never slept with a man and I think 
if if I ever did have surgery or if I ever did live full time as a woman I 
would probably be a lesbian. I'm a closet lesbian. (K: right) I'm a I'm an 
unfulfilled, frustrated, closet lesbian she-male. (hh) (K: ok) (Cheryl, MtF, 
41,2/131-135). 
Here is a clear example of the `multiplicity' of identity. Cheryl, who at times identifies as 
transgendered or transsexual, takes oestrogen, lives as a woman in a social sphere yet 
works as a man, and identifies, in this case, as a closet lesbian she-male. 
As such, one of the problems for community cohesion is that it has not proved possible 
to speak of `transsexual' experience, let alone shape some kind of unity between 
transsexual, transgender, transvestite, lesbian, gay or bisexual narratives. This is 
particularly the case when, as has been documented in this chapter, the intersections 
between sexual desire and gender identifications are often instrumental in the perforation 
of a secure sense of gendered self. 
As I have suggested throughout this thesis, a more nuanced analysis of transsexual 
experience must pay heed to the differences between the transitional processes of MtF 
and FtM transsexuals, the possibilities for embodied subjectivity and accessibility to the 
new gender position they take up, as well as their individual life trajectories. For now, 
however, I want to illustrate how some MtF and FtM transsexuals have different, but 
equally problematic, relations with other identities - in this case transvestite and lesbian - 
that also fall under the general rubric `queer'. 
7.7 (i) Borderline identity battles 
One of the dominant discursive constructions to emerge from the MtF transsexuals' 
accounts was that transsexualism was distinct from transvestism. As Emily describes: 
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... I don't really like 
definitions too much (K: mm) I mean obviously I I'd be 
particularly keen to divorce (.. ) drag and transvestites and transsexuals and 
have those clearly defined as as you know separate entities (K: mm) 
because obviously the larger perceptions, public perception is that they are 
kind of inter-linked (.... ) but then you know no one likes to be 
misunderstood and I suppose there's a sort of there's a fear of being lumped 
in and labelled with something that you're not (K: mm) (Emily, MtF, 33, 
2/32-38). 
When considering the distinction between transsexual and transgender Emily resisted 
"defining things too tightly", but stressed that there should be a clear distinction between 
transsexuals and transvestites on the basis that "no one likes to be misunderstood". 
Perhaps this is because Emily did feel misunderstood for many years. Here, she explains 
her confusion over misdiagnosis: 
... I kind kind of had 
doctors telling me I was a transvestite and umm and 
then you'd read sort of quack medical histories that would say umm 
transsexuals aren't sexually turned on by umm women's clothing, cross- 
dressing. Well, so you start to believe all these different points and I was 
utterly utterly repulsed umm by erections having erections and um (. ) so I 
use to have erections when I was crossed-dressed and umm that was kind 
of, you know, drove me into this sort of transvestite thing and you think 
you're transvestite and umm it use to the the whole notion of being sexually 
aroused by (.. ) by the clothing umm just utterly repulsed me in the same 
way as you know transvestites have um female names they they chose 
names for themselves and (. ) I could never do that it's just such false it's so 
wrong and like having false breasts and stuff you know if it's not part of you 
then (. ) then you're kind of deluding yourself (Emily, MtF, 33,2/488-499). 
Emily was obviously traumatized by being positioned as a transvestite as she was 
`repulsed' by her own sexual arousal when she used to experience erections whilst 
wearing female clothing. At the Third International Conference on Sex and Gender, 
Herbert Bower (1998) gave a paper in which he suggested that psychiatrists no longer 
see sexual arousal as indicative of only a transvestite `condition'. Rather, he proposed 
that some transsexuals also become sexual aroused when dressed in female attire. But for 
Emily, the idea that her subjectivity is somehow the same as a transvestite's is abhorrent. 
For her, taking hormones and developing her own breasts realizes her status as woman, 
whilst the transvestite is `false' and `deluding themselves'. 
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This distinction between transsexual `being woman', and transvestite `playing woman' 
and therefore somehow trivializing transsexual experience, was commonly found in 
many of the other MtF participants' accounts. Sarah spoke of transvestites as devaluing 
transsexual experience: 
... I use to go to aT TS support group 
in A Local Town and er it just seemed 
to be that it was another night where transvestites could go and get dressed 
up (.. ) that's what I felt it was it was quite it was really phoney (K: right) 
umm but I've spoke to I spoke about doing this (support) group and (.. ) 
what I want to try and do is keep it exclusively TS rather than have trannies 
there (K: right) (.. ) um because it just drags it down it it devalues the whole 
the whole night (K: right) and you can actually talk about issues that are 
important to people rather than just oh I like your dress it really suits you 
your hair and stuff like that a big wig or something (hh) so I'd like to try 
and keep anything I did in the future like exclusively TS (Sarah, MtF, 37, 
3/400-413). 
Transvestites are seen as `phoney' women who devalue Sarah's female subjectivity. 
Perhaps the notion of men dressing up as women is too close to her own story. To 
associate with transvestites runs the risks for Sarah of also being seen as a man who is 
`playing woman' which would, undoubtedly, cause great anxiety for her sense of 
gendered self. This may be exacerbated by the fact that, as she said earlier, Sarah 
actually moved through identifying as transvestite as part of the process of 
`discovering who she was'. Caroline, whilst agreeing with this hierarchical 
construction of the transsexual's claim to the status `woman' over and above the 
transvestite's, also notes that MtF transsexuals' relationships with transvestite spaces 
are often important during transition: 
... they (transvestites) 
don't understand because to them being a woman is 
just putting a dress on (K: mm) and because it to them it's a different thing. 
It's more play. That's that's enough for them. For me it wasn't. Its sort of, I 
am a woman and I'm stuck in the wrong body that kind of thing. I mean 
they are men pretending to be women. I must sound so condescending. Its 
not meant to sound like that umm but (. ) it's a completely different thing 
umm and I mean a lot of transsexuals go through that because when you're 
in that transition stage it's a very safe environment to hang around in 
(Caroline, MtF, 29,3/236-245). 
So again, although insecurities and anxieties about who, and what, they are can be 
sparked and inflamed by the tensions between MtF transsexual and transvestite 
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identifications, the boundaries between them are sometimes rather fuzzy. Often the 
transvestite scene permits the MtF transsexual time to explore their gender questions in a 
relatively safe and accommodating environment, and they may even for some of this 
time identify as transvestite. 
In a similar vein, there is contention over where to draw a distinction between FtM 
transsexuals and lesbians. In a recent edition of the FTM Network's newsletter (Boys 
Own, April 2000) a list entitled 10 Most Damaging Myths about Transmen and FTM's 
was presented. Again we see the problem of further fragmenting identities as we must 
assume that representing both FTM's and Transmen indicates a difference between these 
two categories. I am unsure of how to quantify the difference between these two possible 
modes of subjectivity but perhaps, at times, they are used to represent one and the same 
person. In this case, it is apparent in at least four of the myths that together FTM's and 
Transmen differ from lesbians, although there is no indication that they are different 
from one another. For example, the two most common myths about Transmen and 
FTM's are described as: 
1. Transmen are really just butch lesbians who change sex to justify same- 
sex relationships or to avoid harassment. 
2. Historically, all women only chose to live as men to pursue careers that 
were otherwise unavailable to them, to seek economic opportunities, or to 
justify lesbian relationships. (Boys Own, April 2000: 9) 
In a series of papers entitled Butch/FTM Border Wars Judith Halberstam and C. Jacob 
Hale (1998) debate these two recurring themes that are employed to distinguish FtM 
identity from `butch lesbian'. Both caution against trying to stabilize terms such as 
transsexual, transgender and butch and challenge "the practice of predicating an identity 
politics on the dead bodies of people who cannot answer for their own complexities" 
(1998: 285). The search for FtM and butch lesbian narratives that are grounded 
historically can be particularly problematic. The need for `role models' or simply the 
delight that can be gained from recognizing your own experience in someone else's, is 
understandable. But, to re-claim figures and attempt to shape them into an FTM 
transsexual - as has happened with the jazz musician Billy Tipton and the Nebraskan 
teenager `Brandon Teena/Teena Brandon' (see Chapter Three) - often results in an 
inaccurate portrayal of an individual's life. Equally, Halberstam (1998) argues there is 
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nothing to substantiate a lesbian reappropriation of these individuals' experiences within 
lesbian history. Here, their lives are often rationalized as lesbians who lack access to a 
liberating lesbian discourse, as is pointed out in the second most insidious myth to FtM's 
and Transmen. But, importantly, Halberstam warns that: 
[W]hile a distinction between lesbian and FTM positions might be an 
important one to sketch out, there is always a danger that the effort to mark 
the territory of FTM subjectivity might fall into homophobic assertions 
about lesbians and sexist formulations of women generally (Halberstam, 
1998: 297). 
And I agree. Efforts need to be made to avoid falling into the trap of alienating would be 
supporters by becoming caught up in a battle to chalk out regulatory lines for gender and 
sexuality identifications. It may seem that queer theory and politics have little to offer the 
transsexual subject who is trying to gain both legal and social recognition in their new 
gender presentation. Politically, in the UK, members of the `trans'-community tend to 
draw upon the biological discourses of transsexualism and heterosexual normativity in 
order to achieve the long campaigned for right to change their birth certificates. Thus, 
many transsexuals may feel, that an affiliation with `queer' is, at best, unhelpful, whilst 
they fight a `legitimate' battle to challenge oppression on the basis of a biological birth 
defect. 
Whilst I acknowledge the reasons why some transsexuals and transgenderists attempt to 
branch away from any affiliation with the lesbian and gay community, I believe that 
mutual support would prove a more politically effective philosophy. In terms of numbers 
alone, the transsexual/transgender community is very small - and it could disintegrate 
further as we begin to see fractures between those who identify as transsexual and those 
who identify as transgendered. Instead, perhaps an analogy for a more politically 
productive relationship between the trans and gay/lesbian communities can be drawn 
from Rita Felski's writing about 'hybridity' in the case of post-colonialism and the 
nomadic subject. As she states: 
Metaphors of hybridity and the like not only recognize differences within 
the subject, fracturing and complicating holistic notions of identity, but also 
address connections between subjects by recognizing affiliations, cross- 
pollinations, echoes, and repetitions, thereby unseating difference from a 
position of absolute privilege. Instead of endorsing a drift toward an ever 
206 
greater atomization of identity, such metaphors allow us to conceive of 
multiple, interconnecting axes of affiliation and differentiation. Affiliation, I 
would stress, does not preclude disagreement but, rather, provides its 
precondition; it is only in the context of shared premises, beliefs, and 
vocabularies that dissent becomes possible (Felski, 1997: 12). 
Thus, her argument is not to valorize or essentialize hybridity as a new formulation for 
the radical or subversive, but to recognize `cultural impurity as the inescapable backdrop 
of all contemporary struggles' (1997: 15). Perhaps then, the most effective political aim 
for the trans-community would be to actively engage in challenging heterosexist and 
normative gender epistemologies, rather than concentrating efforts on attempting to 
demarcate the infinitely blurred ontological boundaries between gender and sexuality. 
In the next, and final, chapter I draw together the themes that have been discussed 
throughout this thesis, making conclusions and recommendations for future research and 
political practice. 
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Conclusions, critical reflections and developments 
... the ability of traditional gender systems to absorb, or even 
require, such forms of gender-crossing as transsexualism leads us 
to a more sophisticated appreciation of the power of gender as a 
principle of social and cultural order. While transsexualism reveals 
that a society's gender system is a trick done with mirrors, those 
mirrors are the walls of our species' very real and only home. 
Judith Shapiro, Transsexualism: Reflections on the Persistence of 
Gender and the Mutability of Sex, (1991: 24) 
We all tell stories. The participants in this study told stories that involved immense 
change, movements from one embodied gender to the other. Some had completed their 
journey, whilst others were only just beginning. One had decided to occupy an alternative 
space, for now at least, undecided about how willing she was to embrace the requisite 
shifts in body morphology and social status. Some held on rigidly, defensively even, to 
their new found liberation, contrasting sharply with those who wanted to incorporate 
notions of gender transgression, self-fluidity, ideas and feelings about their previous 
embodied selves into their self-narratives. And, all of these stories were both tainted and 
enlightened by experiences of their previous gender manifestation. Unequivocally, these 
participants' lives are scarred by the tragedy and bitterness inherent in profound self- 
confusion; social stigma; dislocation; non-conformity provoked anxiety and a failed 
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sense of belonging to the world. However, while their long hard struggles were 
frequently marked by loss - of familial relations, friends and lovers - their stories were 
also peppered with references to hope, happiness and the future. That future offered the 
resurgence of a life sutured together in a style reminiscent of their surgically altered 
bodies. These are bodies that are marked by-past life, past gender and past suffering: yet 
also bodies that provide for new lived experiences that are now beginning to work for 
them. We all tell stories. But, perhaps, our most difficult task is to formulate a story that 
will make our lives that little bit easier to live. In this final chapter, I draw together the 
disparate strands of the thesis, critically reflect upon the themes that emerged from the 
analysis, making recommendations for future research and political practice. 
In Chapter One I traced the emergence of transsexual identity from the auspices of 
sexology during the last century. Thus, transsexualism has always been symbiotically 
tied to the medical conceptualization of homosexuality, albeit more dependent upon the 
medical establishment for hormones and surgical treatment. Critics of the medical 
construction of transsexualism argue medical discourses of transsexualism simply 
regulate the binary gender system (Hausman, 1995; Wilton, 2000), rather than provide a 
"language adequate to express the disparate and diverse desires which lead them to body 
mutilation" (Billing & Urban, 1995: 112). But, whilst transsexualism lacks any degree of 
etiological grounding there will always be issues around diagnosis. Encouragingly, in 
recent times, it appears that the medical professions have responded to transgender 
politics revising clinical practice (Bockting & Coleman, 1992). The diagnostic criteria 
for transsexualism has undergone significant change since Billing and Urban first 
launched their blistering critique in 1982. As part of this process the emphasis is no 
longer upon surgical intervention as a cure-all for gender dysphoria. Yet, for those 
individuals set upon undertaking gender reassignment, the clinical and medical 
professions remain in the position of `gate-keeper', regulating their passage to new 
gender identities. However, I believe attempts to regulate and control access to surgical 
intervention have increasingly been underpinned by a genuine concern to provide the 
gender dysphoric individual with choices and strategies for living with a complex and 
fragmented gender identification (Di Ceglie & Freeman, 1999). 
Psychotherapy encompasses some of these strategies. Certainly, there is little evidence to 
suggest that psychotherapy can `cure' gender dysphoria (Stoller, 1975). But gender 
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dysphoric feelings, and the complexities of life that ensue for the transgendered or 
transsexual individual, can be addressed in a psychotherapeutic setting. The Standards of 
Care For Gender Identity Disorders (HBIGDA, 1998) recommends that each individual 
presenting with gender dysphoria undergoes at least a six month period of psychotherapy 
before commencing any other form of treatment such as hormone therapy. It is of 
particular concern that only a few of the participants in this study met this criterion. 
Whilst many had had contact with mental health professions at some point in their life, 
this was rarely with a practitioner who specialized in gender issues. After deciding to 
transition, most approached a private psychiatrist and, of these, all were prescribed 
hormones on either their first or second visit. Unless a system is in place for gender 
dysphoric individuals to discuss the options available to them with a therapist skilled in 
gender issues, reassignment surgery will remain the dominant trajectory. Moreover, 
psychotherapy currently has an undervalued role for these individuals post-transition. As 
we have seen in previous chapters, many transsexuals cannot simply `disappear' into 
their new gender identities. The aftermath of a radical shift in gendered embodiment 
unleashes its own set of problems; particularly the questions of how to negotiate previous 
gender history and past social relations and how to live in the new gender role when you 
do not always `pass'. These types of issues raise very real anxieties in the transsexual 
subject and ongoing access to psychotherapy may facilitate some degree of relief from 
these stresses. 
In Chapter Two I documented the twists and turns in gender theory from Simone de 
Beauvoir (1949) to present day accounts that attempt to theorize transsexual subjectivity. 
Judith Butler's (1990) notion of performativity has been central to these latter 
developments, precipitating both an outburst of 'queer' texts and the emergence of a new 
discipline 'trans-studies'. In Gender Trouble, Butler formulated a challenge against the 
ontological status of gender, arguing that 'being' is reducible to the form of 'appearing'. 
There is no ontological 'truth' to being male or female. Rather, every aspect of gender is 
performed. In her subsequent book, Bodies that Matter, Butler (1993) re-addressed the 
notion of gender construction by focusing upon the materialization of 'sex'. Here, Butler 
argued that the process of materialization "stabilizes over time to produce the effect of 
boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter" (1993: 9, emphasis in original). Thus, there 
is no 'real' male or female body, only an unattainable ideal to aspire to become. An ideal 
that is maintained through the reiteration and embodiment of gender norms cemented 
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together by heterosexuality. Following Butler's contention that all of our claims to `be 
male' or `be female' are a fiction, I argue that transsexuals are embroiled in much the 
same process of attaining a `sex' as non-transsexuals. Namely, Being Transsexual entails 
the ongoing process of becoming male or female - although more work must be put into 
unbecoming the sex which they wish to reject. 
However, some critics have continually raised the issue of Butler's apparent failure to 
acknowledge the limitations of the body, as well as its potential (e. g. Martin, 1992). This 
is particularly crucial in the case of transsexualism. As we saw in Chapter Six, 
transsexual subjects are disadvantaged in their quest to perform gender `realness'. This is 
because they are marked as previously embodied and biological beings. Whilst this may 
be traumatic for those individuals in their day-to-day interactions not `passing', or even 
refusing to `pass', it has opened up the possibility for new subjectivities. Bordo suggests 
that cultural transformation can only be affected by "real, historical changes in the 
relations of power, modes of subjectivity, the organization of life" (1993: 41). The 
concept `transsexualism' is certainly one such means of invoking cultural transformation: 
challenging the polarized gender system; offering new modes of gendered subjectivity 
and even new models of masculinity that will impact on present day power referentials of 
gender relations (Halberstam, 1998; Self, 2000). But, some transgender theorists (e. g. 
Rubin, 1998) have, legitimately, asked why transsexuals should be expected to challenge 
the binary gender system when so few of the rest of us do. Some feminists, like 
Raymond (1994) and Wilton (2000), are right to critique the medical concept 
transsexualism for upholding the binary gender system. But, transsexuals are also 
individuals trying to make sense of their own gender confusions; trying to create a sense 
of cultural belonging when gender remains a principal ordering factor (Shapiro, 1991). It 
is not their aim to knock down gender assumptions and it would be unrealistic for 
feminist and gender theorists to expect them to do so. 
More sympathetic to the plight of transsexuals are those theorists who are also 
themselves transgendered. Sandy Stone recognizes the fear that would, undoubtedly, be 
invoked in many transsexuals if they were to make themselves more visible, or embrace 
the notion of `being transsexual' and forgo attempts at `passing'. However, by the early 
1990's, she had championed the deconstruction of transsexuals seeming collusion with 
the binary gender system: 
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To deconstruct the necessity for passing implies that transsexuals must 
take responsibility for all their history, to begin to rearticulate their lives 
not as a series of erasures in the service of a species of feminism 
conceived from within a traditional frame, but, as a political action begun 
by reappropriating difference and reclaiming the power of the refigured 
and reinscribed body (Stone, 1991: 298). 
As we have seen from complex identification practices and discursive positions of some 
of the participants in this study, steps are beginning to be made, if only by a few, towards 
the incorporation of a differently gendered past within self-narratives. This has to be 
welcomed, for both the lived experience of individual transsexuals and the state of wider 
gender relations. 
Like Sandy Stone (1991), I am wary of the political ramifications of the desire to `pass', 
but I am sympathetic to the day-to-day existence of those who resist `coming-out' or, as 
Jay Prosser (1998) describes it, `undoing the realness' of the gender to which they have 
aspired. As was evident from the material presented in Chapter Five, many of these 
participants are attempting to construct a sense of `wholeness'. As Susan Hekman 
argued, "unity of self is both a difficult achievement and a necessary requirement for 
leading any version of a good and satisfying life" (2000: 299). Moreover, for a variety of 
social and economic reasons, it is not always possible and nor should it be expected that 
every trans-person inhabit the gender-borderlands, as `gender outlaws' as Kate Bornstein 
(1994) has suggested. Yet, the making `visible', the refusal to `pass' and the refusal to 
deny a differently gendered history, is the very route not only to understanding 
transsexual subjectivity, but also to making the transsexual a subject. 
Sifting through gender theory debates that frequently focused upon de-essentializing the 
ontological status of `woman' and `man', but then refused point blank to recognize the 
male or female transsexual's claim to these categories, has been vexing. Henry Rubin 
succinctly wrote that it is hardly surprising that "feminist and queer critiques of `trans' 
phenomena have coincided with generally acknowledged dead ends in debates on 
subjectivity and embodiment" (1998: 279). Perhaps one of the best examples of this can 
be drawn from Elizabeth Grosz's (1994) extremely informative text Volatile Bodies. A 
consistent thread in Grosz's (1994; 1995) argument is her concern with counteracting 
essentialist accounts of gender and ahistorical or biologically determined notions of the 
212 
body. Certainly, her phenomenological reading provides a nuanced, interesting and 
influential thesis for theorizing embodiment beyond a Cartesian dualist account. Yet, in 
one short paragraph where she discusses transsexualism conceptually, she reneges on her 
own principles by employing an essentialist account of sex differences to deny the male- 
to-female transsexual's claim to be woman: 
Men, contrary to the fantasy of the transsexual, can never, even with 
surgical intervention, feel or experience what it is like to be, to live, as 
woman. At best the transsexual can live out his fantasy of femininity -a 
fantasy that in itself is usually disappointed with the rather crude 
transformations effected by surgical and chemical intervention. The 
transsexual may look like a woman but can never feel like or be a woman. 
The one sex, whether male or female or some other term, can only 
experience, live, according to (and hopefully in excess of) the cultural 
significations of the sexually specific body. The problematic of sexual 
difference entails a certain failure of knowledge to bridge the gap, the 
interval, between the sexes. There remains something ungraspable, 
something outside, unpredictable, and uncontainable, about the other sex for 
each sex (1994: 207-208). 
Like Henry Rubin (1998), Grosz's seeming retreat under the epistemological mantle of 
essentialism surprised me. In this extract, contrary to her general thesis, the transsexual 
woman's failure to ever "feel like or be a woman" implies an inherent female `essence' 
that is only available to biological women. Grosz argues that this is inconsistent with the 
"fantasy" of the male-to-female transsexual who, wrongly, assumes that they "experience 
what it is like to be, to live, as woman". Rubin is correct to "object to Grosz's 
misrepresentation of transsexual projects and the easy way that transsexuals are criticized 
for using essentializing strategies, while she deploys her own essentialisms freely to 
support her feminist agenda" (1998: 275). As was illustrated in Chapter Five and Chapter 
Six, the participants' relationship to the categories `male' and `female' were not so 
straightforward. Certainly, some of them did claim to 'be male', or 'be female'. But, for 
many of the participants, a conscious awareness of the fragility of their claim to a new 
gender identity was evident in their narrative accounts. The following extract taken from 
an interview with Emily reiterates this point: 
We're not umm, in the case of male-to-female, we're not natural born 
women nor will we ever be so and the kind of sense and feeling of 
womanhood is the closest approximation to how er we are ourselves rather 
than actually being a woman (K: right) and so from that context I kind of 
feel that (.. ) we should as a body kind of accept and understand ourselves as 
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transsexual rather than necessarily as women (.. ) because we're never quite 
there and you know, I can't tell you what it feels like to be a woman, all I 
know is that's the closest association umm in rigid gender terms (Emily, 
MtF, 33,1/99-106). 
As I have continually stressed throughout this thesis, all too often many feminists are 
quick to theorize transsexualism conceptually, and slow to engage with the actual 
experiences of those who identify as transsexual. The emergence of `trans-studies' has 
begun to provide much needed nuanced accounts of the experiences of those who live, 
often uncomfortably, at the gender margins. Feminist theorists have traditionally been at 
the forefront of gender research constructing anti-essentialist, anti-biologically reductive, 
historically and culturally located accounts of sex and gender. But, if they are to remain 
there, they need to actually engage with the phenomena they write so well about. In the 
light of recent theoretical developments, it should no longer be acceptable to read crude 
accounts that group together "cosmetic surgery, transsexual surgery, dieting and high- 
heel shoes" as practices of self-mutilation (Jeffreys, 2000: 410) - one example amongst 
many. 
Feminist psychologists have a particular role to play in this process. Whilst sexual 
politics are important, as psychologists, I believe it is also important to engage with and 
attempt to theorize `psychological' phenomena that may not necessarily fit with our own 
political agendas. As I suggested in Chapter Three, perhaps the paucity of research by 
feminists investigating the experience of being transsexual is due, at least in part, to the 
impact of radical feminist politics. However, I am convinced the narrative accounts of 
those who identify as transsexual or transgendered will continue to provide a fruitful site 
for addressing many of the most pressing issues for feminist psychologists: questions of 
`sex', `gender' and `sexuality'; as well as `subjectivity', `embodiment' and 
`intersubjective gender relations'. I believe this thesis contributes to this process. 
The notion of researching and theorizing embodied subjectivity became a central concern 
when formulating an appropriate methodological approach for this research. Certainly, 
most of the dilemmas incurred during this project resulted from trying to attend to the 
complexities of embodied subjectivity and the notion of an interior life, a psyche, whilst 
using a discursive methodology. In Chapter Four I discussed the merits and limitations of 
a discursive analysis for researching embodied subjectivities. Like those theorists I have 
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subsequently come to critique, I began the research with the intention of concentrating on 
identifying discourses that construct transsexualism (e. g. Hausman, 1995; Wilton, 2000). 
However, during the analysis I was continually struck by the richness of the interview 
accounts, and how difficult it was to deconstruct these without losing the transsexual 
subject. Attempting to theorize embodied subjectivity using a methodological tool that, in 
most of its guises, quite openly denies any interest in internal states can be hugely 
frustrating. At this point I began to draw upon alternative methodological approaches, 
incorporating aspects of phenomenology (Csordas, 1999), and psychoanalysis (Hollway, 
1989; Hollway & Jefferson; 2000) into the analytic procedure. 
If I were to start this project again I would, in all likelihood, move further towards a 
narrative analysis. This is not to suggest that a narrative analysis would be problem free. 
As Naomi Scheman (1997) points out: 
People do not remember everything that happens to them, and culturally 
available story lines help give shape to the stuff of some lives (make them 
"memorable") while leaving others gappy and jerky. Narrativity per se may 
be humanly important, but we have no access to narrativity per se: What we 
have are culturally specific narratives, which facilitate the smooth telling of 
some lives and straitjacket, distort, or fracture others (Naomi Scheman, 
1997: 126). 
Many of these participants' lives are straitjacketed, distorted and fractured by their 
radical swing across gender identifications. Whilst, for most of us, beliefs, attitudes and 
aspirations are accepted as sometimes ephemeral, the one aspect of self-narrative that is 
expected to always cohere is our gender identity. Thus, for the transsexual, this often 
involves denying a differently gendered past. Or, as we saw in Chapter Five, if they wish 
to include aspects of their gender history into their self-narrative, this entails drawing 
upon powerful discourses, be they Cartesian dualist, biological or psychoanalytic, to 
account for continuity in self. A discourse analytic method is beneficial as it provides 
insight into the multiple and contradictory ways individuals use cultural concepts to 
make sense of their social world. However, Harriet Bjerrum Nielson asks, "whether one 
can grasp the other side of the dialectic between the individual and the social without a 
psychological perspective". This would entail not only attending to "how people make 
use of cultural concepts to construct themselves and their social world, but also how such 
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personal constructions may give rise to cultural and social change" (1999: 46-47, my 
emphasis). 
Nielson argues that when we create specific texts we do not only make sense of what 
goes on around us: we also make sense of our internal, unconscious passions and 
sufferings (1999: 50). Thus, she incorporates a psychoanalytic reading alongside a deep- 
hermeneutic cultural interpretation of narrative accounts, seeking out "`black holes' as 
sites for self-constructions". Drawing upon others, Nielson distinguishes between a 
psychotherapeutic interpretation in therapy (which aims to provide insight and change the 
analysand) and the eliciting of unconscious structures that permeate symbolic forms in 
order to "understand how unconscious desires and cultural activity are intertwined" 
(1999: 71). Our lives may indeed be constructed to conform to a particular historical 
time, but this self-construction is always underpinned by emotions, dreams, desires and 
fantasies. Furthermore, she argues social constructionist accounts that concentrate solely 
on discourse, theorizing how discourse mediates change in `conceptions of self', will fail 
to grasp that subjectivity is also open to temporal change. Thus, in a style not that 
dissimilar from Hollway and Jefferson (2000), Nielson suggests that subjectivity can only 
be properly theorized through attention to unconscious structures. Consequently, 
autobiographical accounts may provide an insight into how a narrator can contribute to 
cultural transformation via the impact of their symbolic behaviours, which can be elicited 
from story telling or embodied practices. 
My frustrations with discursive psychology led me to examine psychoanalytic theory 
during the final stages of this thesis. My understanding of the diverse range of 
approaches remains slight. However, it seems likely that future research which draws to a 
greater degree upon psychoanalytic conceptions may provide a fruitful means for 
illuminating the discursively inaccessible processes at play in transsexual subjectivity, 
and the potentials these pose for the cultural transformation of gender relations. As 
Patricia Elliot and Katrina Roen suggest: 
... sexuality and psychic life cannot be understood with historical tools alone. To do so is to produce a limited reading that cannot adequately theorize a 
given subject's relation to his/her own embodiment, to unconscious desire, 
and to the particular history of a subject's own psychic life. Psychoanalysis 
offers us the tools for another kind of reading, a reading that does not make 
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other readings irrelevant or wrong but that does pose other sorts of questions 
(Elliot & Roen, 1998: 246). 
To reiterate Adam Phillips, "[P]sychoanalysis, as theory and therapy, can never be 
useful... as a way of putting us closer to the Truth. But it can be useful in the way it adds 
to our repertoire of ways of thinking about the past" (1994: 67). And, I might add, the 
future. 
8.1 Implications for political practice 
These are, predominantly, apolitical times. But, the politicization of the `trans' 
movement has resulted in an increased profile and, I believe, to some degree, a greater 
awareness of the phenomenon `transsexualism'. However, the political strategies 
employed by Press for Change in the UK are underpinned with a deep conservatism. 
This has implications for a more nuanced understanding of transsexual embodied 
subjectivity. 
Throughout the thesis I have illustrated how Cartesian dualist discursive constructions 
permeate the representations of transsexualism found in both media and individual 
participants' accounts. It has been argued that the effect of deploying `born in the wrong 
body' and `having the brain of the other gender' as explanatory accounts for 
transsexualism serve to reinforce and reinstate that there are only two genders, male- 
masculine, female-feminine and that everyone must ascribe to one and only one of them 
(see Chapters One, Three and Five). Thus, transsexualism in these accounts is not radical 
or transgressive. Rather, it is the result of an unfortunate medical condition and 
reassignment surgery is available, not only to cure, but also to regulate a binary gender 
system. I have also endeavoured to show how transsexuals themselves attempt to move 
beyond Cartesian dualist explanations. For example in Chapter One, when asked if she 
was `born in the wrong body', Jackie attempted to explain that 'it wasn't that simple'. 
Alternative formations of transsexualism (see Chapter Five) and instances when 
transsexual subjectivity resists Cartesian dualist conceptions through practices such as 
incorporation gender history into self-narrative and refusing to `pass' have been 
suggested as effective ways to undermine the binary gender system. 
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However, the notion that transsexualism supports heteronormative gender relations can 
also be discerned from campaign material that aims to assure the right to change the birth 
certificate for those that identify as transsexual (see Chapter Four). Another excellent 
example of the deployment of `conservative discourse as political strategy' is 
exemplified in the media coverage that surrounded Stephen Whittle's 1996 case at the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Stephen Whittle fought, and eventually 
lost, a convoluted legal case at the European Court that attempted to secure his right to 
be recognized as the legal father of his partner's biological children, who were conceived 
after artificial insemination. The legal issue pivots on the notion that Stephen cannot be 
recognized as male whilst his birth certificate reads female. Whilst recommendations 
were made to the UK government to address this issue, the case was rejected because the 
European Court viewed it as a matter for the member state. The point here is certainly 
not to question Stephen's claim to be legally recognized as the guardian of his children. 
He has been there for them since they were born, he picks them up from school and plays 
a vital role in their upbringing (Self, 2000). However, I want to look at the way this case 
was represented in some media sources, and outline what it can tell us about how 
`transsexualism' is constructed, evaluating the discourses that are being mobilized in 
order to achieve political reform. 
In an article that is worthy of a far more detailed analysis than I have the space for here, 
Sarah Rutherford, Stephen Whittle's partner, provides an account of their situation: 
Both of us wanted children and a normal family life. Yet it seemed 
impossible... I never stopped loving Stephen, but I hated the complications 
he had brought to my life. What I disliked most of all was the feeling that 
society did not recognise our relationship... All Stephen and I want now - 
for our children's sake more than our own - is the right to marry one 
another. J, too, feel I am being forced into being a common law wife when 
I would like to be a proper one. Stephen has lived as a man and is now a 
father. Why can't he also be my husband? (Clare Campbell, Daily Mail, 9 
October 1996) 
This article is illustrated with two photos: one of Stephen and Sarah, and one of Stephen 
cradling their baby daughter. The caption reads "Sarah Rutherford and Stephen Whittle: 
Battling to have a normal family life". Stephen and Sarah's loving relationship and 
secure family home is deployed to appeal to the sensibilities of middle England in an 
attempt to attain political change. In this account, in contrast to parts of his self-narrative 
218 
he divulged to Will Self (2000), Stephen Whittle is the male version of Bayley in 
Coronation Street: inoffensive; conformist; an upholder of family values. But, this 
representation negates the complexities of many transsexuals situation. Instead, it 
reinforces the dominant heteronormative hegemonies, restricts the possibility of creating 
more ambiguous forms of gender subjectivity and keeps `unrecognized' relationships 
well and truly hidden. 
Similar trends towards a `media friendly' conservative style of campaigning for 
relationship recognition and sexual equality have also emerged from the gay community, 
under the banner of `virtually normal' (e. g. Sullivan, 1995). As Toby Manning laments: 
Rather than challenge the thinking behind taxonomies of `deviant' and 
`normal', the gay response has been to try and prove its `normality' ... In 
order for these `positive images' of gayness to be easily understood by the 
`straight' world, all `difficult' aspects of homosexuality are glossed over, 
and those whose lives place them slap in the middle of these difficulties are 
marginalized accordingly. Taken at random these difficulties include: 
sadomasochism, male promiscuity, transsexuality, bisexuality, tensions 
between lesbians and gay men, lesbian penis fantasies, and, simple self- 
loathing (1996: 100) 
As was shown in Chapter Seven, some transsexuals may object to being positioned as 
one aspect of homosexuality, preferring instead to aspire to fixing a claim upon the 
privileges of heteronormativity. Rather than join forces with the other "`difficult' aspects 
of homosexuality" or, more accurately, those marginalized individuals whose 
subjectivity falls outside of heteronormative hegemonies, some transsexuals, in the UK 
particularly, have begun to fight their own battles under the same `nearly normal' banner 
(see also Chapter Four). 
Whilst I understand the motivations behind Press for Change's style of campaigning, the 
opportunistic use of heteronormative discourses that fail accurately to represent the 
experiences of most trans-people may, in the long term, only serve to regulate modes of 
subjectivity for those with ambiguous gender subjectivities. This type of political 
strategy is as restrictive as those medical discourses of transsexualism that seek to fix 
gender ambiguity by pushing the gender dysphoric individual to identify as either male 
or female. By failing to represent the particularities of transsexual subjectivity, Press for 
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Change misses the opportunity to challenge the very structures of 'normativity' which 
make gender ambiguity an unlivable zone. With such criticisms in mind, Angel Juan 
Gordo Lopez has argued: 
... it is not enough to 
identify practices which regulate the body and gender. 
Coalitions and alternative alliances with people who participate in these 
practices should be strengthened. A high degree of coordination is needed to 
organize and mobilize those `cultural unintelligible categories' such as those 
people who want to retain their ambiguous sexual/gender identities within 
gender reassignment programmes. To legitimize these sort of locations we 
need stronger networks and relational analytical devices to mediate and free- 
associate in more efficient ways (1996: 191). 
In Chapter Seven, I argue for stronger political alliances between transgendered and gay 
and lesbian communities. This was, firstly, to provide an accommodating space where 
non-heteronormative sexual and gender identities can be tried on and played out, and, 
secondly, to facilitate a more effective challenge against heterosexist and normative 
hegemonies that regulate the permissible modes of gendered subjectivity for us all. I am 
aware that transsexual men and women do not have the same legal rights as biological 
men and women and that the success of political campaigns is often dependent upon a 
single political goal underpinned by the illusion of representing a monadic identity 
category. As Susan Hekman argues: "[A]mbigious, fluid identities don't fly in the 
political world or in courts of law. Thus, far from problematizing the connection between 
identity and politics as the theorists had hoped, identity politics has instead made 
embracing a specific, fixed identity a precondition for political action" (Hekman, 2000: 
297). However, like Wendy Brown (1995), I am wary of the ramifications if, and when, 
identity categories become tied to legal definitions. Undoubtedly, if transsexuals secure 
the right to change their birth certificate, this right will be predicated upon particular 
conditions. Most obviously, as is the case in other countries, this will entail having 
completed gender reassignment surgery. This leaves little room for ambiguity and has 
significant implications for the choices and gender trajectories open to gender dysphoric 
individuals. 
220 
8.2 Concluding overview 
In this thesis I have argued that Being Transsexual involves the ongoing process of 
becoming male or female. As illustrated in Chapter Six, shifts in embodied gendered 
subjectivities can be profound, but memories of a past existence, often lying dormant, are 
never far from casting long shadows of doubt over seemingly secure identifications. An 
old photograph, a random meeting with a past acquaintance, a slip of pronoun by a life- 
long friend, not to mention the physical markings of a previous embodied being can all 
violently unpick a new found sense of self. But, these other selves need not always be 
our undoing as they can also facilitate our understanding of both selves in transition and 
the politics that underpin this. As Adrienne Rich elegantly scribed: 
It can be difficult to be generous to earlier selves... Yet how, except through 
ourselves, do we discover what moves other people to change? ... A more 
politicized life ought to sharpen both the senses and the memory (Rich, 
1986: 223). 
Yet, throughout the chapters of this thesis I have traced the appeal of biological 
explanations for transsexualism that perpetuate conservative politics and implicitly deny 
any notion of a prior gendered self. But, as Gayle Rubin argued in 1984: 
... human sexuality 
is not comprehensible in purely biological terms. Human 
organisms with human brains are necessary for human cultures, but no 
examination of the body or its parts can explain the nature and variety of 
human social systems. The belly's hunger gives no clues as to the 
complexities of cuisine. The body, the brain, the genitalia, and the capacity 
for language are all necessary for human sexuality. But they do not 
determine its content, its experiences, or its institutional forms. Moreover, 
we never encounter the body unmediated by the meanings that cultures give 
to it (Rubin, 1984: 276). 
Seventeen years later, this begs the question why are we still puzzling over the same 
critiques. Gender is not innate, nor biologically determined. The evidence from this 
thesis illustrates that gender identity is played out through social, cultural and material 
practices. In order to manifest as their desired gender identity these participants had both 
to learn new ways and shake off old habits of gendered embodiment. They were not 
simply born that way: they had not always been male or been female. Furthermore, many 
recognized the impossibility of ever achieving their desired male or female identity. 
What this tells us is something of the cultural force of gender. Some of us arc in the 
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privileged position of only occasionally feeling ambivalent about our gender identities. 
Whilst, for others, gender proves an unlivable zone. But, more than this, it illustrates how 
gender, as a cultural ordering factor, has come to dominate the current social and 
historical landscape. 
Perhaps, this is why the phenomenon `transsexualism' is, to many, both abhorrent and 
fascinating. Transsexualism opens up the possibility of a different gender position for us 
all. Moreover, as Will Self (2000) and some of the FtM participants argued, it might even 
lead to better gender relations by offering, in this case, a different model of masculinity. 
Certainly, as those critics of the medical construction of transsexualism argue, 
transsexualism does aid in the maintenance of a polarized binary gender system. But, and 
this is an important but, in its very existence it also undoes our certainty in the 
immutability of our pre-destined gendered being. Perhaps, and it already seems 
imminent, we will see increasing numbers of men presenting for reassignment surgery 
(Press for Change, 2000). This is not because of an epidemic of supposed birth defects, 
but because of the ongoing investment in and valorizing of dominant images of 
masculinity and some men's increasing, and rarely spoken, anxieties about their ability to 
meet these. Likewise, for FtM transsexuals, whose gender anxieties must also have been 
unconsciously mediated by their ability to slot into the social and cultural structures of 
femininity, always and already filtered through power differentials, explanations that 
attempt to ground transsexualism within biological discourses remain the most popular. 
This is because biological explanations reinscribe a feeling of gender certainty. 
Conversely, for the non-transsexual, the practice of representing the transsexual as a 
`freak', `weirdo' or `psycho' allays our own gender anxieties that the mere existence of 
the phenomenon unleashes. As Milan Kundera suggests, "possibility shadows every 
single person and changes the nature of his [sic] life; for... any new possibility that 
existence acquires, even the least likely, transforms everything about existence" (1996: 
36, my emphasis). 
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Appendices 
1 Recruitment material 
1(a) Recruitment Leaflet distributed at 2nd International Transgender Film Festival 
GENDER RESEARCH PROJECT 
Calling MtF and FtM transsexuals who would 
like to partake in a research study that aims to 
provide an informative and diverse account of 
transsexual experience. 
If you are interested in discussing your own 
personal account of transition, as well as more 
general notions of masculinity, femininity, 
manhood and womanhood 
then contact 
Katherine Johnson 
Middlesex University, Enfield, EN3 4SF 
Tel: 0181-362654 (work) 
Tel: 0181-8027603 (home) 
or email: K. Johnson@mdx. ac. uk 
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1(b) Advertisement slip in FM newsletter, Boys Own 
I am a PhD student at Middlesex University currently researching 
transgendered/transsexual identity. I would like to discuss with both gay and 
heterosexual identified F-T-M's topics including: experiences of the reassignment 
process; gender terminology and sexual orientation; and finally perceptions of how 
TG/TS identity is represented in the media. If you would be interested in taking part, 
please contact Katherine Johnson, tel: (work) 0181 3626654, (home) 0181 8027603; or 
email me at K. Johnson@mdx. ac. uk 
1(c) Advert in The Pink Paper 
Transsexual/Transgender Research Project: 
PhD researcher needs to hear from 
MtF/FtM TS's/TG's. Please call Katherine 
for more information, 0181 8027603. 
Email: K. Johnson@mdx. ac. uk 
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2 Semi-structured interview schedules 
2(a) Interview 1: Media and Legal representations 
Thank you for agreeing to speak with me about your experience of being transsexual. 
Our conversation will be tape recorded and then transcribed. Your name will be 
changed in order to protect anonymity. You are welcome to choose your own name 
for the purpose of this study, or I will pick one for you. If, for any reason, you would 
rather not answer one or some of the questions, please say so and we will leave them 
out. Similarly, if at any point you would like to terminate the discussion just say so. I 
may use some material from the transcripts for publication and, of course, you are 
welcome to have copies. 
Introduction 
How old are you? 
How long has it been since you had reassignment surgery? 
Transsexuals in Society - Media and Legal representation 
Media 
What is your favourite television programme? 
Why? 
What newspapers and/or magazines do you read? 
What is about them that you like? 
Can you remember and describe any newspaper articles about transsexuals that you 
have particularly liked? 
Why did you like them? 
Did you feel they related to your own experience in anyway? (can you explain how? ) 
Have there been any newspaper articles about transsexuals that you have particularly 
disliked, or objected to? 
What was it in particular that you objected to/disliked/upset you? 
How did it make you feel? 
In what ways would you have liked to change the article? 
Can you remember and describe any television programmes about transsexuals that 
you have particularly enjoyed? 
What was it about them that you liked? 
Did you feel they related to your own experience in anyway? (can you explain how? ) 
Can you describe any television programmes about transsexuals that you have 
particularly dislike? 
What was it in particular that you objected to/disliked/upset you? 
How did it make you feel? 
In what ways would you have liked to change the programme? 
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How do you think transsexuals are portrayed in the media? 
Do you think the media coverage of transsexualism increases peoples understanding 
of transsexuals? (in what ways? can you give any specific examples? ) 
Do you think that the media coverage of transsexuals is an accurate portrayal of 
things that occur in your own life? (in what ways? can you give any specific 
examples? ) 
Can you think of ways any media coverage has been of particular benefit to you? (in 
what ways? can you give any specific examples? ) 
Has there been any coverage you feel has had a detrimental effect on you or your 
experiences? (in what ways? can you give any specific examples? ) 
Law 
What is your understanding of the legal position of transsexuals? 
What affect does this have on your life? 
Have you had any detrimental experiences due to the legal positioning of 
transsexuals? 
Can you describe what happened? How did you feel? 
What aspects of the law would you like to see changed? (birth certificates, marriage, 
parenting? ) 
What involvement do you have with groups such as Press for Change? 
Does their work have an important affect on your life? 
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2(b) Interview 2: Changing Identities MtF participants 
Transsexualism 
What do you think it means to be a transsexual? 
What does the term transsexual mean to you? 
Is it a term you identify with? (why/why not? ) 
Are there any situations in which you would prefer NOT to identify as transsexual? 
(why? ) 
Do you think to identify as a transsexual gives a full enough representation of 
yourself? 
Are there any other terms you would prefer to identify as? 
What does the term gender dysphoric mean to you? 
In what ways do you feel it differentiates from the term `transsexual'? 
Is it a term you have, or would use to represent yourself? 
When? In what situations? 
Sexuali 
Can you describe your first crush? 
Can you describe when you first became aware of sexual feelings? 
How would you describe your sexual orientation? 
Have you ever questioned that? 
In what ways? 
Has your sexual orientation changed since your reassignment? 
How do you feel about that? 
Is your sexuality important to your identity in any ways? 
Do you feel your sexual orientation has any influence on your life? 
Has your sexual orientation been affected by being a transsexual in any way? 
Did your sexual orientation have influence on your reassignment process? 
Is your identity as a transssexual affected by your sexual orientation in any way? 
For those who identify as lesbian 
Is it something that you are openly out about? 
In all situations? 
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What situations are you less comfortable about being out? 
Do you socialise much in the lesbian scene? 
In what ways have you found members of the lesbian/gay scene to be 
supportive/accepting of transsexuals? 
Have you had any un-supportive or non-accepting experiences with members of the 
lesbian/gay scene? 
Do you or would you use methods to divert attention from your sexuality? 
If so what/why? 
How do you feel about this? 
M-T-F's on women 
What do you think it means to be a woman? 
What does it mean to you to be a woman? 
In what ways do you express yourself as a woman? 
What do you think it means to be feminine? 
How important do you think femininity is to being a woman? 
In what ways? 
How important do you believe appearance is to femininity? (e. g. clothes, make-up, 
physique) 
In what ways do you feel you express femininity? 
In what ways is being perceived as feminine important to your identity? 
Do you ever take your femininity for granted? 
Do you ever feel unfeminine? 
In what ways? 
Is it something that concerns you? 
Do you ever feel masculine? 
In what ways? 
Is it something that concerns you? 
How do you view femininity in others? 
Is it something you find attractive/unattractive, like/dislike? 
Do you see femininity as a positive/negative quality? Why? 
In what ways do you feel women might reject femininity? 
How do you feel about women who do? 
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M-T-F's on men 
What do you think it means to be a man? 
Have you ever felt that you were a man? 
In what ways? 
Have you ever tried to be a man? 
How? In what ways? 
Do you think it was effective? 
How did this make you feel? 
What do you think it means to be masculine? 
How important do you think masculinity is to being a man? 
In what ways? 
How important do you believe appearance is to masculinity? (e. g. clothes, physique) 
Do you think you have ever been masculine? 
In what ways? 
How do you view masculinity in others? 
Is it something you find attractive/unattractive, like/dislike? 
Do you see masculinity as a positive/negative quality? Why? 
In what ways do you feel men might reject masculinity? 
How do you feel about men who do? 
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2(c) Interview 2: Changing Identities FtM participants 
Transsexualism 
What do you think it means to be a transsexual? 
What does the term transsexual mean to you? 
Is it a term you identify with? (why/why not? ) 
Are there any situations in which you would prefer NOT to identify as transsexual? 
(why? ) 
Do you think to identify as transsexual gives a full enough representation of yourself? 
Are there any other terms you would prefer to identify as? 
What does the term gender dysphoric mean to you? 
In what ways do you feel it differentiates from the term `transsexual'? 
Is gender dysphoric a term you have or would use to represent yourself? 
When? In what situations? 
Sexuali 
Can you describe your first crush or when you first became sexually aware? 
How would you describe your sexual orientation? 
Have you ever questioned that? 
In what ways? 
Has your sexual orientation changed since your reassignment? 
How do you feel about that? 
How important is your sexuality to your identity? 
What influences do you feel your sexual orientation has on your life? 
Is your sexual orientation affected by being a transsexual? 
Did your sexual orientation have an influence on your reassignment process? 
Is your identity as a transssexual affected by your sexual orientation in any way? 
For those who identify as gay 
Is it something that you are openly out about? 
In all situations? 
What situations are you less comfortable about being out? 
Do you socialise much in the gay scene? 
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In what ways have you found members of the gay/lesbian scene to be 
supportive/accepting of transsexuals? 
Have you had any un-supportive or non-accepting experiences with members of the 
lesbian/gay scene? 
Do you or would you use methods to divert attention from your sexuality? 
If so what/why? How do you feel about this? 
F-T-M's on men 
What do you think it means to be a man? 
What does it mean to you to be a man? 
In what ways do you express yourself as a man? 
What do you think it means to be masculine? 
How important do you think masculinity is to being a man? 
In what ways? 
How important do you believe appearance is to masculinity? (e. g. clothes, physique) 
In what ways do you feel you express masculinity? 
In what ways is being perceived as masculine important to your identity? 
Do you ever take your masculinity for granted? 
Do you ever feel unmasculine? 
In what ways? 
Is it something that concerns you? 
Do you ever feel feminine? 
In what ways? 
Is it something that concerns you? 
How do you view masculinity in others? 
Is it something you f nd attractive/unattractive, like/dislike? 
Do you see masculinity as a positive/negative quality? Why? 
In what ways do you feel men might reject masculinity? 
How do you feel about men who do? 
F-T-M's on women 
What do you think it means to be a woman? 
Have you ever felt that you are a woman? 
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In what way? 
Have you ever tried to be a woman? 
How? In what ways? 
Do you think it was effective? 
How did this make you feel? 
What do you think it means to be feminine? 
How important do you think femininity is to being a woman? 
In what ways? 
How important do you believe appearance is to femininity? (e. g. clothes, make-up) 
Have you ever tried to be feminine? 
In what ways? 
How do you view femininity in others? 
Is it something you f nd attractive/unattractive, like/dislike? 
Do you see femininity as a positive/negative quality? Why? 
In what ways do you feel women might reject femininity? 
How do you feel about women who do? 
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2(d) Interview 3: Autobiography - Telling your story 
The process of change 
Do you remember when you first heard the term `transsexual'? 
What did it mean to you? 
How did you feel? 
How old were you when you first thought it might relate to how you were feeling? 
How did you feel? 
Did you confide in anyone? 
Did you read many books about transsexuals? 
Were there any that had a particular effect on you? 
How long after this was it that you began the reassignment process? 
What did you do in this time? 
How did you cope with your feelings? 
How long did reassignment take you? 
Can you describe for me the stages you had to go through in order to get where you 
are now? 
How long did you have to live as a womanlman before you were allowed to have 
surgery? 
How often did you meet with clinical and medical staff? 
When did you begin hormones and how did they make you feel? 
What exactly did your surgical procedure involve? 
What was the most crucial part of the reassignment process for you? 
Can you describe the relationship you had with the psychiatrists involved in your 
reassignment? 
Were they supportive/understanding? 
Can you describe the relationship you had with the surgeons who did the operations? 
Were they supportive/understanding? 
Can you describe how you feel about your body now? 
What aspects of the surgery were you most pleased with? 
What aspects of the surgery are you most disappointed about? 
Do you plan to have anymore surgery? 
Can you describe the ways in which you feel you have changed since your 
reassignment? 
In what ways do you feel the sex reassignment has affected your health? 
Psychologically? Physically? 
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Social Networks 
Employment 
Were you working before you began the reassignment process? 
What did you do? 
Did you enjoy it? 
Are you working now? 
Do you enjoy your work? 
If not, how do you feel about that? 
Did you stay in your job during the reassignment process? 
Can you describe to me the reactions you received from your employer? 
Can you describe to me how your work colleagues reacted to your proposed 
reassignment? 
OR 
When did you stop working and why? 
Did you manage to find alternative employment? 
In what ways do you think reassigning has affected your employment prospects? 
Has your income been affected since having sex-reassignment? 
Has your career path been affected by having sex-reassignment? 
How does that make you feel? 
Friendships 
Do you know many other transsexuals? 
What kind of relationship do you have with them? 
Do you belong to any support groups? 
Which ones? Would you like to? 
In what ways was belonging to a support group important to you during your process 
of change? 
Is it as important to you now? 
Do you have many friends who are not transsexuals? 
Are some of these friends people who knew you before your reassignment? 
Can you describe to me how you went about telling them of your plans to reassign? 
What were their reactions? 
Are you open about being a transsexual with the friends you have made post- 
operatively? 
Can you describe to me how you went about telling them? 
What were their reactions like? 
Are their friends that you have lost because of your transsexualism? 
How does this make you feel? 
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Lovers 
Were you sexually active before you began the process of sex reassignment? 
In what ways did your perception of your body affect your sexual desire? 
Did you like having sex? 
Why? /Why not? 
Have you been sexually active since your reassignment? 
In what ways does your perception of your body as it is now affect your sexual 
desire? 
Do you enjoy having sex now? 
Why? /Why not? 
Were you in a relationship before you began the process of reassignment? 
Can you tell me about this relationship? 
What happened to the relationship? 
How do you feel about that? 
Are you in a relationship now? 
Can you tell me about this relationship? 
How do you feel about it? 
Would you like to be in a relationship? 
Why/why not? 
Can you describe to me the type of relationship you would like to have? 
In what ways do you feel being a transsexual affects your ability to meet potential 
partners (for sex or relationship)? 
Earl life 
Can you describe your earliest childhood memory? 
Do you remember your childhood as a happy time? 
In what ways? /Why not? 
Can you tell me about the time you spent at school? 
Did you enjoy it? 
Can you describe to me your experience of puberty? 
Can you describe how you felt about your body? 
Family 
Do you have any brothers of sisters? 
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What was your relationship like with them as children? 
How about now? How has your reassignment affected your relationship with them? 
What is your earliest memory of your mother? 
What is your earliest memory of your father? 
Can you describe the relationship you had with your parents as a child? 
What affect has your reassignment had on your relationship with your mother/your 
father? 
Have they been supportive/un-supportive at all? 
Is there anything about the relationship you have with your family now that you 
would particularly like to change? 
Is there anything about the relationship you have with your family now that you are 
particularly happy with? 
Do you ever have any doubts or regrets about having reassigned? 
Is there anything else you would have liked me to ask you about? 
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3 Transcription Notes 
(i) K: interviewer, occasionally referred to as KJ. 
(ii) (Albert, FtM, 59,2/23-26). This string indicates that the participant was Albert, he 
is 59 years old and that the extract was taken from interview 2, lines 23-26. 
(iii) (... ) pause in speech, each full stop indicates one second. 
(iv) so words that are underlined are emphasized in speech. 
(v) (hhh) represents laughter, the h's the longer the length of laugh. 
(vi) ... 
indicates omitted text. 
(vii) italics represents my emphasis. 
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4 Coding Frames 
(a) Coding Frame for MtF Interview analysis 
1 Transsexualism 
A What does it mean to be TS? 
To be Transsexual = born in the wrong body 
Transsexuals = brain/mind body dualism 
Transsexual = freak/weirdo/abnormal 
Transsexualism as distinct from transvestism 
TS= not a choice 
Transsexual as biological/birth defect/chromosomes 
Transsexual = psychological condition/non psychological 
Transsexual = medical condition 
To be transsexual = to be straight 
To be transsexual = to be gay 
Transsexual as cross-gender identification 
Transsexual as transitory category 
Transsexualism as ongoing process of change 
B Negotiating process of TS identification 
Identifying as Transsexual 
Resisting Transsexual identification 
Identifying as Transgendered 
Resisting identifying as Transgendered 
What does it mean to be transgendered? 
Identifying as Gender Dysphoric 
Resisting identifying as Gender Dysphoric 
Gender Dysphoria = transsexual 
Gender Dysphoria as distinct from Transsexualism 
C Her/History 
Realising/Discovering transsexualism 
Always known 
Acknowledging a differently gendered past 
Resisting a differently gendered past 
Reconceptualizing the past 
Accounting for delay in transition 
Cross-gender comparisons 
Distress 
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2 Sexual orientation 
A Transsexualism and sexuality 
Identifying as straight 
Identifying as gay/lesbian 
Identifying as bisexual 
B Transsexualism and heterosexuality 
C Transsexualism and lesbianism 
Problems of identifying as TS lesbian 
Doing lesbian 
3 Gender 
Gender determined by brain 
Gender determined by body/sex 
Gender determined socially/interpersonal relations/perceptions of others 
Childhood as un-gendered 
Rigid gender codes 
Gender conformity 
Gender as separate from sexual orientation 
Femininity/masculinity as traits separate from gender 
A What does it mean to be woman? 
Woman = to be me 
Woman = appearance 
Woman = to be emotional 
To be woman `in your head' 
To be woman defined by interpersonal relations 
B Becoming woman 
Identifying as woman 
Not being woman 
A mental transition 
Physical transition/embodying `woman' 
Social role 
Appearing/passing as woman 
C To be feminine 
Femininity and woman 
Femininity and sexual orientation 
Femininity and appearance 
Femininity as a bodily practice 
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Femininity as innate - the natural state of `woman' 
Subscribing to dominant images of femininity 
D What does it mean to be male? 
Male = penis/biology/physicality 
male = social role 
male = masculine 
E To be masculine 
masculine = power 
masculine = bodily practice 
F On being male 
Identifying as male 
Refusing male identity 
G On being masculine 
Rejecting masculinity 
4 Self and identity 
Being me 
Changing `selves'- new person 
5 The Body 
On the body 
Puberty 
Hormones/biological changes 
Cultural practices of embodiment 
6 Social Relations 
Relating to other Transsexuals 
Support Groups - Transsexual & others 
Friendships 
Sexual relationships 
7 Media Portrayal of Transsexuals 
Sensationalising/simplistic representations 
Conservative discourses 
8 Medical/Psychiatric 
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4(b) Coding Frame for FtM Interview analysis 
1 Transsexualism 
A What does it mean to be TS? 
To be TS= born in the wrong body 
TS = brain/mind body dualism 
TS = in-between 
TS = freak/weirdo/abnormal 
TS= not a choice 
TS as biological/birth defect/chromosomes 
TS =psychological condition/non psychological 
TS = medical condition 
Transsexualism as a spiritual quest 
To be TS = to be straight 
To be TS = to be gay 
TS as cross-gender identification 
TS as transitory category 
TS as ongoing process 
B Negotiating process of TS identification 
Identifying as TS 
Resisting TS identification 
Identifying as Transgendered 
Resisting identifying as Transgendered 
What does it mean to be transgendered? 
Identifying as Gender Dysphoric 
Resisting identifying as Gender Dysphoric 
Gender Dysphoria = transsexual 
Gender Dysphoria as distinct from Transsexualism 
Gender dysphoria = confused about gender 
C Her/History 
Realising/Discovering transsexualism 
Always known 
Acknowledging a differently gendered past 
Resisting a differently gendered past 
Reconceptualizing past 
Accounting for delay in transition 
Cross gender comparisons 
Distress 
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2 Sexual orientation 
A FtM Transsexualism and sexuality 
Identifying as straight 
Identifying as gay/lesbian/queer 
Identifying as bisexual 
Questioning sexual orientation 
B Transsexualism and heterosexuality 
negotiating heterosexual relationships 
C Transsexualism and lesbianism 
D FtM Transsexualism and gay identity 
negotiating gay male relations 
3 Gender 
Gender determined by brain 
Gender determined by body/sex 
Gender determined socially/interpersonal relations/perceptions of others 
Childhood as ungendered 
Rigid gender codes 
Gender conformity 
Gender separate from sexual orientation 
Femininity/masculinity as traits separate from gender 
Gender a choice 
B Becoming male 
Identifying as male 
Not being male 
mental transition 
physical transition 
transition in social role 
appearing/passing as male 
Embodying male 
C To be masculine 
masculinity = to appear male 
masculinity and sexual orientation 
masculinity and appearance 
masculine = to be protective 
masculinity and bodily practice 
masculinity and hormones 
masculinity as innate - natural state of male 
subscribing to dominant images of masculinity 
resisting dominant images of masculinity 
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D What does it mean to be woman 
Don't know 
woman = not me 
woman = to be feminine 
woman = social role 
E On being woman 
F On being feminine 
Femininity and appearance 
Femininity and sexual orientation 
4 Self and identity 
Being me 
Changing `selves'- new person 
Being the same person 
Questioning self identity 
Other identities 
5 The Body 
On the body 
Puberty 
Hormones/biological changes 
Surgery and desired physical changes to the body 
Cultural practices of embodiment 
6 Social Relations 
Relating to other Transsexuals 
Support Groups - TS & others 
Other Friendships 
Sexual relationships 
7 Media Portrayal of Transsexuals 
Sensationalising/simplistic representations 
Conservative discourses 
Media as informative 
8 Medical/ psychiatric 
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6 Glossary' 
Bilateral (double) mastectomy: surgical removal of both breasts 
Cross-dressing: dressing in clothing appropriate to the opposite sex 
Drag king: FTM cross-dresser, often packing (see) 
Ethinyl-oestrogen: synthetid female sex hormone 
FTM: female-to-male transsexual or transgenderist 
Gender bender: anyone crossing the gender line who is not concerned about appearing 
`convincing'. Also gender fuck: politicized cross-dressing, in both directions, 
emphasizing gender ambiguity and challenging traditional gender concepts 
Gender dysphoria: the condition of feeling uncomfortable with one's gender/sex 
Gender identity: one's sense of belonging to the male or female sex 
Hypothalamus: part of the brain above the pituitary gland 
Hysterectomy: surgical removal of the uterus (womb) 
Intersex: born with the (full or partial) sex organs of both anatomical genders or with 
underdeveloped or ambiguous sex organs. (Replaces the politically incorrect term 
hermaphrodite) 
MTF: male-to-female transsexual or transgenderist 
Packing: wearing a dildo or penile prosthesis 
Pass: to be seen as convincing in your preferred gender image 
Penectomy: surgical removal of the penis 
Phalloplasty: plastic or reparative surgery of the penis 
Read: when someone detects that an individual is transgendered 
Reassignment: procedure of gradual transformation from one gender role to the other; 
to usually takes several years and often culminates in surgical reassignment of the 
genital organs 
Transgender (TG): originally used to refer to full-time cross-dressers or non-surgical 
transsexuals, people who live and work in the opposite (of their physical anatomical) 
gender continuously. Now it is also used to refer to the group of all people who cross 
gender lines. Sometimes it is used as a synonym for transsexual. 
1 This glossary has been constructed from the glossaries found in Nataf (1996) and Walters & Ross (1986). 
264 
Transsexual (TS): anyone who wants to have, or has had, a sex-change operation. 
Transsexual's want to appear convincing in their new gender roles 
Transsexualism: Attempts of an individual to assume the physical characteristics of the 
opposite sex - the symptom complex of gender dysphoria 
- primary transsexualism: arising in childhood without any other underlying 
psychological or physical cause 
- secondary transsexualism: arising later in life, usually in late adolescence or early 
adulthood and secondary to some underlying psychological or physical condition 
Transvestism (TV): dressing in the clothes of the opposite sex, often associated with 
sexual excitement 
Vaginoplasty: construction of a neo-vagina 
